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Brian P. Jones 
 
Advisor: Stephen Brier 
“The Tuskegee Revolt: Student Activism, Black Power, and the Legacy of Booker T. 
Washington” is a historical study of a student movement that challenged prevailing educational 
and political ideas in the nation’s most ideologically important historically black university. The 
late 1960s student movement at Tuskegee Institute played a significant off-campus role in 
shaping local, regional, and national social movements and politics. In the process, these 
Tuskegee students turned their attention back on-campus, and attempted to radically revise their 
school’s educational framework. Founded by Booker T. Washington in 1881, Tuskegee Institute 
represents the origin of a particular (and recurring) political-educational-paradigm for black 
people: deferring aspirations for collective political and social transformation and instead 
emphasizing individual and personal change. Washington’s legacy has been debated 
exhaustively, but thus far has been represented as a debate between Washington and external 
figures (principally W.E.B. Du Bois). The student movement at Tuskegee Institute — which 
demonstrates a historic pattern of internal debate, dissent, and protest — has never been the 
subject of scholarly investigation. From the school’s founding in the late 19th century, Tuskegee 
students consistently questioned and at times openly challenged various aspects of Washington’s 
paradigm. The most significant student protests at the school erupted in the late 1960s, and 
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represent one of the most dynamic student movements in the South in these years. That 
movement provides a new vantage point from which to consider the legacy of Booker T. 
Washington. This study tells Tuskegee Institute’s history from the student perspective, explains 
the origins and dynamics of the 1960s movement, and attempts to understand the shifting 
political and educational ideas on the Tuskegee Institute campus in a historic moment of social 
conflict and change. For the first time, students at the institution Washington founded will have 
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Three days after Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis, 
Tennessee, on April 4, 1968, approximately three hundred members of the Alabama National 
Guard arrived at the gates of Tuskegee Institute, threatening to invade the campus. Their mission 
was to set free members of the Tuskegee board of trustees who were being held hostage by 
hundreds of students demanding curricular changes. In this standoff between students and 
soldiers, Tuskegee Institute joined the geography of global revolt in that incendiary year, 1968. 
Nearly fifty years later, however, few associate Tuskegee with these events, few remember the 
dramatic showdown on campus, or the dynamic years of student organizing on and off campus 
that preceded it. As an institution, Tuskegee has instead always been closely connected in public 
consciousness with the cautious politics of its founder, the nation’s most famous black educator, 
Booker T. Washington. After the defeat of Radical Reconstruction, when the prospects for black 
people to access formal education were bleak, Washington, then only 25, garnered support from 
wealthy and powerful white people— in the South and in the North — to create a Normal School 
for Colored Teachers in the town of Tuskegee, Alabama; the school opened its doors in 1881. 
The curriculum emphasized the morality and dignity of manual labor and deemphasized civil and 
democratic aspirations. Through the decades, Tuskegee grew in wealth and stature, and the 
modest teacher-training institute became a university.1 In the 1960s, however, Tuskegee began to 
develop a reputation as a center of somewhat less than cautious political thought and action. By 
1968, some of the most powerful white people in the state of Alabama openly loathed the school 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Tuskegee Institute had graduate programs in the 1960s, formally became “Tuskegee University” in 1984. I 
therefore use the historically accurate “Institute” designation, except when writing about the school in the present. 
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and feared that it was teaching “communism.” From the students’ perspective, they were trying 
to transform Tuskegee Institute from a “White” university to a “Black” one. 
 This dissertation, The Tuskegee Revolt: Student Activism, Black Power and the Legacy of 
Booker T. Washington, seeks to understand how and why the conflict between students, 
administrators, and ultimately, the state of Alabama, developed into such an extreme physical 
confrontation in April of 1968. Based on archival documents and interviews with former 
Tuskegee students, professors, and administrators, The Tuskegee Revolt also analyzes the 
meaning of this movement in relation to the political and educational legacy of the school’s 
founder. While some student activists imagined Washington as a forefather of their struggle, 
others saw their rapidly escalating movement and the ideas it produced as departures from his 
political-educational-paradigm. Following the murder of one their classmates by a white man 
off-campus two years earlier, Tuskegee student activists fought for change under the banner of 
“Black Power.” They insisted on the immediate and full exercise of democratic rights in their 
city and county. In the pages of the student newspaper, Campus Digest, Tuskegee activists 
interpreted their political work in terms of a new attitude toward blackness and explicitly debated 
the meaning of the word.  
 Their changing political views had pedagogical implications as well. Tuskegee students 
demanded the power to participate in shaping and reshaping their education. They wanted greater 
emphasis in the curriculum on African and Afro-American history and culture, and less emphasis 
on the dominant European and Euro-American history and culture. For some Tuskegee students, 
reconceiving their school’s purpose meant deprioritizing aspirations for individual advancement 
in white society in favor of larger collective visions for social change; for most students, I argue, 
making Tuskegee a “Black University” meant fusing the two. The content of their dissent reveals 
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the contradictory position of Tuskegee students in American society, particularly in the 1960s. 
As black students within the Jim Crow system, they were second-class citizens. They challenged 
manifestations of this status – inside and outside of the classroom – and aligned themselves 
accordingly with anticolonial revolts in Asia and Africa. As upwardly mobile students in a 
school with strong connections to centers of American wealth and power, however, they were 
offered significant opportunities for individual advancement. Like their postcolonial 
counterparts, Tuskegee student activists debated and discussed a wide range of answers to the 
question: How much has to change for us to be free?  
 By focusing on student activists The Tuskegee Revolt reveals a familiar and historically 
significant place – Tuskegee Institute – in a new light. From studying the student perspective, we 
learn that the campus was a site of greater political and educational contestation and a wider 
range of political and educational thought than is commonly understood. The Tuskegee Revolt 
thus contributes to scholarly research on Afro-American education history by showing that 
Booker T. Washington’s political and educational paradigms were not hegemonic – they were 
debated, contested, and challenged on the campus that he founded, from the late nineteenth 
century and throughout the twentieth century. Located almost exactly in the middle of the region 
known as the “Black Belt” (named after the color of the soil and the folks who worked on it), 
students at Tuskegee Institute were well placed to make major contributions to both the Civil 
Rights and Black Power movements. The Tuskegee Revolt builds on historical scholarship that 
emphasizes the continuity between these movement phases, and recovers the role of Tuskegee 
students in both. I argue that “Black Power” effectively meant “democracy” in Macon County, 
Alabama, in the 1960s. Whereas previous scholarship has celebrated civil rights battles and 
denigrated the student movement, I show that the latter was an essential and important 
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continuation of the former. Tuskegee students had a significant yet little-appreciated impact off-
campus, a process that politicized and radicalized them. Working to transform their world, 
student activists returned to their classrooms and found them intolerable.  In the late 1960s, as 
the “Black University” reform concept spread across the nation’s historically black colleges and 
universities (HBCUs), some of its first articulations came from Tuskegee. By making the bold 
choice in 1968 to confront the school’s trustees directly with their vision and demands, Tuskegee 
students gave us the clearest articulation of a long pattern of student dissent at an institution 
whose history is foundational for Afro-American history, education, and politics.  
 
Literature 
This dissertation is the first scholarly study of the Tuskegee student movement, but it 
builds most immediately on insights from two other closely related (yet very different) books. 
The only scholarly narrative of political activism at Tuskegee is Reaping the Whirlwind: The 
Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee by Robert J. Norrell, first published in 1998 and republished 
with an updated conclusion in 2013.2 In many ways this dissertation takes Reaping as a jumping 
off point, particularly as a stylistic model of historical narrative. Norrell tells the story of the 
struggle for voting rights in Macon County in the 1940s and 1950s, led by Tuskegee’s faculty. 
The star of Reaping the Whirlwind is Tuskegee professor Charles Gomillion, who patiently and 
systematically collected evidence of disfranchisement, leading to a landmark 1960 US Supreme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the whirlwind: the Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (1998; Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina, 2013). In 1958 the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith published a 46-page booklet on (what 
was at the time, incomplete) Tuskegee voting rights struggle: Lewis Jones and Stanley Hugh Smith, Tuskegee, 
Alabama: Voting Rights and Economic Pressure (New York: Anti-defamation League of B’nai B’rith, with the 
cooperation of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 1958). In 1984 Jessie 
Guzman published a 226-page non-narrative catalog of the structure and activities of the main organization leading 
the voting rights struggle: Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, Crusade for Civic Democracy: The Story of the Tuskegee Civic 
Association, 1941-1970 (New York: Vantage Press, 1984). 
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Court case, Gomillion vs. Lightfoot. Norrell connects the faculty-led voting rights battle with 
Booker T. Washington’s philosophy. Washington was correct, Norrell argues, to think “that 
political rights would indeed follow from economic power,” and thus the “Washington 
philosophy was vindicated, at least in its place of birth.”3 By mid-century, Tuskegee was in fact a 
center of black prosperity, as Norrell demonstrates. It was home to perhaps the largest 
concentration of black professionals in the United States at that time. The disposable income of 
Tuskegee’s black middle class — a resource that was essential to the Gomillion vs. Lightfoot US 
Supreme Court victory — actually developed in ways that had little to do with Washington’s 
prescriptions, however. Washington emphasized land and small business ownership, but 
Tuskegee’s black middle class grew on the basis of academic salaries underwritten by northern 
philanthropy and medical professional salaries at the Veterans Hospital paid by the federal 
government. Thus, the relationship between Washington and the later political activism of 
faculty and students is more complex, I argue. Furthermore, although Norrell rightly celebrates 
the voting rights victory, he does so in a way that downplays the student movement that grew in 
its wake. Whereas professors like Gomillion were patient and careful, Norrell paints the student 
activists as impatient and careless. The younger generation “tended to believe that change had 
come easily,” he writes. “Gomillion knew it had not.”4 Norrell focuses on Tuskegee’s faculty 
and the voting rights struggle, while this dissertation shifts our attention to Tuskegee’s students 
and their movement for Black Power and for a Black University. 
 The second book on the Tuskegee movement is by Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) leader James Forman. In the aftermath of the murder of Tuskegee student 
Sammy Younge, Jr. in 1966, Forman wrote Sammy Younge, Jr.: the first black college student to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind, x. 
4 Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind, 170.  
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die in the black liberation movement.5 Forman had helped to recruit Younge into the movement, 
was personally devastated by his murder. Whereas Norrell’s account is written from the faculty’s 
perspective, published decades after the events took place and attempts to celebrate and highlight 
an important civil rights victory, Forman’s text is student-centered, has the feel of immediacy 
(published just two years after Younge’s death) and is brimming with radical anger at 
Tuskegee’s faculty and administration. Much of the book consists of transcriptions of interviews 
Forman conducted with Younge’s family, friends, and with other activists (including Gwen 
Patton, George and Wendell Paris, and more), interspersed with Forman’s analysis of the events. 
Thus, it serves as both a primary source of contemporaneous eyewitness testimony in late 1960s 
Tuskegee and is also useful as a source of Forman’s theorizing about the southern student 
movement. The book’s final chapter is titled “Postscript: Rebellion ’68” and is comprised 
primarily of an extended interview with Michael Wright, the lead student organizer of the 
occupation of the trustee’s meeting in Dorothy Hall in April of 1968. That twenty-page 
postscript is the most extensive analysis of the 1968 Tuskegee student revolt published to date.  
 This dissertation makes use of many portions of Forman’s book, treating it as a primary 
source document, and understanding it as a product of its moment – the immediate aftermath of 
Younge’s murder and the high point of the global student movement. In 1968, for example, 
Forman and many of the students he quotes viewed Tuskegee’s administration as outright 
enemies. In Forman’s text, he and they direct significant ire at Tuskegee’s dean of students, 
Bertrand Phillips. But there is more to the story. For most of the 1960s, Dean Phillips was 
probably the most popular administrative figure on Tuskegee’s campus. Phillips spent countless 
hours in those years advocating for students and defending their right to protest in various ways. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 James Forman, Sammy Younge, Jr.: the first black college student to die in the black liberation movement (New 
York: Grove Press, 1968). 
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He created the Tuskegee Institute Community Education Program (TICEP), which sent students 
into the surrounding Black Belt counties to work as literacy tutors, a program which radicalized 
many participants. Part of the reason the Tuskegee student movement was so dynamic, I argue, 
has to do with the ways in which faculty and administrators opened the door to its growth in its 
early phase. Although I have a different approach to some of these questions, my analysis here is 
made possible by Forman and Norrell’s works. They are both indispensable starting points for 
this study. They are also, unfortunately, the sum total of books on political activism at Tuskegee. 
 Tuskegee is not the only campus more or less absent from social movement 
historiography. We are nearly fifty years past the high point of radical black student uprisings in 
the United States, yet there has not been a single book-length study of this phenomenon on a 
southern campus. Recently historians have explored black student organizing on northern, 
predominantly white campuses, and have conducted regional and even national surveys of black 
student organizing; no southern campus has been the focus of historical inquiry, however. Four 
of the most useful of the recent monographs are by Joy Ann Williamson (now Joy Ann 
Williamson-Lott), Martha Biondi, Ibram Rogers (now Ibram X. Kendi) and Jeffrey Turner. 
While Williamson and Turner make regional analyses (of black student organizing in Mississippi 
and in the South, respectively), Biondi and Rogers write on the national scale. In various ways, 
all of these studies acknowledge the importance of filling in the gaps of scholarly knowledge 
about the immense contributions of black students to political and educational developments in 
the second half of the twentieth century. 
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 Radicalizing the Ebony Tower is one of the most important contributions to this effort.6 
Whereas previous studies acknowledged the role of black students in the Civil Rights Movement, 
Williamson was among the first to take black students seriously as students, highlighting the 
continuity between their contributions to political movements and to educational transformation 
on eight historically black college campuses in Mississippi. Surveying black student movements 
“in the heart of Dixie” Williamson describes how students co-opted institutional resources and 
battled conservative administrators (white and black alike) in order to organize on their 
campuses. Although they have not received as much attention as activists at predominantly white 
campuses such as UC Berkeley in the same years, for example, Williamson argues that students 
carrying out boycotts at Mississippi Vocational and Alcorn State University “were extremely 
radical, particularly since they attended institutions under the thumb of racist white legislators 
and trustees, and sanctions, expulsions, and death threats occurred regularly.”7 Williamson also 
carefully attends to the varying dynamics and responses to activism on private and public 
campuses. Challenging the “private” power of liberal philanthropists could often be as 
challenging as bucking the “public” power of segregationist legislators, she argues.8 Her 
examination of the ways that public and private status simultaneously offered both protections 
and vulnerabilities to movement activists is useful for thinking about Tuskegee Institute, which is 
a hybrid of the two.9  
 Turner’s 2010 book on the southern student movement, Sitting in and Speaking out: 
Student Movements in the American South, 1960-1970, is unique in its regional focus and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Joy Ann Williamson, Radicalizing the Ebony Tower: Black Colleges and the Black Freedom Struggle in 
Mississippi (New York: Teachers College Press, 2008). 
7 Williamson, Ebony Tower, 61. 
8 Ibid., 112-3. 
9 Tuskegee was both public and private from its beginning — relying primarily on philanthropy but also receiving 
an annual appropriation from the State of Alabama. 
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fact that it analyzes student movements on both predominantly white and black campuses.10  
Turner identifies many broad patterns of black student organizing that are resonant with the 
events at Tuskegee Institute. Despite widespread use of the term “revolution” among student 
activists in the late 1960s, I find convincing Turner’s contention that the “thrust of southern 
student activism remained liberal in the sense that the activists pushed primarily for the reform 
rather than destruction of existing institutions.”11 He also suggests that many historically black 
campuses saw a great deal of unanimity between students and administrators in early years of 
off-campus Civil Rights activism, but tensions between the two groups tended to grow in the 
later part of the decade as students increasingly directed their energies at pursuing on-campus 
reforms. The story of the Tuskegee revolt certainly follows a similar pattern.  
I challenge Turner’s assessment of the 1968 building takeover at Howard University 
(which preceded Tuskegee’s by a few weeks) as “the fullest development to date of a combined 
student rights and Black Power movement on a black campus.”12 The Tuskegee student 
movement was more deeply connected to the southern roots of Black Power and actually 
achieved a more impressive list of reforms in the town and on campus. Turner’s account of the 
events at Howard, however, is based on a single book chapter that is almost fifty years old.13 
And, like Biondi and Rogers, when it comes to assessing the Tuskegee movement, Turner relies 
almost exclusively on Norrell and Forman. Essential as these two surveys are, we are overdue for 
original research on student movements at historically black colleges and universities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Jeffrey A. Turner, Sitting in and Speaking out: Student Movements in the American South, 1960-1970 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2010). “Unique” as a monograph, that is. See also, Robert Cohen, David J. Snyder, and 
Dan T. Carter, eds., Rebellion in Black and White: Southern Student Activism in the 1960s (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
11 Turner, Sitting in, 7. 
12 Turner, Sitting in, 182. 
13 Lawrence B. de Graaf, “Howard: The Evolution of a Black Student Revolt,” In Protest! Student Activism in 
America (New York: Morrow, 1970), 319–344. 
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 In The Black Revolution on Campus, published in 2012, Biondi recovers the social and 
educational imagination of black students in the late 1960s and shows that their vision for 
transforming higher education was far more expansive and redistributive than the current nature 
and status of programs born from their struggles (such as affirmative action and Black Studies) 
would suggest.14 She delves into black student organizing in San Francisco, Chicago, and New 
York and spends two chapters summing up the ways their movement played out in HBCUs. “In 
contrast to their conservative image,” Biondi writes, “black colleges were important incubators 
of leadership in the Black student movement throughout the entire decade of the 1960s.”15 
Biondi concludes that the black student movement opened greater space for subaltern discourses 
in higher education in general, including ethnic studies and women’s studies. Although popular 
consciousness often only recalls violent repression of white student activists in this period — 
particularly the murder of four white students by National Guardsmen at Kent State University in 
1970 — Biondi tells several stories of state violence on black college campuses: the “full-scale” 
police assault on Texas Southern University in Houston in 1967; the murder of three students at 
South Carolina State University in Orangeburg in 1968; a “combined ground and air offensive” 
against students at North Carolina A&T in Greensboro in 1968; the murder of two students at 
Jackson State College in Jackson in 1970; and the murder of two students at Southern University 
in Baton Rouge in 1972.16 Accordingly, when the Alabama National Guard entered Tuskegee’s 
campus in April of 1968, it was not an unreasonable assumption that the resulting confrontation 
might have been fatal. State repression is a crucial part of the story of the Tuskegee revolt. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Martha Biondi, The Black Revolution on Campus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). 
15 Biondi, Black Revolution on Campus, 6. Biondi mentions the Tuskegee student revolt in only one paragraph 
(pages 39-40), commenting, “Booker T. Washington might have rolled over in his grave if he knew what students 
were up to at the school he founded.” 
16 Ibid: 31-33, 159, 161, and 163-164. 
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 In 2012 — the same year Biondi’s Black Revolution appeared — Rogers published the 
most comprehensive study of the 1960s black student movement to date, The Black Campus 
Movement: Black students and the racial reconstitution of higher education, 1965-1972.17 
Attempting to summarize and describe a protest movement that covered perhaps one thousand 
campuses, Rogers’ account is full of fascinating details and insights. Following Jacqueline Dowd 
Hall’s reframing of the “long civil rights movement,” Rogers describes what he calls the “long 
Black student movement,” stretching back to the origins of higher education for black people at 
the end of the nineteenth century, but rising in strength in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.18 For 
Rogers (as for Hall), this move emphasizes the continuity of 1960s struggles with their earlier 
(and often, radical) antecedents. This genealogy of black student protest was essential to my own 
process of tracing the pattern of student activism across many decades at Tuskegee Institute. 
Rogers’s work also helped me to think about what was at stake in these battles. Biondi and 
Rogers summarize the goals of the 1960s black student movement as: increasing “Black” 
consciousness and exposing normalized “whiteness,” upgrading academic offerings and reducing 
paternalistic micromanagement of student behavior, and expanding student governance and 
power.19 In many instances, they also challenged what Rogers calls “ladder altruism” — the 
belief that personal advancement was the path to collective advancement.20 This tension between 
individual aspirations and collective ones is at the heart of the story of the 1960s Tuskegee 
student revolt as well. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Ibram Rogers, The Black Campus Movement: Black students and the racial reconstitution of higher education, 
1965-1972 (New York: Palgrave, 2012): 29; 4-5. 
18 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The long civil rights movement and the political uses of the past,” The Journal of 
American History 91, no. 4 (2005): 1233-1263. 
19 Biondi, Black Revolution on Campus, 142; Rogers, Black Campus Movement, 4-5. 
20 Rogers, Black Campus Movement, 5. 
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 These historical surveys have given us a sense of general patterns, but there has been no 
original research on the Tuskegee student movement. Biondi, Rogers, and Turner all 
acknowledge Tuskegee student activism in the 1960s, but their assessments are based on articles 
in The New York Times (Biondi), or on Norrell and Forman (Rogers and Turner). Tuskegee’s 
student movement is worth a closer look not only to correct this elision, but because of the 
school’s role in black history. Tuskegee Institute has been a lightening rod for controversy ever 
since its founding, and throughout the twentieth century it was a symbol of the political and 
educational horizons of Afro-Americans. As both a self-described model for black education 
nationally and a political “answer” to the so-called “Negro question” the school that Washington 
built served as a kind of Capitol of Black America for much of the twentieth century. 
Understanding the relationship between political activism and educational paradigms at 
Tuskegee is essential, and is not possible without looking more closely at — and, to some extent, 
rewriting — its institutional history. 
 My interest in Tuskegee’s 1960s student movement actually grew out of my reading of 
the literature on the school’s origins. Perhaps more than any other single volume, James D. 
Anderson’s masterful Education of Blacks in the South: 1860-1935, is directly responsible for 
this study.21 Anderson presents overwhelming evidence that the “Hampton-Tuskegee” model of 
schooling “represented the ideological antithesis of the educational and social movement begun 
by ex-slaves.”22 Whereas the freed people had self-organized schools from their own meager 
resources and used them to promote political literacy and preparation for political and economic 
action, the northern philanthropists who created the Hampton Institute (and later backed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 James D. Anderson, The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1988). 
22 Ibid., 50. 
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Tuskegee Institute) intended to train black people to accept subordinate roles in southern 
economic and social life. From the founding of both institutions into the late 1920s, neither 
Hampton nor Tuskegee were actual trade schools, “nor academic schools worthy of the name,” 
Anderson writes, “but schools that attempted to train a corps of teachers with a particular social 
philosophy relevant to the political and economic reconstruction of the South.”23 Samuel 
Armstrong, the founder of the Hampton Institute (and Washington’s mentor) stated the aim: “Let 
us make the teachers and we will make the people.”24 Although Anderson’s work focuses on the 
interests and motives of northern philanthropists, he also points out the resistance of students and 
parents within the “industrial” model. His description of the Hampton student strike in 1927 led 
me to search for evidence of similar actions at Tuskegee. Once I asked the question, I began 
seeing evidence of the long Tuskegee student movement sprinkled like breadcrumbs throughout 
the literature on Booker T. Washington. That evidence — including a Tuskegee student strike in 
1903 — is discussed in detail in the first chapter of this dissertation.  
 The legacy of Booker T. Washington remains a topic of no small importance to scholars 
and commentators in the twenty-first century. While Washington’s critics are legion,25 Michael 
R. West’s recent book, a critical reassessment of Washington’s 1903 autobiography, Up From 
Slavery, represents a novel attempt to engage with Washington’s intellectual legacy.26 
Washington, according to West, is not exactly the inventor, but is the most famous proponent of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Anderson, Education of Blacks, 94. 
24 Ibid., 62. 
25 See, for example: W.E.B. Du Bois, The souls of black folk (1903: New York: Bantam Books, 1989 edition); C. 
Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971); 
Donald Spivey, Schooling for the New Slavery: Black Industrial Education, 1868-1915 (Westport: Greenwood 
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Washington, Industrial Accommodation and Black Workers in the Jim Crow South,” Labor History, 44, no. 3 
(2003), 337-357. 
26 Michael R. West, The Education of Booker T. Washington: American Democracy and the Idea of Race Relations 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).  
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a “race relations” theory of racism. This theory suggests that racism is better understood as a 
problem of “relations” between people, and that black people’s self-improvement efforts would 
result in better “relations” with white people. Shifting the burden of blame for inequality onto 
black people is a long pattern in American thought.27 By reframing an issue of democracy and 
inequality as a matter of “relations” (and avoiding anything that would lead to “bad relations”), 
West argues that Washington followed in that poisoned tradition. And far from laying a 
foundation for later civil rights victories, West argues that it was precisely Washington’s “race 
relations” framework that Dr. King and his comrades had to overthrow.28 All over the South, 
activists who grew bolder in challenging segregation laws had to answer the charge that it was 
they who were causing problems by disrupting “good relations” between the races.  
A new trend in historiography shifts away from critique and attempts to exonerate 
Washington.29 The two-volume biography by Louis Harlan still represents the most well rounded 
assessment of Washington’s career to date,30 but salient among the new vindicationist literature 
is Norrell’s 2009 biography, Up From History: The Life of Booker T. Washington, in which he 
argues that Washington’s choices are explained by the political constraints of his era.31 If 
Washington advocated against open political agitation, Norrell shows that he carried on 
extensive civil rights advocacy behind closed doors — an approach I discuss further in the 
chapter one below. While West highlights Washington’s philosophical idealism, Norrell 
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emphasizes his philosophical materialism. When black people own banks, businesses, and are 
“manufacturing what the white man needs,” Washington wrote, “there will be no more lynchings 
in the South than in the North.”32 To the extent that Washington preached political abstention, 
Norrell believes that he more or less navigated the only course possible. Emphasizing the 
constant threat of political danger surrounding Tuskegee and physical danger surrounding 
Washington personally (“A Pinkerton guard was with him at all times…”)33, Norrell’s account 
builds sympathy with Washington’s precarious position, but is less compelling as an explanation 
for his career. In Norrell’s text, Washington is a less powerful figure than many other educators 
of lesser stature around him, and it is their choices that constrain him. But arguably the opposite 
is true — Washington’s choices were, of course, constrained, but in turn helped to shape the 
broader political landscape in which all other black educators operated. As the world shifted, 
Washington did, too, in certain ways. Beginning in 1912, Norrell notes, he became more explicit 
and assertive about the need for civil and political rights for black people, a stance he maintained 
until his death in 1915.34 
 This study is also deeply indebted to the work of the late historian Manning Marable. 
Marable’s scholarly writing about Washington and Tuskegee are all the more perceptive because 
of his intimate connections to the subjects. Marable’s parents grew up in Macon County, and he 
taught briefly at Tuskegee Institute in the 1970s. Two book chapters and two articles in particular 
have provided crucial guidance for thinking about Black Power in Tuskegee and the legacy of 
Booker T. Washington. In the two articles (both published in 1977, while he was still teaching at 
Tuskegee Institute) Marable catalogued the struggles over the meaning of Tuskegee Institute and 
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33 Ibid., 333. 
34 Ibid., 407. 
 
16 
the efforts of black elites in Macon County to follow in Washington’s footsteps after his death in 
1915. In “Tuskegee Institute in the 1920s” Marable illustrated the contradictions of an institution 
clinging to nineteenth-century cultural and intellectual ideals in an era of growing militancy and 
cultural renaissance among black people.35 In a second article, “Tuskegee and the Politics of 
Illusion in the New South,” Marable argues that these contradictions came to a head in the 1970s 
because black people captured political office, but not genuine economic power. “Without an 
independent political party,” he wrote, “and devoid of a critical political perspective, the black 
petit bourgeoisie of Tuskegee finds itself in a position of municipal power which increasingly 
means very little.”36 Marable concludes by drawing a parallel between the economic decline of 
Tuskegee under “Black Power” and the bitter post-colonial legacy of African independence. As 
discussed in chapters four and five below, this analogy played a particularly significant role in 
the Tuskegee student movement.  
Marable’s also brought his research on Washington and the Tuskegee Institute to bear on 
his analysis of the broad patterns of black political history and struggle. In two book chapters, 
from Black Leadership and from How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in 
Race, Political Economy, and Society, Marable’s class-conscious approach led him to pointed 
critiques of the efforts of the black elite to cultivate and develop political strategies rooted in 
their entrepreneurial aspirations.37 Whether or not their businesses succeed, the ultimate goal of 
political liberation of black people is destined to fail along these lines, he argued, because the 
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imperatives of the market and of profit making are incompatible with genuine human freedom.38 
Marable’s clarity in analyzing competing political and class tendencies in black thought has been 
an essential guide for this project.  
 That approach is particularly useful here because of the class nature of the story’s main 
characters. The Tuskegee Revolt is a narrative of the actions of a particular class – the black 
middle class. I use the term “middle class” to mean people who are neither the wage laborers 
who work as directed nor the owners of capital who set labor in motion, but are between the two. 
The middle class is composed of people who stand between capital and labor and share elements 
from both groups – small business owners, professionals, and managers who direct the labor of 
others, for example. In this sense, “middle class” is neither a subjective designation, nor a 
statement of absolute living standard, nor a moral approbation, but a way to label a very real and 
particular relationship to production and to society. In addition to Marable’s work, recent 
scholarship by N. B. D. Connolly and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor has helped me think about the 
unique attributes of the black middle class.39 As Kevin Gaines puts it, the black middle class has 
a “contradictory position as both an aspiring social class and a racially subordinate caste denied 
all political rights and protections, struggling to define themselves within a society founded on 
white dominance.”40 It is the concentration of black middle class people in Tuskegee, I argue, 
that explains the unique nature of the civil rights activism as it emerged there, led, in the first 
instance, by professors. When student activists came to the fore in the 1960s, they were both 
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propelled by the confidence, resources, and actions of their elders, and, at the same time, had to 
overcome the limitations of their cautious outlooks and methods. 
 Tuskegee’s middle class community was also uniquely placed geographically – in the 
middle of the Black Belt – and so Tuskegee student activists cut their teeth in the context of a 
dangerous battle for democracy there. Without a doubt the boldest organization working in the 
Black Belt was the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Through their 
experiences in the Deep South, SNCC activists radicalized quickly over the course of the decade. 
At least three Tuskegee students — Sammy Younge, Gwen Patton, and George Ware — played 
a leading role in SNCC’s history. Several important historical studies helped me contextualize 
the 1960s Tuskegee student movement. Howard Zinn and Clayborne Carson’s books remain 
important starting points for understanding SNCC’s origins in the sit-ins of 1960 and its political 
trajectory.41 SNCC leaders Stokely Carmichael and James Forman both spent considerable 
amounts of time in and around Tuskegee in those years, and their respective memoirs were 
consulted for this study.42 While these male figures captured many of the headlines, women were 
often playing less publicly acknowledged leadership roles in SNCC, as the personal accounts 
collected in a volume edited by Faith Holsaert, et al. attest.43 In a new book, Ashley Farmer 
develops a political genealogy of black radical women in the Black Power era — including 
SNCC — noting the ways in which they not only challenged sexism and patriarchy in black 
radical movements, but also theorized their oppression and expanded the meaning of radical 
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black politics over many decades.44 Gwen Patton’s long activist career — beginning at Tuskegee 
— is rightfully a prominent feature in both texts, a signal that her life and work is being taken 
seriously by a new generation of scholars.45 
 Patton is one of the figures whose story highlights the connection between southern 
student activism and the Black Power movement. Patton is one of many Tuskegee students who 
stepped off-campus to get involved in political struggles in the wider Black Belt. Some students, 
for example, who began working in the adjacent rural counties as literacy tutors ended up 
campaigning for the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO), the independent political 
party created by SNCC (and whose symbol was a black panther) to challenge the Democratic 
Party in the 1966 elections. Hasan Kwame Jeffries’s account of this electoral effort provided 
useful background for understanding the southern roots of Black Power.46 At the very end of 
1965, two activists involved in the LCFO, Sammy Younge, Jr. and Stokely Carmichael, 
discussed bringing that model of independent political organizing to Macon County. That did not 
exactly come to pass, but ironically it was Younge’s murder just a week later that set Tuskegee 
students on a path to a different electoral project: campaigning to successfully propel to office 
the first black sheriff elected in the South since Reconstruction — Lucius Amerson — an event 
that reverberated nationwide. Contemporary readers will be forgiven for not recalling that, in the 
late 1960s, many observers looked at Tuskegee as a center of Black Power. We know that this 
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was so in part because when two leading figures in the movement — SNCC activists Stokely 
Carmichael (later known as Kwame Ture) and former Tuskegee professor Charles Hamilton — 
sat down to co-author a definitive book on the subject, they devoted an entire chapter to this 
prospect.47 “Tuskegee, Alabama, could be the model of Black Power,” Carmichael and Hamilton 
wrote in 1967. “It could be the place where black people have amassed political power and used 
that power effectively.”48 
 The story of the Black Power era is both local and global. The explosive social 
movements in North America in these years were intimately connected to others in Asia, Latin 
America, and particularly, Africa. The powerful currents of anti-colonial African thought and 
action influenced Tuskegee students through a variety of means, not the least of which were 
African students at Tuskegee Institute, who introduced their classmates to the works of Frantz 
Fanon, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, and others. The concept of colonialism, for many 
Tuskegee student activists, was a compelling model for how to think about the situation facing 
black people in the United States. This tendency potentially represented a remarkable reversal of 
Tuskegee’s relationship to the world, given its historic collaborations with European colonialism, 
and the centrality of its relationship with the U.S. military to its identity at midcentury.49 As 
Manning Marable observed, however, many activists at the time read Fanon’s Wretched of the 
Earth but missed the part where he challenged the idea that African colonialism is a useful 
analogy for the problem of anti-black racism in the United States.50 Still, in the time and place in 
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question here — Macon County, Alabama in the late 1960s — the idea that black folks 
represented a colonized people held politically hostage by a colonizing white minority, 
resonated. Furthermore, student activists drew strength from the process of making closer 
personal and political connections with leading figures in the African anti colonial movements. 
They also drew heat from the association — although almost no Tuskegee student activists 
identified with the socialist movement to the extent that anti-colonial leaders abroad did — 
segregationists were all the more quick to report as “communist” any and all activism on and off 
of Tuskegee’s campus.51  
 Reading works by Marable, Robert Allen, Tony Cliff, Jack Bloom and Neil Davidson and 
Sónia Vaz Borges, I began thinking about yet another connection between the local and the 
global.52 Nearly all of the worldwide anti colonial leadership — from Amilcar Cabral and Ho 
Chi Minh to Gwen Patton and Sammy Younge — shared a particular location in the social 
hierarchy. They were not themselves the wretched of the earth; rather, they were the college set. 
They were well educated and their schooling was usually Eurocentric and colonial – they were 
the middle class of the Third World. Speaking perhaps to the danger of schooling in any form, 
these revolutionaries across the globe shared the dual identity of membership in an oppressed 
category and access to a resource — schooling — reserved for an upwardly mobile elite.53 Gwen 
Patton believed that Sammy Younge’s experience as a student in an elite New England boarding 
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school may have actually radicalized him.54 If true, it is unlikely, however, that the leadership of 
that school, Cornwall Academy, intended for Younge’s education there to have that effect. 
 Educational leaders have their own agendas when they organize schooling, and yet, the 
act of gathering students together regularly under the auspices of learning runs the risk that other 
agendas will take root. Schooling can be a dangerous enterprise. My approach to the study of 
student activism at Tuskegee is informed by scholarship in the field of education that emphasizes 
the unique nature of schools as sites of political contestation and the potential for schools to be 
socially dangerous. The process of organizing among Tuskegee students was also an intellectual 
process, following Paolo Freire’s concept of literacy as a means of “reading the world.”55 Some 
of the ways Tuskegee student activists wanted to “read the world” were sharply at odds with the 
political and educational intentions of their professors and administrators.56 Looking at students’ 
intellectual processes, we see that the meaning of Tuskegee and the legacy of Booker T. 
Washington cannot be reduced to statements by Washington or by the school’s official 
leadership. Students, too, attempted to shape the institution, to varying degrees of success 
throughout its history. During Washington’s era as director, the volume of petitions, letters of 
dissent, student protests, and extensive disciplinary counter-measures is a record that 
demonstrates clearly that the Founder’s views did not necessarily represent a consensus on 
campus.  
This historic pattern of internal contestation is not without limitations, however. The 
essential idea that Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis argue in their landmark 1976 text 
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Schooling in Capitalist America is that even the most progressive schools essentially reproduce 
the social relations of capitalism.57 Many scholars since then have dismissed a straw-man version 
of this work as “deterministic,” arguing that it leaves no room for resistance and the agency of 
students. Bowles and Gintis’ actual argument, however, was far more dynamic — emphasizing 
schools as sites of conflict, while explaining that there were limits to how that conflict could be 
resolved on this side of capitalism.58 I find useful their observation that even the most repressive 
educational institutions, in the process of attempting to train conformists, also regularly produce 
“rebels and radicals.”59 Jean Anyon contributed to both of these strands of educational research 
— the reproductive work of schools and the potential for social contention to emerge within 
them. In her pathbreaking early studies, she showed how schools are specifically designed to 
train different classes of the population — work that very much resonates with the explicit 
political aims of the early trustees of “industrial education,” and then shifted in her later research 
to examine schools as potential centers of organizing among teachers, parents, and students 
seeking broader social change.60 Anyon’s scholarship has helped me think about how these 
dynamics existed side-by-side at Tuskegee. 
 This study also engages with literature on the unique role of literacy in Afro-American 
history. Black people have, perhaps more than any other group in this country, equated learning 
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with liberation and pursued it intensively despite innumerable obstacles.61 This is a long and 
unmistakable pattern — a self-organized movement for learning and liberation, not black 
education as charity bequeathed by benevolent school marms and philanthropists — and is 
evident in the works of Booker T. Washington, Carter G. Woodson, W.E.B. DuBois, Herbert 
Gutman, Emilie Siddle Walker, Charles Payne and Carol Strickland, Heather Williams, Adam 
Fairclough and Ronald Butchart, among others.62 An emerging literature explores the lives of 
women who (often) led these educational movements.63 With each attempt, black people faced 
new challenges; the best path forward was not always clear, and there were frequently sharp 
disagreements and debates, not just between black people and their allies and/or enemies, but 
among black people.  
In the last great upsurge of black people’s educational and political struggles — in the 
1960s and 1970s — different tendencies of thought and action crystallized and tried to realize 
their respective visions. I have found useful typologies of these various political/educational 
schools of thought in books by Daniel Perlstein, Manning Marable, and Russell Rickford.64 Their 
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studies show that there is not a singular “black” political or educational philosophy, but rather an 
array of sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory responses to the conditions of 
anti-black racism in the United States. Perhaps the clearest commonality is that black educational 
movements have been, on the whole, progressive — politically and educationally committed to 
enlarging prospects for freedom, democracy, and equality.65 In general, when black-led 
movements for progressive social change have been thwarted, so too have their educational 
movements been thrown backwards.66 Black Studies in higher education, simultaneously an 
enduring and tenuous institutional legacy of the Black Power era, bears the scars of this process 
of social ebb and flow.67 I have tried to take these lessons to heart in the process of exploring the 
meaning of the “Black University” concept as it unfolded at Tuskegee in the late 1960s. 
 The Tuskegee student movement defies easy political categorization. Elements of Black 
Nationalism and Cultural Nationalism mixed frequently with fairly straightforward liberal 
reformism. Off-campus, “Black Power” essentially meant democracy in the Black Belt, I argue. 
On-campus, it was effectively a fusion of different trends and impulses. Taken together, 
however, the reforms proposed by students amounted to a revision of Tuskegee’s prevailing 
political-educational-paradigm. In the prevailing mid-century paradigm, Tuskegee Institute’s 
administrators sought to prepare students to take roles in the technocratic management of the 
machine- and increasingly, computer-age society, and to assume positions as leaders who could 
ensure a smooth and thoughtful transition from Jim Crow segregation to the integration of black 
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people into the American body politic.68 The new “Black” consciousness encouraged a far more 
assertive stance, less concerned with managing the reactions of white people, and more oriented 
on targeting the reigns of power. Black students insisted that their “Black” universities should 
share this new orientation.  
 Not every demand to upgrade academic offerings required such a revision of the 
underlying paradigm, however. Many calls for improving the quality of teaching, of textbooks, 
and of physical plant and infrastructure were well within the universities’ accepted self-
conceptions. Therein lied the tension in the Tuskegee student demands. On the one hand, these 
students demanded a university fully equipped to help them compete in white society, and on the 
other hand, they demanded a new university, more oriented to collective social change than to 
the advancement of individual careers within the white-dominated world. Rather than ask their 
classmates to reject personal aspirations altogether, Tuskegee student activists organized 
collective actions around them. The explosive power of the student movement at Tuskegee in 
1968 is explained in part by the ability of organizers to fuse these disparate impulses under the 
same banner: Black Power. 
 
Sources and Methods 
This study is based on interviews with twenty people: fifteen former Tuskegee students 
(Lena Agnew, Lucenia Dunn, George Geddis, Warren Hamilton, Chester Higgins, Jr., Ronald 
Hill, Caroline Hilton, Robert Jones, Cozetta Lamore, George Paris, Wendell Paris, Gwendolyn 
Patton, Arthur Pfister, Melvin Todd, and Michael Wright); two former Tuskegee administrators 
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(Bertrand Phillips and Richard Wasserstrom); one former Tuskegee professor (Maggie Magee); 
and two people who grew up in the town of Tuskegee (Kathleen Cleaver and Guy Trammel). 
The interviews were conducted over three years — from 2015 to 2017. These participants were 
recruited through personal networks, internet and social media searches, and email exchanges. 
The interviews were open-ended, and mostly took place in person (often in respondents’ homes) 
although a few were done over the phone. My line of questioning generally began with how each 
person arrived at Tuskegee’s campus in the 1960s, their impressions of the campus and the town, 
their eventual involvement in the movement (to varying degrees and in different ways), 
graduation (or, in some cases, expulsion) and life after Tuskegee. Their trajectories at Tuskegee 
fall roughly into two temporal phases of activism: among the pre-1967 group are Gwen Patton, 
George and Wendell Paris, and Melvin Todd; whereas the 1967-1968 story features students 
such as Michael Wright, George Geddis, and Caroline Hilton more prominently. I tried to resist 
the impulse to gather “facts” from these interviews, but rather, to let each participant tell his/her 
story in their own way. I believe, as Alessandro Portelli argues, that oral historians should attend 
to the ways in which “faulty” memory enriches the historical record, revealing deeper levels of 
meaning for the memories in question.69  
 To provide but one small example already apparent before the interviews had been 
completed and before even the completed ones had been transcribed: the issue of who called out 
the Alabama National Guard in April of 1968 is revealing. Several participants recalled that the 
“last act on Earth” of Lurleen Wallace (wife of George, elected Governor in his stead in 1967 as 
his proxy when his term limits had expired; she died of cancer one year later) was to call out the 
National Guard on the Tuskegee students. However, in his memoir, Macon County sheriff 
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Lucius Amerson, elected by the student activists, takes credit for calling out the National 
Guard.70 While people tend to remember that it was the white segregationist governor who was 
responsible (and ultimately, of course, she was the only one with jurisdiction to mobilize those 
troops and must have approved it), it may actually have been the newly elected black county 
sheriff who first made the call. Given the way white people tended to line up in opposition to 
black people’s demands in this story, participants may have been more likely to recall that the 
student movement was placed in mortal danger by an authority figure on the other side of the 
color line.. 
 Two patterns were emerged in the interviews: first, the intense loyalty the participants 
feel towards Tuskegee University and the profound sense of loss from its stature in the 1960s to 
today; and second, the importance of understanding the class nature of the town of Tuskegee. 
Again and again, in their own ways, interviewees returned to either or both themes. Although the 
administration had tried to kick him out of school many times, Michael Wright told me that 
Tuskegee’s campus was “hallowed ground.” The former students describe Tuskegee as a kind of 
middle-class utopia, very much wrapped up in the ideals of upward mobility and acquiring the 
trappings of middle-class American life. Most students were middle class, themselves children of 
college-educated black people. Gwen Patton stressed, repeatedly, the importance of 
understanding “the class within the caste” —- the middle-class black community in which she 
was rooted. Most of the activists were from a similar echelon, themselves the children of college-
educated professionals. There were also some poorer students, the first to go to college, and 
some arrived without any money in their pockets. My father, Robert Jones, was the type of 
student who was unprepared for college-level work and found, in Tuskegee, sincere teachers 
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who “bent over backwards” to meet his educational needs and make sure that he graduated. 
Indigent students would (in a tradition that goes back to Washington’s day) be put to work on 
campus, and would often graduate in five or six years, instead of four. 
 The story presented here is also based on documents related to the Tuskegee student 
movement from three Alabama archives: The Tuskegee University Archives in Tuskegee; the 
Alabama Department of Archives and History in Montgomery; and the Gwendolyn Patton 
Collection in the Trenholm State Technical College Archives (also in Montgomery). These data 
include hundreds of pages from three newspapers: The Campus Digest, The Southern Courier, 
and The Tuskegee News. 
 The Campus Digest, written and edited by students, provides a window into prevailing 
attitudes on Tuskegee’s campus in the 1960s. I read hundreds of Digest pages dating from 1960 
to 1970, although the bulk of my analysis is focused on articles from 1965 to 1969. I do not 
presume that any one article represents the view of all students. Rather, the pieces give a sense of 
the general range of opinion and debate on various issues on campus and beyond. There are, in 
fact, explicit debates in these pages about the extent to which the ideas and actions of the most 
politicized students have been embraced by the campus at large. Furthermore, the reported 
numbers from student actions and protests help to gauge the mood. At some points, it is clear 
that student activists are operating in relative isolation. At other points, nearly the entire campus 
empties to respond to a call to protest. The newspaper also contains advertisements from Fortune 
500 companies aggressively (and quite creatively) trying to recruit Tuskegee graduates. Whereas 
today’s undergraduate students struggle to find jobs that will allow them to pay back mountains 
of college debt, the nature and stature of these firms and the intensity of their recruitment efforts 
help to paint a picture of a political and economic moment that is very different from our own. 
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 The Southern Courier was a newspaper of the southern Civil Rights Movement. It is an 
aesthetically gorgeous newspaper, written and edited by activist/reporters, aiming to capture both 
the movement and the texture of everyday life of black people in the South. Flipping through its 
pages, it is truly remarkable how frequently they contain news, reports, and photographs about 
goings on at Tuskegee Institute. Reading this newspaper convinced me that Tuskegee was a 
center of the southern student movement. I read many hundreds of Courier articles spanning the 
years 1965 to 1968. In many cases, the reporting in these pages provides useful corroboration of 
and additional details about stories contained in The Campus Digest or gathered from participant 
interviews. 
 The Tuskegee News is a local newspaper from the town of Tuskegee. I read hundreds of 
its pages from 1965 to 1970. It was owned and operated entirely by white people and reflects the 
changing consensus among them in those years. From the mid-1960s onwards it became a bi-
racial newspaper that reported in hopeful tones about the town’s political and economic 
prospects and helped to project Tuskegee’s image as a “model city.” The Tuskegee News treated 
Tuskegee Institute with reverence and respect, frequently celebrating achievements of its faculty 
and students. Like the governor, the editorial board supported large annual increases in the state 
budget for education and the expansion of school facilities for black and white students. And, 
like the governor, the paper staunchly opposed the student movement at Tuskegee, frequently 
singling out Stokely Carmichael as the source of the problem. As the student movement gained 
force, The Tuskegee News reflected the hope among Tuskegee’s white establishment that the 




 Another large amount of data comes from the papers of students and professors, 
including students Michael Wright, Sammy Younge, Chester Higgins and professor Erik 
Krystall. These names were identified through my reading of The Campus Digest and other 
sources, and they — unlike many other people identified — happened to have papers collected in 
Tuskegee’s archives. Michael Wright’s papers contain court documents and affidavits in relation 
to the University’s attempt to kick him out of school (Wright played a central role in taking the 
board of trustees hostage in 1968). Wright represents the radical wing of the student movement 
at Tuskegee. His papers also contain some of his political writings for the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), including articles he wrote on the political economy of racism 
in the United States and some sketches of the history of the black freedom struggle. Sammy 
Younge’s papers, gathered posthumously after his murder in 1966, include autopsy reports and 
photographs, images of student protests of his murder and of the acquittal of the man who 
murdered him, and related newspaper clippings from around the United States. Erik Krystall was 
a professor at Tuskegee who co-authored many sociological studies of changing attitudes and 
opinions about racism, Black Power, segregation, etc. during the 1960s. These were mostly 
quantitative studies based on surveys conducted by Krystall’s students. They provide some 
evidence about prevailing attitudes among white people and black people in the town and on 
campus at different moments in the decade. Krystall’s papers also happen to include an 18-page 
sketch of the “Black University Concept” vision statement for Tuskegee, drafted by student 
activists and presented to the trustees being held hostage in April of 1968.  
As the 1968 crisis played out, one student decided to record the events for posterity. 
Chester Higgins, Jr. (who later became a world-famous photographer) collected every leaflet, 
letter, memo, manifesto and other document produced by Tuskegee students, faculty and 
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administrators in the heat of the 1968 struggle. Higgins received assistance from a professor and 
the approval of the administration for the final product, which consists of typed versions of all of 
these documents, running to 166 pages. Tuskegee Institute published it as Student Unrest, 
Tuskegee Institute: A Chronology. Student Unrest is invaluable as a source of text from all 
parties involved in the 1968 conflict and as an authoritative timeline of events. It is, perhaps, a 
testament to the historical significance of the events in question that two people – Higgins and 
Forman – had the impulse to create an archive of them. 
 My aim is to understand these dramatic events not only from the grassroots perspective, 
but also “from above,” using archival sources to uncover the opinions and perspectives of 
trustees, the administration, and the governors of Alabama.71 Towards this end I was able to 
interview two former Tuskegee administrators: Bertrand Phillips and Richard Wasserstrom. The 
papers of Tuskegee president Luther Foster were unorganized and at the time of writing were 
unavailable. I have, however, read several letters, speeches, and memos by Foster, including his 
annual reports to the alumni from 1968 through 1970, and his remarks at a Tuskegee symposium, 
published in 1954, on the role of Tuskegee in the context of the economic changes taking place 
in the South. Foster’s approach to the student movement is also captured in his reports to the 
Board of Trustees. I read through a complete set of minutes from the meetings of that board from 
1965 through 1970. The twenty-three trustees represented a powerful and well-connected liberal 
elite. Eighteen were white and five were black (only two were women). Six were businessmen, 
six were public officials, three were bankers, one was a major general in the US Army, and the 
rest were lawyers and philanthropists. The trustees alternated their biannual meetings between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 I am mindful of Brian Kelly’s admonition that telling history from the “bottom up” requires understanding what 
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Tuskegee’s campus and the executive suites of Chase Bank in Manhattan. These minutes capture 
their collective responses to the student movement’s demands and their proposals for growing 
and developing Tuskegee Institute in the context of the political crisis of the late 1960s. One way 
that HBCU history is unique is the way in which administrators worked both to contain student 
protests and to protect them. Tuskegee students were threatened by armed forces three times – in 
1923 by the Klan and in 1940 and 1968 by state troopers. All three times Tuskegee 
administrators put themselves between the invaders and the students, and all three times they 
were able to avoid bloodshed.72  
In the late 1960s, the state of Alabama threatened Tuskegee with guns and with money. 
Another large section of the data set (roughly 300 documents) comes from the papers of 
Alabama Governors George and Lurleen Wallace. This set contains letters, speeches, and other 
writings about Alabama’s economy, the role of education in general and about Tuskegee Institute 
in particular. George Wallace’s correspondence reveals the extent to which he saw the school as 
a center of radical organizing and was committed to withdrawing the state’s financial support 
from it. The data I found in Wallace’s files about the economic changes taking place in the state 
are dramatic — Alabama’s rapid industrialization is essential to understanding both the room for 
maneuver for civil rights activists and the governor’s expansive education agenda.73 Also 
included are several reports from the Commission to Preserve the Peace, a body set up by the 
state legislature to investigate radical organizers and organizations in the state of Alabama. Their 
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reports are hysterically anti-Communist and often wildly speculative, but provide a sense of the 
social danger political elites felt student organizers posed, especially from Tuskegee’s campus. 
 I was fortunate to have SNCC veteran and former Tuskegee student government 
president Dr. Gwendolyn Patton guide me through her own papers, stored at Trenholm State 
Technical College in Montgomery. I reviewed hundreds of documents from the collection, which 
include letters, speeches and writings tracing her activist trajectory from Tuskegee in the mid-
1960s (she helped to found the Tuskegee Institute Advancement League — TIAL — the student 
activist wing of the civil rights movement at Tuskegee) to a veritable tour of the most radical 
wing of the Black Power movement through the late 1960s and early 1970s — including the 
Lowndes County Black Panther Party, the Black Panther Party initiated by Huey Newton and 
Bobby Seale years later, the Revolutionary Union Movement in Detroit, and more. Patton claims 
to have organized the first Black Power conference in the United States — at Tuskegee Institute 
in February of 1967. She never actually made it to the conference, though, as she was badly 
injured in a mysterious car accident en route. For the rest of her life, one of her legs was shorter 
than the other. She lectured for a time at Brooklyn College, but eventually returned to Alabama 
and remained a sought after public speaker on civil rights, Black Power, and the role of women 
in activism. Patton’s archive contains several lengthy speeches and articles from the 1970s 
assessing the prospects for broad social change — even socialism — and ideas about how 
schooling, women’s rights, and the fight against racism fit into those perspectives. Patton is 
probably the best-known activist to emerge from Tuskegee in the 1960s. When she died in the 
spring of 2016, I attended her funeral, spent time with her family and friends in Montgomery, 





The six main chapters of this dissertation are organized chronologically in two parts. In 
order to explore the connection between the 1960s student movement and the legacy of 
Washington, it was necessary to write a history of Tuskegee Institute. Part one analyzes eighty 
years of Tuskegee’s history, from its origins in 1881 to 1960. Part two examines events on 
campus during only eight years – from 1960 to 1968. After the first two, subsequent chapters 
cover smaller and smaller amounts of time. The events described in the final chapter take place 
during only one year: 1968. In this way, I emphasize telling the story of the late 1960s student 
movement, while also giving a sense of its origins in and continuity with much earlier events.  
Part one is about the contradictions of Tuskegee’s long history, the compromises and 
political and educational choices that made its growth possible over the course of eight decades, 
and recurring controversy related to those choices. The first two chapters cover the first seventy 
years of the school’s existence, not as a comprehensive history, but focusing on the pattern of 
internal conflict on campus, and the pressures that altered the institution’s guiding political and 
educational paradigms throughout. My writing of this institutional history is based primarily on 
secondary sources and represents my assessment of the existing literature on Washington and 
Tuskegee. Chapter one (1881-1915) reframes the DuBois/Washington debate, emphasizing the 
extent to which Washington’s political-educational paradigm was the subject of internal debate 
on Tuskegee’s campus, specifically demonstrated by the pattern of student dissent. This 
reframing complicates Washington’s legacy, revealing the fact that many people who shared his 
background (poor, southern, black people in the post-Reconstruction U.S. South) had competing 
visions and aspirations for Tuskegee Institute – his political and pedagogical choices, in other 
words, were not the only ones possible or imaginable. The second chapter (1916-1950) picks up 
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the story after Washington’s death. I show how the political economy of Tuskegee Institute 
changed considerably. Following the regional decline in agriculture, Tuskegee’s leadership 
shifted away from Washington’s vision of promoting small businesses and land ownership. 
Rather, Tuskegee Institute’s leadership aligned itself increasingly with the federal government – 
particularly with the U.S. military. This relationship pulled the campus and its students into the 
contradictions of imperial policy and segregation in the armed forces, while at the same time 
opening up new career opportunities for graduates. In the third chapter (1950-1960), as I begin 
weaving my research into the narrative, I show that the prosperity of Tuskegee’s midcentury 
black middle class was based on academic salaries from northern philanthropy (for professors) 
and wages paid by the federal government (for medical professionals at the Veterans Hospital). I 
argue that as this class began to break with Washington’s cautious political strategy and push for 
voting rights, they opened the door to the student movement.  
 In part two, I slow the narrative down, in order to “zoom in” on the actions of students in 
just an eight-year period. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters are based on my original research 
on the 1960s Tuskegee student movement. In the fourth chapter (1960-1965) I “set the scene” of 
Tuskegee at midcentury, describing the middle-class students, their families, and the community. 
I proceed to recover the role of Tuskegee students in the southern Civil Rights movement, 
showing that their organizing efforts had a much wider influence than is thus far revealed in the 
literature. Tuskegee Institute was truly an organizational and intellectual center of the southern 
student movement, and Tuskegee students were instrumental in the fight for democracy in the 
surrounding Black Belt counties. In the fifth chapter (1966-1967), I explain the radicalization of 
the student movement and how Tuskegee came to be a national model of Black Power. After 
Tuskegee student Sammy Younge, Jr. was murdered in 1966 in an off-campus dispute over a 
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segregated restroom, his classmates turned their attention back to their school and decided that it, 
too, must change. Tuskegee students were among the first to publish systematic critiques of 
HBCUs and to imagine what a “Black University” might look like. In the sixth chapter (1968), I 
narrate the explosive events of 1968, including the days when students held the trustees hostage 
for two days until the Alabama National Guard arrived, threatening to invade the campus. The 
further development of the student movement was arrested when the president closed Tuskegee 
completely for two weeks, but activists still registered an impressive list of victories. I unpack 
the “Black University” concept and show that the demands students fought for represented a 
marriage of their desire for individual upward mobility with their aspirations for collective social 
change. In the seventh chapter I offer concluding thoughts about the history of Tuskegee’s 
student movement, the legacy of Booker T. Washington, and implications for the present and 
future of black education. 
 
A Critical History 
 I have often reflected on a tension I perceived in the oral history interviews I conducted 
for this study: between loyalty and reverence for Tuskegee Institute and criticism of it. At a time 
when many HBCUs are struggling financially, many commentators naturally emphasize their 
historic strengths and their continuing importance. Tuskegee Institute graduates have many 
reasons to be proud. Their school remains celebrated and highly regarded, and continues to 
produce distinguished graduates in many fields.74 And yet, this dissertation focuses on the 
historic pattern of student criticism. What is the value in that? I think it is important to state that 
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the internal critics I write about in this dissertation always aspired to reform the institution, to 
improve it – and they did. More than forty years ago sociologist Daniel C. Thompson pointed out 
the irony in the fact that HBCUs trained most of the leading black activists and yet, were the 
institutions “most harassed by the racial revolution.”75 Thompson may not have known that the 
same pattern existed prior to the 1960s. “Oddly enough,” noted one white visitor to Tuskegee’s 
campus in 1930, “Tuskegee and its methods receive more criticisms from the Negroes 
themselves than from the Southern whites.”76 Those who bristle at the idea of a critical history 
may, as they read the stories contained here, find themselves in accordance with these student 
protesters. In the end, such internal critics succeeded in their aim: making Tuskegee Institute a 
better place. 
 In telling this story, I have endeavored to embrace the contradictions of Tuskegee 
Institute and not to flatten them. I am critical of Washington, but I also understand the power of 
his legacy as the founder of a black-led educational institution. I highlight student critics, but try 
to appreciate what we can learn from the fact that their school was a place that nurtured such 
critical voices. It was simultaneously confining, restrictive while also a “haven for activist 
people” as one former student described it.77 Tuskegee Institute has a proud military history that 
is also a controversial history. It was a military outpost that was nearly invaded by the military – 
twice. Tuskegee students in one era traveled abroad to collaborate with European colonialism in 
Africa, and in another era sought to learn from and imitate the process of African liberation from 
European control. In one decade students were hired by mine owners to convince black workers 
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not to join unions, and in the next decade Tuskegee students ventured off campus to organize 
black workers into unions. The truth of Tuskegee Institute is that is has been a home to a wide 
range of political and educational ideals, many of which do not neatly fall within the ideals laid 
down by The Founder. 
 There is a broader significance to this history, I believe. Today, paradigms of black 
education are once again hotly debated – charter schools and school choice, for example – and 
black college students coast to coast are organizing to demand institutional change. There is no 
singular “black” perspective on these questions, but a range of responses by black people, 
including stances that conflict. Often, but not always, different classes of black people have 
different imaginations about what kinds of changes are possible or necessary. The radical history 
of student movements at historically black colleges and universities provides an opportunity to 
expand our contemporary political and educational imaginations. That history can also enrich our 
understanding of HBCUs. Too often our knowledge of institutions comes from the people at the 
top, not the people at the bottom.  Understanding the perspective of student activists gives us a 
richer picture of the educational and political ideas in circulation at Tuskegee Institute. The 
legacy of Booker T. Washington has been examined for almost a century from every angle 
except this one: for the first time the students at the school he founded will have their say in the 
scholarly record. I sincerely hope that The Tuskegee Revolt does justice to their story. 
 
 
Chapter 1: The Origins of Tuskegee Institute, 1881 to 1915 
 
 Tuskegee University is unique among American universities in its historical self-
awareness. It is perhaps the only school that is so closely identified with its founder — Booker T. 
Washington, the most famous black educator in American history. Tuskegee is also unique in 
that, unlike its sister school, the Hampton Institute, it had a black leadership from the beginning. 
For almost a century, Tuskegee was a kind of “capital” of black America. For many of those 
years, whatever happened at Tuskegee reverberated throughout the nation — and at times, the 
world. For better and worse, the school’s name carried different connotations through the years 
— in one era, “progress,” in another, “heroism,” or in still another, “medical racism,” but most 
consistently, “Booker T. Washington.”1 Washington’s strategy of black advancement through an 
embrace of capitalism, Protestant morality and self-help closely adhered to the beliefs of the 
black middle class. Throughout the school’s first eight decades, Tuskegee students both agreed 
with these beliefs and challenged them, particularly as they manifested in the curriculum. When 
Tuskegee’s students clashed with the administration in 1968, they most likely didn’t know that 
these same ideals had been a source of student protest and activism stretching all the way back to 
its founding. In the history of Tuskegee Institute, sketched below, the debate within the school 
community is a new vantage point from which to consider black educational history in general, 
and Booker T. Washington’s legacy in particular. 
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Industrial Education and Counter-Revolution 
 Tuskegee Institute was born in a counter-revolution. What was destined to become the 
nation’s most famous school for black people came into existence just as the self-organized 
movement of newly-freed black people after the Civil War to build and sustain their own schools 
was thwarted. The enigma of Booker T. Washington lies in the fact that he rose as his people 
fell. Washington became a figure of national and even international fame in the context of a 
counter-revolution in the South at the end of the nineteenth century. Undoing the work of the 
revolution was a tall order. In Black Reconstruction in America: 1860–1880, W.E.B. Du Bois 
portrayed the post-Civil War South as a world turned upside down. Du Bois called 
Reconstruction in its most radical phase a “dictatorship of labor,” a new society in which those 
who had been on the very bottom — slaves — were suddenly exercising political power at the 
top, at times in coalition with poor and working-class white people. Six hundred black people 
joined southern state legislatures, and sixteen were elected to the US Congress.2 In Macon 
County, future site of Tuskegee Institute, former slave James Alston was elected to the state 
legislature, representing, among his constituents, the man who had once owned him.3 
 The freed people set to work immediately building schools. The U.S. army’s occupation 
of the South enabled the consolidation of the freed people’s schooling movement in a system of 
state-supported public schools. Alabama’s first public schools for black people were established 
in Huntsville in 1863 when the city was captured by federal troops.4 The armed military 
occupation of Alabama opened a political space in which freed people could create public 
schools for the first time in the South. Furthermore, Reconstruction, guided by Union generals, 
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allowed black people to participate in forming new state constitutions, where they pushed for 
legislating public schools into existence. By 1870, every single southern state constitution 
contained specific language about the formation of a state-supported public school system.5 
Black people carried out this revolution through the Republican Party, where they were allied 
with some white people – northern liberal and radical politicians and some southern working 
class people. But the initiative for the creation of public schools came from black people. Long 
denied access to education in any form, they prioritized the formation of schools in the new 
South. “Public education for all, at public expense,” Du Bois wrote, “was, in the South, a Negro 
idea.”6 
 Afro-Americans have, in general, always placed great value on literacy. As historian 
Herbert Gutman notes, the post-emancipation impulse to build schools did not spring from 
nothing, but rather from the fugitive literacy efforts that had already been developed in slavery.7 
During slavery, acquiring literacy had been a way to subvert slavery in secret and possibly to 
acquire the means to escape. “Because it most often happened in secret,” historian Heather 
Williams writes, “the very act of learning to read and write subverted the master-slave 
relationship and created a private life for those who were owned by others.”8 After the Civil War, 
literacy held tremendous promise for the freed people. Being able to read and write was a way to 
gain distance from the degraded status of slavery, and to seize more completely upon the 
opportunities presented by freedom. More than anyone else, newly emancipated black people 
equated learning with political liberation. “Literacy would permit them to negotiate the new 
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relations of production and exchange,” writes historian Steven Hahn, enabling them to fight back 
against unprincipled employers, and “better equip them to exercise the new rights of 
citizenship.” And besides contracts and legal documents, it would empower them to personally 
engage with one of their most meaningful texts: the Bible.9 
 Different groups of white people took different approaches to the question of the 
education of black people. Elite white people in particular were divided on the issue by region 
and by industry. ”The planters favored a labor-repressive system of agricultural production,” 
writes historian James Anderson. “They had little incentive to use education and technology to 
increase efficiency and productivity or to use schooling as a means to train and discipline a more 
efficient work force.”10 Northern elites, on the other hand, tended to believe in the power of 
education to improve society and to lubricate social tensions.11 Education meant moral training, 
discipline, and socializing the labor force to the rigors and rhythms of wage labor.12 After the 
Civil War, and much to the planters’ chagrin, missionaries and philanthropists poured resources 
into the South to build and promote schooling for the freed people — the origin of the first 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). Later, when northern elites abandoned 
the defense of civil rights for black people, they ended the military occupation of the South and 
allowed the planters to restore a social system more conducive to profitable agriculture. Thus 
began the counter-revolutionary “redemption” of the South. A reign of terror swept the southern 
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states. Schools for black people were systematically de-funded and destroyed.13 “The sight of 
blacks carrying books often had the same effect on whites as the sight of armed blacks,” writes 
historian Leon Litwack, “and many would have found no real distinction between the two 
threats.”14  
 In Alabama’s Black Belt (a region so named for the uniquely rich soil and for the folks 
who worked on it), the counter-revolution swiftly ensured that most black people would be 
trapped in the same work they performed as slaves: growing and harvesting cotton. Before the 
war and after it, the labor of black people was essential to America’s standing in the world. It 
was cotton and the global market that developed around it that made the Industrial Revolution 
(which began with the production of cotton-based textiles) and put the United States on the map 
as a world power. Before the Civil War, raw cotton represented 61 percent of the value of all 
U.S. products shipped abroad.15  During the war, European factories were abruptly cut off from 
their southern suppliers for several years. However, once the planters’ rebellion was suppressed, 
northern and southern elites agreed that the most important question of the day was figuring out 
how to get black people back to work on the plantations. A British minister to Washington 
reported in 1865 that “everywhere measures are being taken to force the Negroes to work, and to 
teach them that freedom means working for wages instead of masters.”16  
 Through violence, terror, and murder, the counter-revolutionaries largely succeeded in 
excluding black people from politics and confining them to a form of social and racial 
subordination (later known as “Jim Crow”). Since the ex-slaves never received reparations in the 
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form of land, they were essentially indigent and the planters retained an advantage in the struggle 
to re-establish a new labor regime across the South. The freed people wanted to be independent 
farmers and resisted becoming wage laborers, but through debt accumulation and harsh legal 
repression and violence, a new social compromise emerged that placed most of them in the role 
of sharecroppers — directing their own work day to day with little supervision on the one hand, 
but perpetually debt-obligated tenants on the other.17 As late as 1925, 90 percent of black farmers 
in Macon County were tenants, paying their rent in cash, cotton, or other produce. But since 
white landlords kept all of the records of debt, controlled all of the courts (in which any disputes 
might be settled), the typical tenant fell further in debt year after year.18    
 In Alabama this counter-revolution dragged out over the last thirty years of the nineteenth 
century. Despite widespread terror and fraud, Republicans held onto office in the 1870 elections. 
Through violence and vote-stealing, the Democratic Party — the party of the planters and former 
slave-owners — finally regained dominance in Alabama state government four years later. 
Macon County’s two state representatives — both black — were convicted of felonies and 
sentenced to chain gangs.19 Nine out of every ten people lynched in the U.S. before the Civil War 
were white; now the reverse was true.20 More than two thousand black people were lynched in 
the U.S. between 1882 and 1903. The planters, abetted by the outright terror of the KKK, used 
fear of “Negro domination” to split the Republican coalition, and succeeded in driving black 
people out of electoral politics, although this took three decades to fully accomplish. Black 
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people did not lose the right to vote in Alabama until 1901.21 There had been 181,000 black 
people registered to vote in the state in 1900, but only 3,000 were registered by 1902.22 Thus, 
with waning political influence and confined “in the shadow of the plantation” primarily to 
agricultural labor, black people found it extremely difficult to maintain or expand public 
schooling, or to do anything which would alter their social status.23  
 The counter-revolution in the South that overthrew Reconstruction did not, as a rule, 
sweep away all schools for black people. The counter-revolutionaries (the so-called 
“Redeemers”) sought many mechanisms to defund black schools and to redirect public funding 
to white schools. However, in their attempt to erect and preserve a segregated social system, it 
was necessary to allow a small layer of black professionals to be trained to serve their segregated 
communities. Furthermore, the maintenance of a segregated schooling system required 
segregated teacher training institutions. Thus, for many years higher education for black people 
mainly took the form of teacher training institutions.24 
 Between the push and pull of counter-revolution and the rising system of Jim Crow 
segregation, the magnitude of freed people’s achievements after the Civil War is remarkable. 
Despite the fact that less than 10 percent of black people were literate as of 1860, between 1865 
and 1900 the freed people established more than 1,200 black-owned newspapers.25 As of 1890, 
Meyer Weinberg notes, of 15-18 year olds, “the college-going rate of black youth [18.76 
percent] exceeded that of native white youth born of foreign parents [14.74 percent] and closely 
approached that of native white youth of native white parents [20.44 percent].” The figure for 
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black youths is somewhat distorted, however, by the fact that most of those students attended 
Negro colleges where pre-collegiate coursework was more the rule than the exception, since high 
schools for black people were still rare before the 20th century.26 This first general of black 
college students went on to become educators, professionals, and to the extent possible, 
businesspeople — the black middle class. There had always been different classes of black 
people in the United States, but the new opportunities afforded by emancipation widened the 
divide between the majority of black people stuck in agricultural labor, and a small, fragile, but 
increasingly confident black middle class. 
 
From Hampton to Tuskegee 
 The man who would become the nation’s most famous black educator was born a slave. 
Booker Taliaferro came into the world in Virginia in 1856 and later gave himself the name 
Washington. Young Booker witnessed the transition from slavery to freedom, and caught the 
freed people’s collective, infectious thirst for literacy. “From the time that I can remember 
having any thoughts about anything,” he wrote in his autobiography, Up From Slavery, “I recall 
that I had an intense longing to learn to read. I determined, when quite a small child, that, if I 
accomplished nothing else in life, I would in some way get enough education to enable me to 
read common books and newspapers.” After the Civil War, Washington worked in coal mines 
while pursuing education in his spare time. He learned of the existence of the Hampton Institute, 
a school for Negroes, and made his way there in 1872. Having no money for tuition and little 
education, his entrance exam consisted of how well he did sweeping a school room.27 
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 The Hampton Normal and Industrial Institute was founded by Samuel C. Armstrong, a 
white Civil War veteran who wanted to create schools to prepare black teachers (called “normal” 
schools, at the time). Hampton Institute intended to train black people to accept a subordinate 
role in southern economic and social life. Hampton was not a trade or academic school, 
Anderson argues, but a school “that attempted to train a corps of teachers with a particular social 
philosophy relevant to the political and economic reconstruction of the South.”28 Through long 
hours of work necessary for the maintenance of themselves and the school, students learned to 
“value” manual labor. “Hampton students initially spent half of their days working and only half 
in the classroom,” according to historian Adam Fairclough. But “[b]y 1879, with the 
establishment of the night school, in which pupils studied for two hours after having labored for 
ten, Hampton raised the proportion of the school year devoted to manual training to something 
like two-thirds.”29 Armstrong and the trustees were absolutely clear that the purpose of the 
school was to make possible a New South based on black laborers. In the aftermath of the defeat 
of Reconstruction, the “great problem," said one Hampton trustee, was "to attach the Negro to 
the soil and prevent his exodus from the country to the city.” Teacher training that emphasized 
manual labor was the solution to this problem. “Let us make the teachers,” Armstrong said, “and 
we will make the people.”30  
 Before the counter-revolution was completed, however, young Booker T. Washington 
nurtured dreams born of Radical Reconstruction Although he would later disclaim civil rights 
activism and the “mistakes” of seeking political office during Reconstruction, Washington 
sought out both earlier in life. On one occasion this took the form of collective action on campus. 
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Washington participated in at least one protest as a student at Hampton, signing a petition to 
demand the reinstatement of a student whom Armstrong had dismissed; the student was 
readmitted.31 After graduation, Washington’s first ambition was to be a lawyer and to ascend to 
elected public office. “Politics was another enthusiasm of the young Booker T. Washington,” 
notes his biographer, Louis Harlan.32 Washington studied law on his own and joined a local 
Republican Party organization.33 “The first extant piece of writing by Booker T. Washington,” 
Harlan writes, “was in his capacity as secretary of a local political gathering.”34 The counter-
revolution ultimately foreclosed the possibility of satisfying his ambitions in law or public office 
— black people were driven out of those arenas by terror, violence, fraud and murder. It did not 
take long for Washington to find another path. 
 Tuskegee Institute was made possible by compromises rooted in political defeats. At the 
end of the 1870s, the Redemption had driven black people in Macon County from public office-
holding, but had not yet taken their right to vote. Lewis Adams, a local black tinsmith, negotiated 
a deal with two prominent white men in town: black people would vote for the Democratic Party 
in return for a state-supported normal school located in Tuskegee. Both sides upheld the bargain 
and the Tuskegee Institute opened in July of 1881. Historian Robert J. Norrell argues that this 
may not have been a simple “quid pro quo” but rather part of a pattern of white planters 
supporting the establishment of limited schooling for black people at the end of the nineteenth 
century to prevent their exodus from the Black Belt. The mayor of Tuskegee wrote to Samuel 
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Armstrong asking for a white man he could recommend as principal of the new school. 
Armstrong tapped a black man instead, his star pupil: Booker T. Washington.35 
 Washington followed directly in his mentor’s footsteps — and also surpassed him. Black 
people needed moral education and manual skills, Washington now taught, not the traditional 
liberal arts education they — and he, earlier — sought. “No race can prosper,” he said, “till it 
learns that there is as much dignity in tilling a field as in writing a poem. It is at the bottom of 
life we must begin, and not at the top.”36 Washington personally oversaw the construction and 
expansion of the school’s facilities, most of which were built by the students themselves. 
Washington forbade the introduction of liberal arts courses popular at other Black colleges, such 
as Greek or Latin. Instead, students focused on technical skills. Male students studied carpentry, 
printing, and agricultural techniques, while female students learned how to do laundry, sewing 
and “kitchen duties.” “We are not a college,” Washington told students in 1896, “and if there are 
any of you here who expect to get a college training, you will be disappointed.”37 Under 
Washington’s leadership, Tuskegee acquired land and erected impressive buildings on a 
sprawling, immaculate and handsome campus. 
 Tuskegee quickly became much more than a school, however, and attracted praise and 
criticism from black people and white people. As a wide range of scholars — from Du Bois to 
Michael R. West and others — have noted, Washington’s main legacy was in the realm of ideas 
and ideology; Tuskegee was “operated as a propaganda agency” Horace Mann Bond 
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concluded.38 To black supporters, it was a symbol of pride, an impressive example of what an 
institution run by black people could achieve. To white supporters, it promised to teach black 
people to forgo political and social agitation in favor of the kind of humility and deference that 
would foster good “race relations.” To white detractors, any kind of schooling implied 
revolution: black people were attempting to rise above their assigned station. For the school’s 
black critics, the problem was the opposite — that the school trained black people to keep them 
in that place. 
 
The Gospel of Work and Money 
 In The Souls of Black Folks, Du Bois attempted to explain Washington’s incredible rise. 
“One hesitates,” he began cautiously, “to criticize a life which, beginning with so little, has done 
so much.” Du Bois identified the secret of Washington’s success as his ability to tap into the 
feeling of the era — “this very singleness of vision and thorough oneness with his age”  — that 
while the radical dreams of Reconstruction were crushed, hope lay not in political change or in 
civil rights, but in embracing one’s chances in the marketplace. “Mr. Washington’s programme 
naturally takes an economic cast, becoming a gospel of Work and Money,” Du Bois wrote.39  
 Washington came to national prominence after a famous speech in Atlanta in which he 
hopefully merged the subordinate social status of black people with the prospect of commercial 
progress in the New South. Washington delivered what has become known as the “Atlanta 
Compromise” address to the Cotton States and International Exposition in September of 1895. In 
his address, the “compromise” was that black people would forgo any challenge to the regime of 
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disenfranchisement and segregation, and, in exchange, white people would support schooling for 
black people and fair treatment in the marketplace.  
 Washington promised white people that they could count on black people to be 
productive and loyal. Black people, he told them, would “buy your surplus land, make blossom 
the waste places in your fields, and run your factories.” He assured white people that they could 
“be sure in the future, as in the past, that you and your families will be surrounded by the most 
patient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful people that the world has seen.” Washington 
pledged that, unlike immigrants from Europe, black people would not protest or strike: “[W]e 
shall stand by you with a devotion that no foreigner can approach, ready to lay down our lives, if 
need be, in defense of yours, interlacing our industrial, commercial, civil, and religious life with 
yours in a way that shall make the interests of both races one.” In a well-known passage, he 
embraced segregation: “In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, 
yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.”40 
 Washington advised black people not to leave the South, but to stay and seek out the best 
“chance” in the marketplace. Washington called on black people to “Cast down your buckets 
where you are”41 -- to develop marketable skills: “Cast it down in agriculture, mechanics, in 
commerce, in domestic service, and in the professions.” When it comes to business “pure and 
simple,” he continued “it is in the South that the Negro is given a man’s chance in the 
commercial world.”42 
 The speech brilliantly spun a negative into a positive. It was both a political surrender to 
the counter-revolution and an optimistic projection that black people would advance in freedom, 
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by returning to the well-established pattern of doing so modestly, within the boundaries set by 
white paternal guidance.43 For these reasons, the elite — northern and southern — were pleased. 
When Washington finished speaking, the former Governor of Georgia rushed up on stage to 
shake his hand. The Boston Transcript wrote that the speech “seems to have dwarfed all the 
other proceedings and the Exposition itself. The sensation that it has caused in the press has 
never been equalled.”44 The Atlanta Constitution called it “The beginning of a moral revolution 
in America,” and “The most remarkable address ever delivered by a colored man.” It continued: 
“The speech stamps Booker T. Washington as a wise counselor and a safe leader.”45  
 David Jackson has argued that Washington’s speeches cannot be taken at face value. 
Washington had, in Jackson’s account, “perfected the art of wearing the mask” for white people. 
He claims that Washington borrowed from the slave tradition of using double meanings to 
conceal one’s true aims from white people. “Because of their shared experience,” Jackson writes, 
“blacks identified with and decoded Washington’s messages in ways virtually impossible for 
whites and others outside of their cultural experiences to understand.”46 Jackson is certainly 
correct that Washington was skillful at reading an audience, and adroit at putting forward 
messages that black or white audiences (and often black and white audiences) would enjoy and 
accept. However, this argument implies a perfect connection between Washington’s ideas and 
those of the mass of black people, a proposition that leaves several questions unanswered. Two 
issues that are addressed directly below are Washington’s elaborate efforts to suppress criticism 
of his ideas in black newspapers (what would be the purpose of this if black audiences largely 
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shared his views?) and the pattern of internal dissent and protest at his own institution (if he were 
merely tricking white people, were his own students not in on the joke?). Also of no small 
importance in this discussion, of course, is the role of the white men who lifted Washington up 
and made him a leader. 
 Whereas in his youth he hoped to rise on the shoulders of the enfranchised freed people, 
when that path was blocked by counter-revolution, Washington saw an opportunity to ascend 
with support from the richest and most powerful white men in the nation. In 1905, Washington 
shrewdly moved his northern headquarters from Boston to New York. New York had become 
the center of American philanthropy when the new class of “robber barons” — John D. 
Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie in particular — built mansions there.47 Washington preached 
the right message at the right time to the right people. Among the arts that Washington perfected, 
was that of courting donors. However, more importantly, was the fact that Washington’s 
“industrial” philosophy coincided with the worldview of men like Carnegie and Rockefeller. 
Whereas Jackson sees Washington as a fox, tricking white people into giving him money for 
subversive ends, William H. Watkins and others see him as a proxy, a puppet manipulated by the 
rich.48 Closer to the truth is the fact that Washington believed in what he preached. Washington 
represented a class of black people — the middle class — who by and large embraced the 
acquisitive spirit of the age. In addition to preaching moral uplift and deploring agitation for civil 
rights, the Hampton/Tuskegee curriculum essentially taught a Protestant work ethic and the 
natural harmony of capital and labor.49 Carnegie was not tricked by Washington — rather, 
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Carnegie correctly sized him up as a coreligionist.50 Furthermore, Washington practiced what he 
preached. Carnegie was so impressed with Washington’s cost-saving method of using student 
labor to erect campus buildings that he pledged in 1902 to begin donating $10,000 a year to 
Tuskegee. In 1903, however, he outdid himself, giving the school a lump sum of $600,000.51 
 “Industrial education” did not easily coexist with other models of education for black 
people. Northern philanthropists sought to impose an “industrial” model of education as the only 
model. Washington was the black leader who, better than any white man, represented this policy 
to black people. By directing resources to “little Tuskegees” and away from schools with 
classical liberal arts offerings, philanthropists hoped to force all of black higher education in the 
South into one mold.52 For many years, they succeeded. Hampton and Tuskegee stood apart from 
all other colleges for black people. By 1915, Hampton had a $2.7 million endowment, and 
Tuskegee’s was $1.9 million. Together, these sums were greater than half of all of the private 
Black college endowments in the country combined.53 Wealth did not just provide greater 
educational resources; it also meant political resources. On the basis of this largesse Washington 
built a political mini-empire that was, arguably, more influential than his educational one. 
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The Tuskegee Machine 
 While Booker T. Washington advised black people to abstain from politics, he built up 
considerable political influence himself, all the way up the White House. If the historical axis of 
black politics is the tension between accommodation to racism and resistance to it, Washington’s 
political strategy contained elements of both. Washington was not merely a prisoner of the 
counter-revolutionary political terrain on which he operated; he also participated in shaping that 
terrain. 
 As C. Vann Woodward observed, very few white men wielded the influence that 
Washington did. “The man who abjured “social equality” in the South moved in circles of the 
elite in the North and aristocracy abroad that were open to extremely few Southern whites,” 
Woodward wrote. “The man who disparaged the importance of political power for his race,” he 
observed, “came to exercise political power such as few if any Southern white men of his time 
enjoyed.”54 A good word from Washington meant the favor of philanthropy and, potentially, of 
the president of the United States. A mark of Washington’s stature is that he was honored by a 
personal visit in Tuskegee from a sitting United States President, William McKinley, in 1898.55 
 Washington’s star rose when that of Alabama’s black people was falling. The 1901 state 
constitutional convention decided that the best way to end political feuding among different 
classes of white people was to disenfranchise black people altogether. 1901 was also the year 
that Washington was the first black man to be invited to dine as a guest of the White House.56 
Thus began a political partnership between Booker T. Washington and Theodore Roosevelt, who 
wanted to use Washington’s knowledge of the politics of the South to reshape the Republican 
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Party in that region. Washington, on the other hand, by having the president’s ear on the matter 
of federal appointments, developed the power to reward his friends and punish his enemies — 
white and black.57 This strategy did not, however, translate into an enlargement of black political 
power more generally. In addition to the catastrophe of disenfranchisement, Roosevelt actually 
reduced the number of black federal appointees.58 
 The “Tuskegee Machine” under Washington’s control wielded tremendous political 
influence in black America, often in ways that made civil rights activism more difficult. “Spies 
were planted in civil rights organizations,” notes Manning Marable, who grew up in Tuskegee 
and taught there in the 1970s, “and black colleges whose faculty or administrators opposed the 
Tuskegee philosophy were denied funds from white philanthropies and corporations.”59 The 
machine’s workings usually resulted in “much cruelty and disappointment for unconventional 
thinkers,” as one historian put it.60 Washington owned several black newspapers outright, and 
used his wealth and influence to buy off and cajole others. One of his agents successfully bribed 
the editor of an anti-Washington newspaper, the Washington Bee, in return for printing pro-
Washington editorials.61 Washington sent a spy to the 1905 founding meeting of the protest 
organization, the Niagara Movement (the predecessor to the NAACP) -- and succeeded in a 
campaign to get black newspapers to ignore the event. The newspapermen, influenced by 
Washington’s “lieutenants in every major northern city,” fell in line. Washington, writes Harlan, 
“could not tolerate even one defection.” When the black magazine, The Voice of the Negro, came 
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under the influence of the Niagara Movement, Washington succeed in suppressing it, “his most 
devastating action” against Du Bois’s movement.62 
 At the same time, Washington has a tendency to confound historians because he was 
well-intentioned. He genuinely believed that the strength of his Tuskegee Machine was in the 
best interest of black people; and he was not necessarily wrong for thinking so. Washington did, 
in fact, use his influence to direct funds to some black schools. “[I]n one way or another,” notes 
Harlan, “Washington helped at least twenty-two black educational institutions applying for 
Carnegie libraries, other buildings, or operating funds.” Despite his rhetorical opposition to 
academic and literary education, Washington served as a trustee of liberal arts-oriented Howard 
and Fisk, and successfully steered philanthropic funds in their direction. Washington told 
students in 1895 that he supported their highest ambitions: “I am not now, nor have I ever been, 
opposed to any man or woman getting all the education they can,” he said.63 Later, Washington 
attempted to shift philanthropic attention to the condition of high schools for black youth.64 
 Washington also spent his resources in well-intentioned (if, at times, ill-fated) attempts to 
help black people of all classes. He launched, for example, several “extension” initiatives 
intended to improve the lives of Black people in Macon County and beyond. Tuskegee Institute 
sponsored regular conferences for black farmers to learn the latest scientific techniques and 
strategize about how to get out of debt. The school also hosted annual meetings of black 
businessmen from across the country. And, just before he died, Washington started a public 
health campaign initiative that later became National Negro Health Week. Getting black farmers 
out of debt, supporting black businesses and improving black people’s health were noble goals, 
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but progress remained elusive. By the time Washington died in 1915, rapidly changing 
technology had made many of the vocations one could learn at Tuskegee irrelevant, and black 
people could not break into other trades without challenging Jim Crow. Despite the best efforts 
of the famed Tuskegee scientist George Washington Carver to spread his ideas about growing 
peanuts and other crops, few farmers in Macon County could afford to diversify; the rise and 
then fall of cotton prices bankrupted them by the thousands.65 
 Furthermore, despite his very public acceptance of the Jim Crow system, behind the 
scenes Washington led and personally funded several attempts to challenge discrimination in 
voting, jury selection, railroad accommodations, and even debt peonage. Washington tried to use 
his connection with the railroad magnate William Baldwin to solicit assistance in overturning 
Georgia's 1900 decision to segregate railroad cars. When Baldwin's enthusiasm for the effort 
waned, Washington teamed up with Du Bois to devise a legal strategy.66 Washington supported 
property restrictions for voting rights, but thought they should be applied to black and white 
people equally. Still, he helped two Alabama suffrage cases that made it to the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1903 and 1904.67 Washington also secretly funded and supported the case of a farmer 
from Montgomery County, Alabama, who was subjected to debt peonage, a case that also made 
its way up to the Supreme Court.68 Like his extension programs, these secret legal maneuvers 
usually did not succeed, and even when they did, their impact was limited. For most black people 
in the South, the noose of Jim Crow tightened in the early years of the twentieth century. Before 
he died in 1915, and perhaps sensing the futility of fighting Jim Crow in secret, Washington 
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broke with his own strategy and published an open attack on segregation, calling it “unjust” and 
“unnecessary.”69 
 Washington’s influence extended beyond the borders of the United States. He had an 
impact on people in the African diaspora across the globe, many of whom attempted to translate 
his philosophy in ways that suited their aspirations for freedom from European colonization and 
oppression. Cubans of African descent paid close attention to Washington’s model of racial 
uplift.70 In Jamaica, a young Marcus Garvey was inspired by Washington’s emphasis on pride 
and self-reliance. Garvey struck up a correspondence with Washington and even hoped to create 
a Tuskegee-style school. Washington likewise had contact with aspiring black nationalists in 
South Africa. He communicated with the men who became the founders of the African National 
Congress, who more or less shared his accommodationism and orientation on entrepreneurial 
activity and philanthropy. “It is no accident that these early ANC elite leaders so vehemently 
denounced socialism and so vigorously defended black private enterprise,” Marable noted.71 
Washington’s support for African nationalists was never anti-colonial. In fact, Washington 
admired the colonial powers and, not unlike his approach to the situation facing American black 
people, he sought elite assistance in “civilizing” Africans. Washington consulted closely with 
two American presidents to arrange a financial bailout for Liberia and to preserve its status as a 
semi-colony of the United States. He teamed up with European colonial governments in Sudan, 
Congo and South Africa to assist them in development projects.72 Washington sent four men 
from Tuskegee to the German colonial government in Togo, for example, to help encourage the 
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Ewe people to grow cotton in large quantities for export. The effort came to grief, however, as 
the Tuskegee men, following Washington, assumed the purpose of the mission was to develop 
the Ewe people’s independent economic strength, while the German government really just 
wanted a cheap, reliable source of cotton for the German textile industry. Both the Tuskegee 
delegation and the German colonial administration assumed the inferiority of the Togolese 
people, who actively resisted both of their efforts.73 
 The widespread activities of the Tuskegee Machine demonstrate that Washington was 
neither all-powerful nor powerless. He was not in perfect control of his political and economic 
environment, nor was he a total prisoner of circumstance, just making the best of a bad situation. 
Washington chose to labor both privately and publicly and his scope was international. In other 
words, he chose to step out of his schoolhouse door and into the realm of politics. He was not 
forced by circumstance to build an educational-political mini-empire reaching across continents; 
he chose to do that. In doing so, Washington in turn shaped the terrain upon which other black 
people acted. By all accounts, Washington believed in what he was doing. The net effect of the 
“Tuskegee Machine” however, was that it opened some doors for black people, while helping to 
close others more firmly. The group it helped was primarily the fragile, but growing black 
middle class; the group it failed, the black working class. “[D]espite its failures to change 
society,” Marable wrote of Washington’s efforts in North America and Africa, “Washington's 
philosophy in both continents helped to create a nationalistic, proud and dynamic elite of black 
people."74 
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 While Du Bois is often considered the antithesis of Washington, scholars have 
demonstrated that these two, in fact as noted above, both clashed and collaborated. Given the 
intensity of racism in the United States, this contradiction should not be surprising. Du Bois’s 
initial reaction to the “Atlanta Compromise” speech was to applaud it. Furthermore, their general 
outlook, as educators, shared a fundamental orientation: both men sought to educate an elite, a 
leadership (Du Bois’s “Talented Tenth”) that would carry black people out of their 
circumstance.75 In 1903, Washington offered Du Bois a teaching job at Tuskegee (Du Bois 
declined). Washington opposed Du Bois’s strategy of open protest against discrimination, even 
while privately supporting legal challenges to disenfranchisement and to segregation.76  
 As scholarship on Tuskegee and Washington focuses on external criticism (such as that 
from Du Bois of Washington), the criticism of students and parents within the “industrial” model 
remains mostly unexplored. Most of these internal protests were over the low level of training, 
since the schools emphasized the value of hard work and the morality of manual labor in order to 
prepare students to impart those lessons as teachers, not as craftspeople. Some students who were 
attracted to Hampton, for example, because of its printing press “commented bitterly” when they 
realized that the printing trade was not taught.77 One “distinguished” black visitor to campus 
complained that Hampton was "teaching the Negroes to be hewers of wood and drawers of 
water, and… servants to the white race.” It was the most beautiful campus he had ever seen, but 
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because of the restricted nature of intellectual pursuits, he said it was also a “literary 
penitentiary.”78  
 Hampton’s emphasis on strict moral training angered students who felt insulted by the 
rules of behavior. The historical record indicates that this sentiment at times was expressed in the 
form of student strikes. A strike in 1889 actually involved the future president of Tuskegee, 
Robert Russa Moton. Male students were insulted when a Hampton matron stopped them from 
escorting female students home one evening after a school social function. Moton was reluctant 
to protest, but was pushed by his classmates into leading their ad-hoc organization. “I realized 
that I was facing four hundred very determined young men,” he recalled. Moton expressed his 
doubts, but the students decide to go on strike anyway.79 The students weren’t the only ones to 
express dissent. Increasingly, Hampton’s political stance came under fire within the broader 
school community. In 1889 alumni wrote a petition of protest against the school’s support of Jim 
Crow segregation on campus. Samuel Armstrong, Hampton’s founder, admitted that criticism of 
the school was “common in the negro papers.”80 This undercurrent of protest and internal 
critique of “industrial” education was no odd occurrence, but a sustained and permanent feature 
of life in Hampton. 
 At Tuskegee, the pattern was much the same. From its founding, through every decade of 
its existence, students, parents, and sometimes faculty protested against the conditions and the 
curriculum. Most colleges had a strong element of moral training in this period, but Washington 
took it to a new level, keeping every detail of student life under personal supervision. As his 
travel schedule strained his ability to maintain such close surveillance, students often took 
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advantage of Washington’s absence to launch their protests. In 1896, his clerk wrote to him as he 
travelled: “The students all struck here today because they were given nothing to eat. I think 
every thing has been settled peaceably; it was a sure enough strike.”81 Washington remained the 
director of Tuskegee Institute until his death in 1915, but he ran the school more as a dictator, 
argues historian Kevern Verney, than a school principal. The Booker T. Washington Papers are 
“peppered with complaints by Tuskegee staff and students about Washington’s authoritarian 
management,” Verney writes. “Moreover,” he concludes, “it is probable that recorded grievances 
represented but a small proportion of the discontent, for individuals who allowed their doubts to 
become public risked hurtful letters of rebuke from Washington.”82 In 1902 Washington 
suggested a slight relaxation of the Victorian rules, perhaps ”dancing might be permitted,” but 
the Dean of Women warned him that doing so would open Pandora's box.83 
 Tuskegee’s alliance with the United States’ armed forces has been both a source of pride 
and protest in the school’s history.84 Washington’s influence with the White House created 
opportunities to align Tuskegee with the American military — a relationship that would be both 
financially rewarding and a source of protests for the next century. After the Spanish-American 
War, Washington, Harlan wrote, “in a partnership with American colonialism” agreed to take in 
black Cuban and Puerto Rican students. But Washington encountered great difficulties winning 
them over to the “industrial” model of schooling. The new students protested against their work 
duties so often that Washington eventually had a guard house built so he could put disruptive 
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students in “jail” if necessary. Harlan describes the climax of one conflict with a student leader, 
Juan Gomez: 
The Cubans refused to eat again and struck against their work. When a teacher and a 
student tried to put Gomez in jail, his compatriots jumped them, but they succeeded in 
making the arrest. Guns were flourished before order was restored.85 
 
 The central issue animating most of the protests throughout Tuskegee’s history was the 
school’s “industrial” emphasis. Most protesters were not from Cuba or Puerto Rico — they were 
black Americans — from Alabama and the surrounding southern states.86 Whatever initially 
drew them to Tuskegee, once they arrived, they frequently chafed at the emphasis on manual 
labor. In his memoir, Washington recalls that “Quite a number of letters came from parents 
protesting against their children engaging in labour while they were in the school.”87  
 Washington always insisted that Tuskegee was a secondary school, not a college; but by 
necessity (and somewhat ironically) he was compelled to hire black college-educated people to 
work as teachers. He hired the eccentric agricultural genius George Washington Carver in 
1896.88 Although his work as a teacher and administrator may have left something to be desired, 
Carver’s discoveries became legendary and increased the association of Tuskegee with serious 
intellectual effort. Despite Washington’s fear that the faculty would catch the "Niagara spirit" 
and infect Tuskegee with it, he recruited Monroe Work, one of that movement’s founders, in 
1908.89 Work founded Tuskegee’s Department of Records and Research, where he compiled 
statistics on the conditions of black life in the United States. His career at Tuskegee exemplifies 
the tensions on campus between academic work and industrial education, and between strategies 
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of protest and accommodation. Initially enthusiastic about the opportunity to use Tuskegee’s 
resources to expand his research, Work was disappointed to find when he arrived and learned 
that he was expected to essentially serve as a propagandist for the Tuskegee Machine. He 
sufficiently impressed Washington, however, who gradually gave him more leeway. Work used 
the opportunity to gather evidence that would shatter myths about black people and expose the 
realities of segregation. In 1913, he published the first of what became an annual “Tuskegee 
Lynching Report,” making the school the nation’s premiere source for information on the topic.90 
 Tuskegee’s students, meanwhile, resorted to strikes and sit-ins to protest the emphasis on 
industrial education. In 1903, a group of students took the opportunity of another of the 
Founder’s sojourns to strike in favor of more academic instruction and less manual labor. Their 
protest was prompted by an administrative change in their schedules: a new division of time 
between academic and industrial work put more emphasis on the latter at the expense of the 
former. “About a week after Washington had left,” writes Harlan, “and after student petitions 
and complaints had been rejected, student dissatisfaction became so general that it was easy for a 
few leaders to bring about ‘an open rebellion.’” The male students marched from their breakfast 
hall to the chapel, “locked themselves in, and after some haranguing voted not to work or study 
until changes were made.”91 The board of directors wrote to Washington for advice; he 
responded simply: “No concessions.”92 
 Eventually, however, there were concessions. After the strike ended, the school’s 
governing council reduced the frequency of mandatory chapel attendance from every night to 
two nights a week. Tuskegee trustee and railroad magnate William H. Baldwin (no fan of 
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strikes), investigated the student strike and concluded there was merit in the students’ complaint 
that “they were required to devote too much time to both industrial work and studies with too 
little time for preparation.” From an “efficiency” perspective, Baldwin thought Washington 
should reduce their burdens. However, rather than grant greater freedom from manual labor, 
Washington elected (against the protest of the academic faculty) to ease the students’ burden of 
time spent in preparation for their academic courses.93 
 The school’s disciplinary records tell us something about the climate on campus. For 
1907, to take one year as an example, 41% of the students (676 out of 1,621) were subject to 
disciplinary actions (ranging from warnings to suspensions).94 If they couldn’t follow the rules, 
coursework allowed little reward, either. The vast majority of students never advanced beyond 
the lowest level classes, and most of those did not graduate. The few who did “survive” to 
graduate did in fact go on to college and joined the professions that defined the “Talented 
Tenth.”95 Others left to pursue higher education elsewhere. The celebrated poet Claude McKay 
was a student at Tuskegee in 1912; he described it as a “semi-military, machine-like existence.”96 
McKay withdrew and transferred to a liberal arts college in Kansas. 
 There is conclusive evidence that criticism of Washington’s educational philosophy and 
methods emerged within Tuskegee, and was by no means confined to northerners like Du Bois. 
The story of internal criticism is not well known, a further testimony to the effectiveness of 
Washington’s machine. “There is not a scintilla of evidence that the officials here are 
overbearing,” wrote one visitor to Tuskegee in 1916, “that the discipline is unduly severe or that 
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the students are discontented or depressed.”97 Whatever the intentions of this visitor, his report, 
published in a New England educational journal, begins with an unmistakably defensive tone, as 
if responding to very specific criticisms not referenced. As demonstrated above, there is more 
than a scintilla of evidence that students, parents, and sometimes faculty challenged the priorities 
and policies of the Founder. But the appearance of total control was an important part of the way 
the school advertised itself. In later years, Tuskegee’s apparent ability to maintain such complete 
control over its students made it an attractive partner to new employers who moved into the state 
of Alabama. The coal mine operators, for example, wanted Tuskegee’s help to make sure its 
black workers remained “patient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful.” 
 
From Cotton to Steel 
 As the nineteenth century waned so did the dominance of cotton in Alabama’s economy. 
The challenger, rising with the advent of the twentieth century, was steel. As Horace Mann Bond 
observed in his influential study of education in Alabama, it was impossible for such an 
enormous economic transformation to occur and leave the social status of black people 
untouched; with new status, came new approaches to their education.98 The boll weevil, the crisis 
in the cotton market, the decline of agricultural employment, and the rise of coal mining and iron 
and steel manufacturing industries all dramatically altered the position of southern black 
workers. Their new industrial employers had different attitudes toward education. Unlike 
planters, who benefitted from a social arrangement that required black people to be illiterate, 
innumerate, and socially ostracized, the industrialists saw an advantage in opening up skilled 
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positions to black workers, since they could be paid lower wages and were believed to have less 
experience with unions. This transformation of the working life of black people inevitably 
required a reworking of the “Atlanta Compromise” and of the governing philosophy of Tuskegee 
Institute. 
 The seeds of the decline of Alabama’s plantation agriculture were sown by the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. Monoculture cotton production had exhausted the soil, making 
it increasingly difficult to get the same yield per acre. And then, a small insect that feeds on 
cotton buds, the boll weevil, arrived in the Black Belt — to devastating effect. Cotton-growing 
acreage was reduced almost by half from 1912 to 1917 and the yield per acre was reduced by 31 
percent. Increasing competition from foreign cotton growers only made a bad situation worse. 
More and more, black Alabamians decided not to “cast down” their buckets in the Black Belt. 
They picked them up, and headed for southern and northern cities. From 1900 to 1930 the 
percentage of black people living in rural areas dropped by 20 percent, and the number living in 
Alabama’s cities doubled.99  
 The migrants were drawn north by the promise of better pay and a better life. Whereas 
cotton production was concentrated in the Black Belt running through the southern part of the 
state, coal and other mineral deposits were primarily found in the northern regions of Alabama. 
The first coal mine opened in Jefferson County in 1840. Coal production in Alabama did not 
really take off until after the Civil War, at which point it exploded. The state produced only 
13,000 tons of coal in 1870, but more than 8 million tons by 1900. The coal operators considered 
black people an ideal workforce not only because they were cheaper, but also because they were 
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thought to be more docile and less prone to striking. By 1923, 52.7 percent of all miners in the 
state of Alabama were black.100 
 For a time black coal miners tried to advance, not through an alliance with elite white 
people, but through organizing trade unions alongside their white co-workers. Building on the 
legacy of Herbert Gutman, Stephen Brier, and other labor historians, Brian Kelly argues that 
interracial unionism in the Alabama mines at the beginning of the century contained a social 
dynamic that, at times, successfully ran counter to white supremacy.101 Although the coal 
operators brought them in as a cheap and “docile” labor force, black workers’ militancy in the 
struggle to establish unions shifted the views of white workers. A strike in 1920 provides a case 
in point. “The determined role that black unionists assumed in prosecuting the [1920] strike,” 
Kelly observes, “made it difficult to sustain racial generalizations about blacks’ proclivity for 
strikebreaking.” 102 In extremely difficult conditions, the survival of unionism itself — let alone 
biracial unionism — was nearly impossible. Black and white miners frequently stood together 
opposing the practice of convict leasing and scabs in the mines. However, as the operators 
shifted to using black strikebreakers predominantly, the solidarity of the union was tested. The 
response of white unionists, Daniel Letwin writes, ranged from “defiant egalitarianism to 
bemused condescension to creative appeals to white supremacy.”103  
 Tuskegee Institute was, in the first instance, a welcomed partner in the rise of the new 
industries. The mine operators systematically sought to forge an alliance with the black middle 
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class in order to better control black laborers. Kelly argues that this was not the unified strategy 
of black people as a group, but a policy generally promoted by the fragile black middle class — 
professionals and small businesspeople. Middle class black people were often the ones to seek 
out alliances with the “better class” of white people in order to secure gains such as housing or 
schools in exchange for votes or labor peace or strikebreaking, while the results of such 
agreements were imposed on black workers, regardless of their views. It was the black 
“preachers, businessmen, newspaper editors, camp welfare workers, leaders of fraternal orders,” 
writes Kelly, “who were held up by employers as the natural spokesmen for black racial 
progress, and who were often materially supported by the coal operators.” Tuskegee graduates 
were often hired by the coal companies to convince black workers not to join unions. In 
Birmingham, operators set up company-run coal camps for black workers to live in and even 
provided schools modeled on Booker T. Washington’s “industrial” ideal. The purpose of these 
welfare programs was to ensure a reliable, cheap, and properly socialized work force for the 
mines. “Hampton and Tuskegee graduates played a prominent role in the various ‘negro welfare 
associations’ set up in the camps,” Kelly points out,  
and operators hired them to teach in and administer their Negro schools. [the De 
Bardeleben Coal Company] appointed the Tuskegee protégé Robert W. Taylor to oversee 
the education of black miner’s children, considering him a “good negro, smart,” who 
“knows his place.” 
In exchange for successful supervision of black workers, the grateful coal company offered 
several scholarships to Tuskegee each year to its black employees.104 
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 The embrace of this mixture of Victorian morality, Protestant work ethic, and white elite 
paternalism is not unique to Alabama, Booker T. Washington, or Tuskegee. In his study of black 
teachers in the segregated South, Fairclough notes that Black teachers were, generally speaking, 
from middle class families, and thus tended to look down on the rude, rough habits of their rural 
cousins. They preached hygiene, thrift, abstinence, temperance, industriousness, elocution, and 
“oversold” the extent to which these attributes could lead to personal success for their students. 
Nearly every college and university for black people operated on an “industrial” model to some 
extent, Fairclough observes. Rural people were often, but not always, deeply invested in such an 
education as a strategy of uplift. For many the economic reality of sharecropping meant that 
children could be more productive in the fields than in school. Even when they were involved in 
a school, they didn’t always agree with its methods. Some parents protested the use of corporal 
punishment by teachers and advocated for a higher level of instruction than was on offer in 
“industrial” models.105 
 The “industrial” label can sometimes be deceiving. Fairclough’s careful observation of 
the various meanings of “industrial” education demonstrates the point. In fact, he documents that 
many schools operated on a different basis from Tuskegee — they slapped the label “industrial” 
on their institutions in order to attract funding, but consciously promoted a liberal arts 
curriculum. Between the boll weevil, depressed cotton prices, and increasing opportunities in 
urban centers, “industrial” education aimed at training farmers and craftspeople (what had been 
the aspiration of the freed people) was increasingly antiquated by the early 20th century. New 
industrial leaders needed black workers educated at a higher level, and in some urban centers 
they pushed for (or even built themselves) better schools. Between the changing status of black 
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people, migration, and the shifting needs of industry, resistance to black education beyond the 
moral training of the “industrial” model broke down after Booker T. Washington’s death in 
1915.106   
 What those segregated schools and their teachers accomplished is not entirely contained 
within the ideals held by the teachers or stated in the curriculum, Fairclough argues. Although 
some teachers explicitly advocated for democracy, civil rights, and other subversive ideas in the 
segregated South, most did not. A generation of activists and thinkers who wrote boldly and took 
bold action were nurtured in these schools (such as Carter G. Woodson, Richard Wright, and Ida 
B. Wells), where, despite the emphasis on manners and morals, an implicit lesson was pride. “By 
and large eschewing revolutionary or left-wing doctrines, they espoused Christian values, 
middle-class virtues, and American ideals. In that sense, they were a conservative force,” 
Fairclough concludes, “Yet they resisted white efforts to place a ceiling upon black achievement 
and refused to indoctrinate black children into white supremacy.”107 
 The changing economic position of black people had implications for their social status, 
and created new openings for them to pursue formal schooling. Industrial workers needed more 
literacy and industrial magnates tended to view schooling as an essential method of socializing 
the workforce — based on the success of this approach in northern states. Thus, raising black 
people from the role of agricultural peons to that of industrial wage laborers meant the 
opportunity to participate in formal schooling, and rising status. Although this new status — 
industrial wage laborer — was not particularly high, from the perspective of the planter any 
higher status was a threat to their social and economic system. Beyond the ideological 
implications, there was the issue of the declining number of people available for agriculture. The 
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exodus of laborers from the rural counties to the cities (motivated by the new opportunities in 
industry) put the remaining agricultural workers in the Black Belt in an improved bargaining 
position. As they had in the past, black people used such leverage to negotiate for educational 
opportunities for themselves and their children.108 In these ways, the old order was unstable. The 
outcomes were not automatic, nor easy — everything came through social struggle and 
contestation — but the terrain on which that conflict occurred was shifting. 
 The philanthropists were slow to respond to these changes. They assumed that black 
people could be socialized into particular industrial occupations. Accordingly, they funded 
“industrial” education in order to promote social stability and productivity. Both social stability 
and productivity proved fragile in the 1920s, however, as the American economy contracted. 
Employers turned “black jobs” into “white jobs” and thus rendered many black workers 
superfluous, frustrating philanthropists’ plans. They eventually abandoned their commitment to 
“industrial” education and higher education and shifted their attention to elementary schools for 
black people. With Washington deceased and the economy changing rapidly, both Tuskegee and 
Hampton became liberal arts colleges. The “New Negro” of the 1920s would not accept anything 
less.109  
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Chapter 2: Transformations of Tuskegee Institute, 1915-1945 
 
The New Negro on Campus Fights Back 
 The dramatic global events that transformed the lives of black people in the United States 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century could hardly leave their colleges and universities 
untouched. Black soldiers traveled to Europe to fight in a world war and came home armed, 
literally and figuratively. Black people increased their migration to urban centers in the South 
and in the North, and the South industrialized. All of these dynamics shifted power away from 
the planters and gave force to calls for educational change. Industrial education in general, and at 
Hampton and Tuskegee in particular, did not survive the decade. 
 Black colleges in the 1920s faced extreme contradictions. Southern states raised teaching 
standards and expanded education, which placed greater pressure on colleges to raise academic 
standards as well.1 However, philanthropists and some black educators tried to hold on to the 
industrial model in the form of vocational education and continued to challenge the rise of 
academic curricula. The federal government, too, did its part to try to prevent change. The 1914 
and 1917 Smith-Lever and Smith-Hughes Acts established a county bureaucracy that deployed 
agents to make sure black schools receiving federal funds did not stray from vocationalism.2 At 
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the same time, black students became a force to be reckoned with. While the number of college 
students in the United States doubled in the 1920s, the number of black college students nearly 
quintupled. Only 400 received bachelor’s degrees in 1920, while 1,903 did so in 1929.3 There 
were 2,132 black students nationwide in 1917 and 13,580 by 1927. These were no longer meek, 
grateful vocational students. Rather, they were often bitter, fearing that their aspirations had been 
traded for philanthropists’ money.4 Black students fought back. Their protests, with growing 
support from their parents and communities, and in the context of changing political economy of 
the South, changed “institutes” into genuine colleges and universities. 
 Often, black students initiated protest movements in response to what they felt were 
antiquated Victorian rules governing their lives on campus. Strict moral codes of conduct on 
campus were traditional for all colleges in the United States, but whereas white schools started 
shedding these regulations in order to emphasize academics in the 1920s, black schools lagged 
behind.5 Every minute of student’s lives at Hampton was scheduled: ”The ringing of a bell told 
them when to get up, go to class, go to meals, go to chapel, go to church and go to bed.”6 
Reviewing the records of the administrative board at Hampton, Edward Graham notes that, “at a 
time when civilization was so far advanced that man had invented the iron lung, flown the 
Atlantic, transmitted the first television image and sound, and designed a rocket-propelled plane 
-- two young ladies were put on probation for playing cards.”7 When Hampton had younger 
students effectively taking courses at the high school level or lower, it was easier to impose such 
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regulations. But by the 1920s, “Hampton was no longer dealing with docile and half-grown 
elementary students, regimented to strict military discipline,” wrote Du Bois. Instead, “she had to 
deal with older college men who were thinking for themselves.”8  
 Students also reacted to the humiliating imposition of Jim Crow rules on their own 
campuses. Although they tried to build up students’ pride and confidence, administrators at black 
colleges also attempted to maintain the norms of the segregated South, especially in the presence 
of funders, dignitaries, and other white visitors. After integrating faculty and dining rooms, 
Atlanta University was told it must give up “radicalism” in order to receive philanthropic 
support. The people holding the reins of power were part of the problem. The trustees of 
Hampton Institute believed in Jim Crow. They saw “complete separation” as the “only solution” 
to the “Negro problem” -- including segregation on campus. Some teachers apparently agreed; 
five white members of Hampton’s faculty marched in a Ku Klux Klan parade in support of 
segregation. Hampton’s leaders decided to ban the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) from campus.9 Fisk did the same, taking the extra precaution of 
removing NAACP literature from its library.10  
 In response to low academic standards, enforced vocationalism and Jim Crow on campus, 
black students launched, in the 1920s, what one black newspaper called “an epidemic of student 
strikes.” At Fisk, in 1924, students demanded greater freedom, the right to form sororities and 
fraternities, and a student newspaper. In a flashpoint, students erupted, overturned chapel seats, 
smashed windows, shouting, “Du Bois! Du Bois!” The students went on strike, shutting down 
the campus for ten weeks, ultimately winning their demands. At Howard, student protests ended 
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mandatory chapel attendance in 1922. Two years later, Howard students threatened a strike and 
won joint power — alongside the administration — in student disciplinary cases. In 1925, 
Howard students struck against compulsory military participation in the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (ROTC), and succeeded in having the program reclassified as an optional way to 
satisfy Howard’s physical education requirement.11 Students at Tuskegee would have to wait 
fifty years to win comparable changes.12  
 Many observers saw the revolt of black students in the 1920s as part of a global 
radicalization. “Youth the world over is undergoing a spiritual and an intellectual awakening,” 
wrote the black poet Countee Cullen, “[and the youth] is looking with new eyes at old customs 
and institutions, and is finding for them interpretations which its parents passed over.” President 
McKenzie at Fisk said that the uprising of black students raised similar issues as the Russian 
Revolution — particularly the issue of control: “This problem in the college is quite similar to 
that occasionally presented, of recent years, by radicals everywhere. Shall the factory be turned 
over to the workers and be run by the workingmen’s council? Shall the colleges be turned over to 
the students and be run by undergraduate committees?”13 Visiting Tuskegee in July 1920, former 
U.S. President Taft hopefully asserted that the legacy of Booker T. Washington would be the 
answer to this global movement. Washington’s philosophy could, he said, “save us from anarchy 
and Bolshevism.”14 
 The two black colleges with the largest endowments, Hampton and Tuskegee, were seen 
as immune from the strike wave. According to one observer, “nobody considered the possibility 
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that anything could happen at Hampton.”15 But something, did, in fact happen, and Hampton 
would not be the same afterwards. Students at Hampton went on strike in 1925 and then again in 
1927 against the low level of instruction and against strict moral regulation. One student leader 
of the latter revolt said his fellow students had a “Du Bois ambition” that was not compatible 
with “a Booker Washington education.”16 Another account summed up the students’ issues: 
“What gave students most concern was the quality of education that the college offered and the 
role of students in campus affairs.” The strike was broken when its leadership was identified and 
removed from campus. At least fourteen of those expelled students were “ranking scholars” on 
campus and several went on to earn degrees elsewhere, and then to distinguished careers in 
education and public service, among other fields, demonstrating that with “unerring accuracy the 
college singled out the backbone of its student leadership… probably one of the most talented 
groups ever to leave a college or university campus.”17 There was victory in defeat, however: the 
strike successfully forced the school to reassess the issues raised, but the pace of change was 
slow. Discontent, grumbling and protest continued after the strike. One measure of creeping 
progress was that it took a whole year after the struggle, until 1928, for students to win the right 
to dance at a few major social activities.18 
 Tuskegee, meanwhile, mostly avoided such clashes in the 1920s for three reasons, 
discussed further below: dissidents often decided to leave campus on their own; the 
administration moved quickly to upgrade the academic programming; and the school faced 
external challenges that united students, faculty and administrators. Following Booker T. 
Washington’s death in 1915, Dr. Robert Russa Moton was selected as the next leader of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Graham and Meade, “The Hampton Strike,” 673. 
16 Anderson, Education of Blacks: 286, 289-91. 
17 Graham and Meade, “The Hampton Strike:” 674; 677. 
18 Wolters, The New Negro on Campus, 271. 
    
80 
Tuskegee. Dr. Moton successfully embraced and celebrated the educational philosophy of 
Booker T. Washington in words, while quietly abandoning many – but not all – aspects of it in 
practice. Moton inherited a college that was effectively a high school. After the state of Alabama 
initiated a policy of only hiring teachers with college degrees, Tuskegee graduates were 
unemployable in the state’s primary schools. Moton decided that he had “to advance the 
curriculum of Tuskegee Institute to the college level in order to meet this requirement.” In 1925, 
Moton initiated a major campaign to raise $5 million and ended up raising $10 million, proving 
that, while shifting course on the curriculum he was able to continue Washington’s legacy of 
courting wealthy donors.19 
 As in the past, the money came with strings. Student life was strictly regimented and 
surveilled in order to perpetually prove that Tuskegee was instilling the proper values in its 
students — including acceptance of Jim Crow segregation. “Male students were organized in 
quasi-military cadet regiments that drilled, performed guard duty, and policed the campus,” one 
historian wrote. Thus there were “continual rumors” of “student unrest” in the 1920s, and 
students found creative ways to “secretly” rebel. Tuskegee students were “divided” Marable 
wrote, “about the new racial consciousness of the twenties.” Some embraced the Eurocentric 
cultural norms on campus, while others wondered “[i]s it a humiliation to be identified with a 
race that has produced such men and women as Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, 
Sojourner Truth, Phyllis Wheatley and many others of such character?”20 Some of the faculty 
considered the observance of Jim Crow rules on campus “obsequious.” Tuskegee attracted some 
of the best and brightest black scholars in the country, but they often bristled under the 
restrictions of the campus culture. The famous social scientist E. Franklin Frazier, for example, 
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recalled that when he began teaching at Tuskegee, he was summoned to the dean’s office and 
“admonished for carrying too many books on the campus.” Apparently, the dean “feared that 
whites ‘would get the impression that Tuskegee was training the Negro's intellect rather than his 
heart and hands.’”21 
 Although Moton moved to upgrade academic offerings, at the same time, Tuskegee 
experienced a rapidly revolving student body. Student attrition — following the pattern of the 
low graduation rates of the 19th century — helped reduce activism at Tuskegee. Moton himself 
admitted that “Too large a percentage of our students, for one reason or another, discontinue 
their studies before completing their courses.” Or, put another way: “…nonconformists generally 
removed themselves from Tuskegee.” As Claude McKay did a few years earlier, Nella Larson, 
another such non-conformist, worked at Tuskegee in 1915 and left in 1916. In her novel, 
Quicksand, the protagonist, a young teacher at a school clearly modeled on Tuskegee, becomes 
disillusioned with the “hypocrisy, cruelty, servility, and snobbishness,” and decides to leave.22 
The departure of figures like Larson and McKay in the first few decades of the twentieth century, 
may explain why “the institute was free from the student and faculty protests that brought 
turmoil to other black colleges in the 1920s.”23 
 
The Tuskegee Veterans Hospital 
 Tuskegee Institute and its new leader, Dr. Moton, emerged from the first world war with 
political capital to spend. Most black leaders (including Du Bois) saw the war as an opportunity 
for black people to raise their status. Du Bois called for black people to “close ranks” and 
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support the war effort, and even endorsed the formation of a segregated officers training camp 
for black people.24 Meanwhile, Moton offered Tuskegee’s resources to the U.S. military. The 
institute gave technical training to 1,229 men during the conflict.25 Moton also lent his personal 
prestige in black America to the government’s effort to manage black soldiers. There was “bitter 
criticism concerning the treatment of Negro soldiers and officers in France,” Du Bois wrote, 
“and there was widespread fear that when these soldiers returned they would be centers of 
disaffection and even revolt in the United States.”26 Moton traveled to France on behalf of the 
U.S. government, allegedly to investigate charges of sexual misconduct by black soldiers (he 
found no evidence). Others argue that Moton’s real mission was to encourage the troops “not to 
be arrogant upon their return.”27 As Du Bois put it, “the administration of President Woodrow 
Wilson depended on Moton to help dampen radical agitation among Negroes.”28 
 The times were changing, however, and the necessity of cringing before white supremacy 
— however controversial or necessary in the past — was increasingly unacceptable to black 
people in all regions of the United States. Moton, too, was a man of his age — but the 1920s and 
1930s was a different era from that of Washington’s. When Moton was invited to speak at the 
unveiling of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. in 1922 (the only black man to have that 
honor), he prepared a blistering speech. In it, he proclaimed that the memorial would be a 
“hollow mockery” and “a symbol of hypocrisy” unless the government took the steps necessary 
“to make real in our national life… the things for which [Lincoln] died.” All mention of mockery 
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and hypocrisy were edited from the speech in advance by the Lincoln Memorial Commission, 
however, and Moton delivered a much tamer version at the actual event.29 
 Moton’s willingness to accommodate the agenda of the White House and the U.S. 
Military paid dividends. For his loyalty and service, Moton and Tuskegee were rewarded with a 
Veterans Hospital. Interestingly, both black militants and white racists objected to the locating of 
a federal hospital for black veterans at Tuskegee. The NAACP argued that the hospital should be 
located in the North; placing it at Tuskegee, civil rights leaders worried, would further strengthen 
the school as a “capital” of black America. An Alabama state senator, meanwhile feared that a 
government hospital would put local black people beyond the control of state officials. “[A] 
bunch of negro officers,” senator R.H. Powell said, “with uniforms and big salaries and the 
protection of Uncle Sam -- negroes who are not responsible to our local laws and not regardful of 
local prejudice -- will quickly turn this little town into a place of riot.”30 Once it was decided that 
Tuskegee would in fact get the hospital, a struggle broke out over the racial composition of the 
staff, especially the professional positions for doctors and nurses. 
 In the process of fighting for an all-black professional staff, Moton retained the élan of a 
militant “New Negro” while developing a new financial base of support for Tuskegee: the 
federal government. At first, the government disagreed with Moton. The Department of Veterans 
Affairs thought that the staff should be all black, except for the professional positions — the 
nurses, doctors and the head of the hospital would be white. But, as one historian noted, in order 
to “avoid estranging Tuskegee Institute from a people that had passed beyond the 
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accommodationism of Booker T. Washington, Moton had no choice but to demand that the 
government appoint Negroes to the professional staff.”31  
 The conflict illustrated the tortured logic of segregation. In the course of the struggle 
some white supremacists argued for an integrated staff and some integrationists argued for a 
segregated staff. White politicians demanded segregation, yet insisted that white professionals 
treat black patients (black nurse-maids were already made essential because Alabama law 
prohibited white nurses from touching black patients). State Senator Power feared having “any 
niggers in the state whom we cannot control” more than he feared an integrated hospital staff. 
President Harding, however, was “uncompromisingly against every suggestion of social 
equality” and thought that black people should “develop their own leaders capable of leading a 
separate Negro society,” and thus his segregationism led him to support Moton’s call for an all-
black staff. The director of the Veterans Bureau, also a staunch segregationist, agreed with 
Harding. Even the integrationist NAACP came around to supporting an all-black staff, after 
originally protesting against what they argued would be a “segregated hospital.” The only major 
black publication to protest was the Messenger. Its editors wrote, “For the Negroes it is a 
dangerous precedent to demand a jim-crow government institution.”32 
 Moton’s blend of accommodation and protest allowed him to avoid a direct confrontation 
with state or federal officials and at the same time present a militant posture in the conflict. At 
first, he actually acquiesced to the demand for white professionals in the hospital, arguing that a 
bi-racial staff was ideal, and calculating that black professionals could take over in time. When 
the hospital opened on May 20, 1923, the professional staff was entirely white. White nurses 
were assisted by black nurse-maids (earning one-third to one-fourth what white nurses made). In 
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July, when the first black professional appeared, an accountant, the hospital’s director ordered 
the security guards to escort him out. Soon after, approximately one thousand local white people 
marched with the Ku Klux Klan directly through Tuskegee’s campus in a single file line that 
stretched two miles. Among the procession were at least twenty hospital employees. Moton 
struck a defiant pose. He was prepared to defend Tuskegee, ordering ROTC students to take up 
positions along the parade route, among campus buildings, and some reserves in the nearby 
countryside “ready to speed in if trouble broke out.”33 The NAACP's Walter White sat with 
Moton in his home during the Klan procession, and remembered: “He pointed to a rifle and a 
shotgun, well oiled and grimly businesslike, that stood in a corner... ‘I've got only one time to 
die. If I must die now to save Tuskegee Institute, I'm ready. I've been running long enough.’”34 
 Standing up to the Klan was not the same as defying the federal government. Regardless, 
Moton’s vacillations achieved his goal in the end. Soon after the Klan march, Moton did in fact 
concede to white supervision of the hospital, and local white leaders conceded the presence of 
some black professionals in the hospital. The NAACP and Du Bois opposed this compromise, 
but Moton stuck to it with the understanding that the federal government supported a gradual 
transition to an all-black staff. Fortunately, elite white opinion was far from united in opposition 
to an all-black staff. After conceding black professionals, it was a short step to conceding a black 
director. By July 1924, only one year after a black accountant had been physically removed from 
the hospital and the Klan had marched through campus, the Tuskegee Veterans Hospital had an 
all-black staff and, with no fuss or protest from white people, a black director. By the 1940s 
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medical residency programs were initiated in the hospital and by the 1970s, it had 1,200 all-black 
employees, including 37 physicians and dentists, and 136 nurses.35 
 Moton is probably the major reason students and faculty at Tuskegee did not erupt in 
protest as they did at virtually every other black college in the 1920s. Transforming Tuskegee 
into a proper college, standing up to the Klan and fighting for an all-black staff at the Veterans 
Hospital, Moton seemed to many to have broken from the “servile deference” of the Washington 
years. As one historian concluded, “..it is doubtful that any considerable number of students and 
professors would have risen in rebellion against a militant principal who, at least in the mid-
1920s, was seen as an embattled major leading a campaign for racial self-determination.”36 In 
1929, Moton published What the Negro Thinks, in which he forthrightly asserted that black 
people oppose segregation and discrimination and demand equality.37 Rather than stifling the 
new militancy, Moton appeared to many to have joined it.  
 Moton skillfully transformed Tuskegee while apparently preserving the legacy of Booker 
T. Washington. In reality, however, Moton abandoned much of Washington’s philosophy, of 
necessity, piece by piece. Washington insisted Tuskegee would never be a college; its primary 
function was teacher training. Moton introduced college courses in 1925; an emphasis on 
vocational training was all that survived of Washington’s “industrial” model. Washington tried 
to develop the ability of black people to be economically independent through owning land, and 
ironically, he was completely dependent on the resources of white philanthropists in spreading 
that message. Moton developed a black middle class in Tuskegee through a contract with the 
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U.S. government for wages at the hospital totaling roughly $75,000 a month, while his idea of 
breaking up the large plantations in Alabama to promote black landownership never got a serious 
hearing.38 As Washington’s model changed in practice, so too did the ideas guiding the school. 
Washington said that racism would attenuate to the degree that black people made themselves 
economically useful. In the case of the Veterans Hospital controversy, precisely the opposite 
happened. The idea of black doctors and nurses terrified some (but not all) white people. What 
remained was Washington’s alliance with wealthy and powerful white people — Moton 
preserved and developed both. Moton maintained Washington’s political stance — avoiding 
open confrontation while privately pushing elements of his agenda that powerful white people 
disapproved. 
 By departing from key elements of Washington’s formula, however, Moton all the more 
effectively preserved Washington’s institution. If many of Washington’s specific proscriptions 
were no longer useful, his legend certainly still was. Moton inaugurated “Founder’s Day” — an 
annual commemoration of Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee, and on one such day in 1922 he 
presided over the unveiling of the infamous statue — still standing — at the campus’ main 
entrance, depicting Booker T. Washington “lifting the veil” of ignorance from a slave.39 
 Despite these profound shifts in the 1920s, the legacy of “industrial education” died hard. 
Across the South, schools struggled to get out from under the “industrial” idea. The president of 
Florida State Normal College, Nathan Young, worked to develop academic curricula, but twice 
changed the name of the school (to “Industrial College” and then to “Agricultural and 
Mechanical College”) just to preserve funding. It was a Tuskegee alumnus who discovered 
Young’s ruse and exposed it to the state authorities. Likewise, the president of the Georgia State 
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Industrial School was forced to resign in the face of “Tuskegee-inspired demands” that he “cut 
this Latin out and teach these boys to farm.”40 
 Meanwhile at Tuskegee itself, Moton successfully refashioned “industrial” education into 
vocational training. “By the end of the twenties,” Marable notes, “Tuskegee had matriculated 
hundreds of students every year who joined the thin ranks of the small but growing Negro petty 
bourgeoisie.” Graduates became clergy, teachers, principals, and social workers primarily; a few 
went elsewhere to study medicine and law. Despite the school’s best efforts, the Jim Crow 
system continued to tighten through the decade and lock black people out of many professions. 
For one million black people in the state of Alabama, for example, the 1930 census showed only 
116 black surgeons, 45 dentists, and 4 lawyers.41  
 
Morality, Sexuality, and Syphillis 
 Tuskegee and its leaders took a particular interest in promoting good health. Just before 
he died, Booker T. Washington initiated what later became National Negro Health Week.42 In a 
region were medical care was scarce, Tuskegee’s campus had two hospitals — Andrews Hospital 
and the Veterans Hospital.43 But in 1932, a program began that would, four decades later, make 
the word “Tuskegee” synonymous with racism in medicine. It came to be known as the 
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“Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment,” but is most accurately named the United States Public Health 
Service Study at Tuskegee.44 
 The facts are known: white doctors from the U.S. Public Health Service found 400 black 
men in the Tuskegee area with late-stage syphilis; they gave them iron tonic and aspirin as a fake 
cure in exchange for permission to perform autopsies when they died and the promise of a decent 
burial, free of charge. Tuskegee Institute was a willing participant, and both of its hospitals lent 
resources to the effort. It was one of the school’s philanthropic backers — the Rosenwald Fund 
(and one of the pioneering foundations supporting the construction of schools for black people in 
the South) — that suggested to the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) that Tuskegee 
be the site of the study.45 
 Tuskegee Institute’s leadership, like the medical profession generally, was deeply 
influenced by racist myths about black people’s sexuality. In the early twentieth century, the 
medical profession made great advances in understanding how diseases spread, and yet were still 
guided in their research by racist assumptions about black people. “No disease seemed more 
suited to blacks than syphilis,” historian James Jones wrote, “for physicians were certain that 
exaggerated libido and widespread sexual promiscuity had led to high incidence of the disease 
among blacks.”46 Once it was understood that syphilis could spread through sexual contact, long-
standing myths about black people’s sexuality also came into play and the two were strongly 
associated. Tuskegee’s leadership knew this all too well. During the World War I, when Moton 
traveled to France, part of his charge was to report on the sexual morality of black soldiers. The 
association with syphilis had even haunted Booker T. Washington. In 1915 a NYC physician 
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said that “racial characteristics” were responsible for the breakdown of his health, which some 
supporters complained was code for syphilis.47 Black sexual myths were a double-edged sword 
for Washington. He suffered salacious headlines when he was accused of speaking suggestively 
to a white woman in Boston; her husband chased Washington down the street and beat him 
badly.48 But Washington also played into these fears when it suited him. In an attempt to 
undermine northern civil rights activists, he encouraged white newspapers to take photographs of 
an integrated activist dinner party in New York. The newspapers took the bait and printed 
articles about the event that suggested the activists were engaging in interracial sex.49 
 The USPHS researchers were guided by racists assumptions and proceeded in a manner 
that was profoundly unethical, but their intent was not malicious. The syphilis study at Tuskegee 
did not involve injecting people with syphilis and was not aimed at “genocide,” as some later 
believed. Rather, it was an attempt to use manipulative and deceitful methods to understand the 
late stages of syphilis. The subjects were not informed of their condition, were offered treatments 
that were fake, and were not given genuine treatments as new ones were developed. Sadly, it was 
not uncommon at the time for the U.S. Public Health Service to conduct research without 
subjects’ consent. By 1936, researchers had demonstrated that late-stage syphilis caused 
neurological and cardiovascular damage, and still the study wasn’t stopped.50 By the 1940s 
researchers knew that penicillin could be an effective treatment, but it was not administered to 
the Tuskegee participants. In fact, the Public Health Service went out of its way to prevent the 
patients from knowing they had syphilis and from seeking any treatments.51 
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 When an Associated Press reporter broke the story in 1972, the impact was tremendous.52 
As the tale spread, so did outrage and misinformation, which, unfortunately made subsequent 
public health initiatives all the more difficult to implement. For example, when health officials 
tried to promote needle-exchange programs to prevent the spread of AIDS in African American 
communities in the 1980s, some black leaders responded with fear and suspicion, invoking the 
legacy of what happened at Tuskegee.53 False information about the study at Tuskegee persists in 
the 21st century and is widespread.54 In 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton officially apologized 
for the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. Surrounded by family members of the study’s subjects, 
and eight survivors, the president announced, among other things, a planning grant for the 
establishment of a bioethics center at Tuskegee University.55 In 1999, the Tuskegee University 
National Center for Bioethics in Research and Health Care opened its doors.56 
 When student protesters occupied Sherman Hall in 1968, they had no idea that such a 
study was in progress, or that for the next several decades, their school would be associated with 
medical racism. They were also most likely unaware that, at that very moment, Tuskegee had 
become associated — in the eyes of Alabama’s Governor George Wallace — with communism. 
Wallace was wrong, of course. Tuskegee was not a communist training ground. The grain of 
historical truth, however, was this: everywhere black people in the South were fighting against 
Jim Crow in the 1930s and 1940s, the Communist Party was an important part of that movement. 
The history of Tuskegee in those years is also part of the story. 
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Depression, Bad Food, and Communism 
 The Great Depression shattered the lives of working people — black people in particular. 
Agriculture suffered more than other economic sectors, primarily because of cotton. The 
overproduction of cotton on the world market meant prices plummeted from 20 cents a bale in 
1927, down to 4.6 cents in 1932. By 1933, 500,000 families were on public relief assistance in 
six southern states. Nearly 300,000 of those were in the cotton counties.57 In the cotton belt, 
black families survived on salted meat, corn, flour bread, syrup, and few vegetables. Sociologist 
Charles Johnson studied Macon County in the early 1930s and lamented the “dietary deficiencies 
everywhere so manifest.”58 
 The federal government’s intervention in the economy during the Great Depression — 
the New Deal — reorganized the shattered economy and ushered in new ways of life. Wide-
ranging federal regulations deepened the South’s integration into the national economy, reduced 
its dependency on cotton, and paved the way for industry. In the 1940s, 450,000 black men left 
agriculture and 500,000 jobs opened up for them in manufacturing.59 Booker T. Washington’s 
goal of promoting independent farmers and craftspeople was no longer relevant. Instead, 
hundreds of thousands of former sharecroppers and farmers became factory workers and 
soldiers. The planters no longer had the same power over their lives. Black people found 
opportunities with new employers, including the federal government. From 1926 to 1933 the 
number of black federal employees jumped from 50,000 to 200,000.60  
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 With rising incomes, migration to urban centers, and newfound confidence, black people 
sent their children to college in record numbers and their expectations soared. Only 12,000 black 
college people were college students in 1928, but by 1941 there were 37,000, and that number 
more than doubled by 1950.61 In the 1930s black students continued to protest, reflecting the fact 
that campuses still did not rise to the level of their aspirations. Rogers notes that “at least” eight 
big demonstrations “rocked HBCUs” in 1936 alone, over poor food, racism of professors, and 
the push for student councils.62 A white visitor to the campus in 1930 noted that: “Tuskegee and 
its methods receive more criticisms from the Negroes themselves than from the Southern 
whites.”63 
 One particularly eloquent testimony about Tuskegee in the 1930s comes from the novelist 
Ralph Ellison. Ellison was drawn to the campus in 1933 to study music under the famed black 
composer William Levi Dawson. Unable to pay tuition, Ellison was allowed to work in the 
school’s bakery, but didn’t earn enough for his musical instrument required uniforms, and 
boarding fees, and found himself quickly sinking into debt. He found solace in reading, and got a 
job at the library, but the “historic ethos of Tuskegee was a constant worship of practicality,” 
which left him feeling isolated from his peers. He also bristled at the strict regulation of student 
life and behavior. The student handbook was explicit: “Here, you will find every phase of your 
life systematically regulated and supervised for the purpose of aiding you in getting the most 
from your courses.” Even the students’ gait was a matter of scrutiny: “Pick up your feet when 
you walk… Never drag yourself along. Some people think that heavy feet indicate a light head.” 
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The handbook reminded students that “Tuskegee is a vast workshop… work is the chief element 
awaiting you at every turn.”64 
 In 1952 Ellison published his first novel, Invisible Man, in which the protagonist attends 
a Tuskegee-style college in the South. The portrait of the school — echoing Quicksand — is not 
flattering. Dr. Bledsoe, a thinly-veiled representation of Moton, was described as a man with not 
one but two Cadillacs, who knew just how to put on a mask for the white people who funded the 
school, and reveled in the power he wielded. “I’s big and black and I say ‘Yes, suh’ as loudly as 
any burrhead when it’s convenient, but I’m still the king down here,” Bledsoe tells the novel’s 
protagonist. Bledsoe continues: 
I don’t care how much it appears otherwise. Power doesn’t have to show off. Power is confident, 
self-assuring, self-starting and self-stopping, self-warming and self-justifying. When you have it, 
you know it. Let the Negroes snicker and the crackers laugh! Those are the facts, son. The only 
ones I even pretend to please are big white folk, and even those I control more than they control 
me. This is a power set-up, son, and I’m at the controls. You think about that. When you buck 
against me, you’re bucking against power, rich white folk’s power, the nation’s power— which 
means government power!65 
Horace Mann Bond corresponded with Ellison in 1967, chiding him about this portrayal. “I 
thought you laid it on a little thick,” he concluded.66 But perhaps the most enduring aspect of this 
fictionalized Tuskegee-inspired narrative is the protagonist’s reaction to the statue of the 
Founder, portrayed as “lifting the veil of ignorance” from a slave. “I am standing puzzled,” he 
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says, looking at the statue, “unable to decide whether the veil is really being lifted, or lowered 
more firmly in place; whether I am witnessing a revelation or a more efficient blinding.”67 
 Like other HBCUs in the 1930s and 40s, Tuskegee provided a space where competing 
ideals were given open expression. Ellison, drawn towards the communist movement as a 
teenager, felt out of step with the culture of the campus as a whole. But he did find a few 
professors and other students who shared his love of literature.68 There were both strict rules and 
the possibility of protesting them. ”Students complained about Victorian codes of conduct,” 
writes Fairclough, perceptively, “but the very frequency of student protests suggests that black 
colleges were not nearly as autocratic as some critics charged.”69 On campus, black students 
became exposed to ideas of collective protest and social change, while the administration 
remained, generally speaking, committed to middle-class personal advancement strategies and 
opposed collective bargaining and unions. The attitude of Tuskegee’s students, faculty, and 
administration towards two Southern-based Communist-led initiatives in the 1930s and 1940s — 
the Sharecroppers Union and the Southern Negro Youth Congress — demonstrates the depth of 
the communist movement’s influence in black America and the broad range of opinion, debate 
and action in play in these years at HBCUs. 
 Historians have, in the last few decades, taken a fresh look at the impact the communist 
movement on black America.70 The Communist Party (CP) was America’s first interracial 
movement to achieve a mass membership; at the end of the 1930s it had more than 50,000 
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members, roughly 7,000 of whom were black.71 The party carried its militant approach to 
fighting racism into trade unions in the North, and into the fields and mines in the South. It was 
in large part due to the efforts of communists that black union membership rocketed from 
150,000 in 1935 to 1.25 million by the end of the second world war.72 Likewise, in the South, the 
CP sent organizers into the Black Belt in the 1930s and recruited thousands of black farmers to 
its rural organizing project: the Sharecroppers Union.  
 The history of the Sharecroppers Union (SCU) suggests that the black middle class’s 
ideas about how to improve black peoples’ lives weren’t the only ones. Instead of rising up 
through market competition in allegiance with powerful white people, the Sharecroppers Union 
offered the possibility of progress through collective action and confrontation with powerful 
white people. Historian Robin D.G. Kelley writes that “through their own participation many 
black working people came to realize that a class-based, interracial politics-in which participants 
operated on a relatively equal plane and put basic rights for African-Americans at the center of 
their program was possible (though still improbable) in the Deep South.” Following Booker T. 
Washington’s stance toward trade unions, the leadership of Tuskegee in the 1930s actively 
opposed the Sharecroppers Union. Monroe Work conceded that the school’s “general policy… is 
to discourage the organization of Negro farmers.” At one point, when sharecroppers had an 
armed conflict with authorities in a nearby county, Moton hoped to “quell black unrest in the 
area” and so “dispatched representatives to Tallapoosa in a calculated move to turn blacks away 
from Communism.”73 
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 In another incident, Moton and Tuskegee both lost credibility with some black people 
over this stance. Fifteen SCU members stood with weapons to defy the sheriff who came to seize 
the livestock of a sharecropper, Clifford James, who had fallen deeply in debt. The sheriff left 
and returned with reinforcements, and in the ensuing shootout James was wounded. Despite his 
injuries, James walked seventeen miles to Tuskegee’s hospital. But the Tuskegee staff handed 
him over to the sheriff.  “After dressing James’s gunshot wounds, Dr. Eugene Dibble of 
Tuskegee contacted the Macon County sheriff,” writes Kelley, “who then removed James to a 
cold, damp cell at the Montgomery County jail.” When James and another SCU member, Milo 
Bentley, both died of untreated wounds while in jail, some black people criticized Tuskegee’s 
administration. The CP’s legal defense organization “held a very successful public meeting at the 
Old Pythian Temple on January 2, 1933,” notes Kelley, “to protest the arrests and to censure 
Robert Moton and staff members at Tuskegee Institute for their complicity in the deaths of James 
and Bentley.” Three thousand people, mostly black, marched a few days later in a mass funeral 
for the two sharecroppers. “Now, if you love your neighbor as yourself,” one local woman asked 
of Moton, “why did you not protect those two poor wounded negro farmers? Why did you let 
them die? A good enimy [sic] of all races I should say you be, in a time of real need.”74 
 The Tuskegee-based elite came in for the most criticism when working class black people 
developed their own strategies for change. The communist-led SCU, like the organization of 
mineworkers in prior decades, represented alternative solutions to the problems of black 
Alabamians. In the 1930s it also presented perhaps the clearest indigenous critique of 
Washingtonism in the Black Belt. Ned Cobb, who lived in Tallapoosa, the adjacent county north 
of Macon, joined the Sharecroppers Union in 1931 and became one of its leading members, until 
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he was sentenced to twelve years in prison for participating in the armed defense of Clifford 
James’ livestock. Cobb remembered traveling to Tuskegee’s commencement ceremonies in the 
spring when he was young, but he remained critical of the school’s founder. Reflecting on 
Washington, Cobb explains both his admiration for Washington, and his critique (and, perhaps 
even obliquely alluding to Ellison’s line about the statue on campus). “I wouldn't boost Booker 
Washington today up to everything that was industrious and right,” he said, 
Why? He was a nigger of this state and well known and everything, but here's what his 
trouble was, to a great extent: he didn't feel for and didn't respect his race of people 
enough to rock bottom with em. He leaned too much to the white people that controlled 
the money -- lookin out for what was his worth, that's what he was lookin for. He was a 
big man, he had authority, he had pull in life, he had a political pull any way he turned 
and he was pullin for Booker Washington. He wanted his people to do this, that, and the 
other, but he never did get to the roots of our troubles. He had a lot of friends, he had a lot 
of courage, but it was all his way. He had a lot of anything a man needed for hisself, but 
the right main thing, he weren't down with that. Yet and still the veil was over the 
nigger's eyes. Booker Washington didn't try to pull that veil away like he shoulda done.75 
 
 As the second world war approached, the Communist Party in the United States, on 
orders from the Soviet Union, dropped its grassroots approach to revolutionism, and sought 
alliances with middle-class protest organizations.76 This new strategic orientation, known as “the 
Popular Front,” represented a move toward the center-left of the American political mainstream, 
making it easier for communist-led and/or -initiated protest organizations to attract and retain 
large memberships of black people. For example, the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC), 
founded in 1937, was initiated by CP members, remained formally independent of the Party, and 
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attracted a wide range of support. At its height, the SNYC claimed 11,000 black members in 10 
southern states.77  
 The SNYC was able to take root in HBCUs because, however conservative in leadership, 
the nation’s black colleges were, in fact incubators of a generation of activists. As students 
pushed for greater academic offerings and more intellectual freedom in the 1930s and 1940s, 
they opened up a space for discussions about left-wing ideas, including communism and 
socialism. Students at Morehouse College could take a course on Karl Marx. And even in the 
Deep South’s state schools, notes Fairclough, “students could hear the likes of Paul Robeson, 
Langston Hughes, and W.E.B. Du Bois” — three of the nation’s most prominent black 
communists.78  
 Whereas Moton had tried to undermine the SCU, Frederick Patterson, Tuskegee’s third 
president (who began his tenure in 1935), could embrace the aims of the SNYC. The new 
organization represented the new mood of protest among young black people in the South, and 
its center-left politics also fit with the ideas of black leaders. In 1936, Edward Strong, a graduate 
student at Howard and a CP member, put out a call for a Southern Negro Youth Conference, 
noting that slavery ended three quarters of a century earlier, but “clouds of reaction and 
repression” still hung over black people. This conference, he wrote, would “strike out in a new 
and mightier drive to the goal that we are determined to achieve — Freedom, Equality, 
Opportunity.” Tuskegee President Fred Patterson was the chair of the SNYC’s adult advisory 
board (along with other leading black educators, including Du Bois and Alaine Locke).79 
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Patterson’s niece, Thelma Dale, was elected as its vice-chairperson.80 At the SNYC’s fifth 
congress, held at Tuskegee in 1942, the most famous African-American communist, singer Paul 
Robeson, gave his first Deep South performance.81 
 The SNYC’s program emphasized campaigns against disfranchisement and poll-taxes — 
increasingly the program of the mainstream liberal black leadership. In its Right to Vote 
campaign, SNYC members shared resources with NAACP leaders and the newly-organized 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Still, Kelley maintains that the SNYC represented 
“something more radical” than Popular Front liberalism.82 While the CPUSA turned away from 
shop floor union organizing during the Popular Front period, student leaders of the SNYC 
successfully carried out union drives among unorganized black workers. In Virginia in 1937, 
they came to the assistance of striking tobacco workers and helped them to form a new union and 
negotiate 10 to 20 percent pay increases and a forty-hour work week.83 After Hitler invaded 
Russia in 1941, however, SNYC leaders moved closer to mainstream black leaders. They 
immediately “dropped antiwar slogans” and became cheerleaders for the war “against 
Hitlerism.” Their call for “Freedom’s Children to Arms,” notes Kelley, “anticipated the Double 
V campaign [V for victory against fascism abroad and another V for victory against racism at 
home] national black leaders launched after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.”84  
 The Great Depression and the build up to the second world war shattered the old 
arrangements upon which Tuskegee had stood for the first fifty years of its existence. Between 
collapsing profit margins in the 1930s and “mounting taxation on private capital” in the 1940s, 
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philanthropic donations to Tuskegee and other HBCUs plummeted.85 “[B]etween 1930 and 
1943,” notes Marybeth Gasman, “the overall income of black colleges decreased by 15 percent 
and income from private gifts decreased 50 percent.”86 When Patterson took over the reins in 
1935, Tuskegee was operating with a $50,000 annual deficit. By his own admission, Patterson 
was not the fundraiser that Moton or Washington had been. “I really had to strike out on my own 
to develop resources,” he wrote.87 
 The sharp decline in funding may explain the wave of food strikes that swept black 
colleges in the 1940s. Students struck over the poor quality of food at Spelman in 1942, Clark 
Atlanta University in 1944, South Carolina's Benedict College in 1944 and 1947, North 
Carolina's Livingston College in 1946, Alabama A&M in 1947, and Alabama State in 1948. The 
“major campus protest” during Tuskegee’s 1940-41 school year was a food strike. As Rogers 
noted: “nearly half of the 1,400 students went on strike. Dozens were arrested, suspended, 
expelled, or battered by policemen in remonstration of ‘despicable’ food sometimes seasoned 
with flies, ants, roaches, and tacks.”88 
 Patterson’s response to the protests was uniquely sympathetic. When the Tuskegee 
student strikers began interfering with delivery trucks entering the campus, state troopers showed 
up. “I had to prevail on the state troopers not to arrest the students who were blocking the 
entrance but to give us a chance to work things out,” Patterson recalled, “which they did. We had 
wonderful cooperation from the troopers, but they had the biggest guns I’d ever seen in my life. I 
said, ‘Don't touch these students.’ They responded, ‘We wouldn't do that, Dr. Patterson.’ I said, 
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‘I think we can get this situation under control.’”89 Patterson did so with a clever deflection of 
the students’ energies. “When students at Tuskegee Institute went on strike in 1940 demanding 
better food,” writes Fairclough, “Patterson let them run the cafeteria. The students learned a 
valuable lesson in economics, gladly relinquishing control after a few days. But the strike also 
taught something to Patterson, who thereafter made a point of including students on college 
committees.”90 28 years later state troopers would threaten to invade the campus once again, this 
time in response to a student occupation of the trustees’ meeting; Frederick Patterson would be 
one of their hostages. 
  
Restructuring in the 1940s 
 Such maneuvers could placate students for a while, but they couldn’t solve the underlying 
financial problem. With tuition at only $50 a year, raising fees would not be enough. Tuskegee 
still had a large endowment (roughly $7 million), but costs were rising faster than income. 
Instead, Patterson initiated a “Five Year Plan” for poorer students to save money through 
extending the amount of work they performed for the school. Students who couldn’t afford 
tuition would work more and study less, and graduate in five years instead of four. In his 
autobiography, Patterson claims that a $150,000 deficit quickly became a $300,000 surplus 
because of his Five Year Plan.91  
 This may be an overstatement, however, since he and the Board of Trustees pursued 
further restructuring. As a result, Patterson agreed to allow the state of Alabama the ability to 
appoint more trustees to the Board (from two up to six, out of 24 in total) in order to receive 
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more funding from the state. “There were six state-appointed men on the board,” Patterson 
recalled. “At least one had to be black, and one was the state secretary of education. The others 
were appointed at large by the governor.” In 1940, the state appropriation was still only $5,000. 
Patterson got it raised to $10,000 and then to $110,000. Since all of the black colleges were in 
the same bind, Patterson suggested they pool their collective fundraising resources. What started 
as the United College Drive Conference later became known as the United Negro College 
Fund.92 Thirteen college presidents met at Tuskegee on April 9, 1943 to begin planning the 
effort. Their goal was to spend roughly $100,000 collectively in order to raise $1 to 2 million. 
They fell slightly short of that goal, reaching $765,000 by 1944.93 
 The economic crisis mandated educational shifts, Patterson believed. To go forward, he 
decided to reach back to the ideas of Booker T. Washington. In 1941, a black newspaper, the 
New York Age, reported that, under Patterson’s leadership, Tuskegee would expand its emphasis 
on training students for “service occupations.” The Age quoted him saying that it was 
“imperative that we give renewed effort in the direction stressed by Booker T. Washington and 
put brains and skill into the common occupations of life.” And furthermore, Patterson warned, 
“unless some Negroes are trained in the capacity of specialists in technological areas, the Negro 
people as a whole shall remain outside of the main stream of American development… and fall 
far short of the balanced development essential for normal participation in American 
democracy.”94 Composer William Dawson saw the writing on the wall, and left Tuskegee; his 
famed music program was shuttered soon afterwards. Ellison also departed.95 Apropos of the 
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curtailment (and given the anachronism in the school’s original name, “normal” for teacher 
training), Patterson likewise shortened the school’s name to “Tuskegee Institute.”96 
 True to his word, Patterson restructured Tuskegee to place greater emphasis on “the 
common occupations of life.” When he took over, the main college-level courses were in 
education and agriculture. Many graduates went on to become teachers or “ag men” — 
agricultural agents of the state and county. Patterson created four new programs at Tuskegee in 
fields that were “up and coming”: commercial food service, veterinary medicine, aviation, and 
engineering.97 In a sign of the changing times, Patterson felt criticized by black activists for 
perpetuating the color line in higher education. “I was loudly accused of promoting segregation,” 
when he initiated the veterinary school at Tuskegee, Patterson recalled. “In his own defense, 
however,” Fairclough notes, Patterson “pointed out that in 1944 it was the only veterinary school 
in the South open to blacks.”98 
 
The Tuskegee Airmen 
 Patterson would face criticism, too, for the formation of the now-famous Tuskegee 
airmen. Seeing aviation as an expanding industry, in 1939 he sought and was awarded a 
government contract for civilian pilot training.99 Once civilian pilot training had begun and an 
airfield built, it was a short step to considering Tuskegee as a site to train black pilots for the 
Army Air Force. As the build up to the second world war began, Frederick Patterson wrote to 
Robert Patterson (no relation), the Assistant Secretary of War: “Tuskegee Institute is available if 
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flying is going to be offered on a segregated basis. We do not want it if there's a chance of 
immediate integration.”100 Segregation in the military was a sore point. In 1939 there were only 
3,640 black soldiers were in uniform, but by the end of 1942, there were almost half a million.101 
The idea of creating segregated training facilities, to many black people, seemed like a step 
backwards. Across the country, black newspapers criticized Patterson’s move. The Cleveland 
Gazette called it a “jim-crow school of aviation at Tuskegee.” Kansas City’s Plain Dealer 
headline read: “$80,000 for Tuskegee Jim Crow Air Unit.”102 
 Patterson, like Tuskegee’s leaders before him, sought to collaborate with the American 
military for political and financial reasons. With help from the Rosenwald Fund, Tuskegee was 
awarded the government contract for the Army Air Forces pilot training program. Aviation 
requires a lot of non-flight staff, who also came to Tuskegee — bringing more well-paid 
professionals into the local economy.103 Enrollment in Tuskegee increased as students pursued 
aviation and related aero-engineering studies.104 As another symbol of continuity in the 
collaboration, Booker T. Washington III (grandson of the Founder), was appointed to oversee the 
development of the military aviation training school at Tuskegee.105 Altogether, from 1941 to 
1946 some 1,000 airmen were trained at Tuskegee.106 
 Although it is now legendary, the program was initially controversial. The NAACP 
complained to the military that “hundreds and hundreds” of young black people were enduring 
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long waits for pilot training because they were only eligible for enrollment at segregated bases. 
The organization requested that black soldiers be able to train wherever training was offered to 
white soldiers, and that segregated bases be abolished, because of the “discouragement, despair 
and cynicism which the limited segregated facilities at Tuskegee are spreading among Negro 
young men eligible for service in the Air Corps.”107 In 1943, William H. Hastie, former Civilian 
Aide to the Secretary of War,  protested segregation at the Tuskegee training camp. “Even in the 
construction plans for the Tuskegee Air Base separate quarters and separate eating facilities were 
provided for white and colored officers,” Hastie wrote. “Similar separation was planned for 
white and colored enlisted men. I protested against these plans and the Air Force refused to 
change them.” Although the military claimed that black officers became qualified and were 
advanced according to their demonstrated ability, Hastie argued that white officers with less 
experience were regularly promoted over black candidates. There is nothing to explain the 
pattern, he said, “except racial discrimination.”108 
 Once the second world war was underway, these charges carried more weight. As 
scholars have frequently noted, the treatment of black people in the United States harmed the 
American ruling class’s self-proclaimed image as the world’s preeminent democratic leader.109 
Some black leaders (including the civil rights activists Walter White and Roy Wilkins) adopted 
the “double V” stance – in favor of both Victory over racism at home and Victory over imperial 
enemies abroad – attempting to use war propaganda for their own purposes. Charles Johnson 
argued that the United States could take its “rightful place” on “high moral ground among the 
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nations of the world” only if it cleared its “conscience” on equal rights for its citizens.110 In this 
moment, the military was attempting to claims such high ground on the world stage and was 
particularly sensitive to charges of racism within its ranks.111 As pressure to desegregate the 
armed forces in general and controversy over the Tuskegee program in particular mounted, 
military leaders sought a détente with the black press. In September 1943, the military arranged 
for Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, commanding officer of the all-black 99th Pursuit 
Squadron to sit down and talk with a gathering of editors from twenty black newspapers. The 
Colonel’s efforts seemed to have an effect. Ludlow Werner, writing for the New York Age, 
reported:  
The thing which stood out in Col. Davis’ talk was the effect that the critical publicity on 
the segregation at Tuskegee Airfield had on the individual members of the 99th Pursuit 
Squadron. Talking about this, he said, “This publicity had a profound effect upon the 
individual member of the 99th. The eyes of the nation were on this organization. It was 
true that he felt hurt to find that his training station at Tuskegee Army Airfield was being 
regarded by some persons outside the military establishment as being a discriminatory 
group. However, he had the good sense to realize that the best means he had to defeat the 
end of supporters of philosophers who relegated him to a subsidiary role in the life of the 
United States was to do his job in such a way that the world would know that he was 
capable of performing a highly specialized and technical piece of work…”112 
 
The airmen themselves, however, saw no contradiction between proving their worth as pilots and 
challenging discrimination in the armed forces. After their training at Tuskegee, they were 
deployed to various bases around the United States and in the European theater. Nearly 
everywhere they went, they faced harassment and discrimination. 
 By merely attempting to use all-white facilities, Tuskegee airmen forced the US military 
to confront the long-standing practice of segregation at military bases, risking their military 
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careers in the process. The airmen’s actions began with the Tuskegee base, which was also 
segregated. “On August 3, 1944,” writes F. Michael Higginbotham, “twelve black officers at the 
air field in Tuskegee, Alabama, decided to challenge the segregation policies practiced at the 
base restaurant.” There was some tension as they were seated and served, but the restaurant was 
thereafter desegregated (although white officers stopped eating there). Some Tuskegee airmen 
were sent for further training to Freeman Field in Indiana. Segregation on the base there was 
widespread and becoming more entrenched. Supervisors were white and trainees were black. 
Therefore the designation of certain facilities as “for supervisors only” was effectively a way to 
get around new nondiscrimination regulations that had been implemented on the base. In 
response, in 1945, thirty-six black officers entered the club for “supervisory” officers on April 
5th and were quickly arrested. Undaunted, other black airmen followed their example and 
refused to abide by the “supervisory” distinction; ultimately, the military arrested 104 black 
airmen at the base. While the efforts of A. Philip Randolph and other activist civil rights leaders 
are often credited with applying pressure that resulted in the desegregation of the armed forces, 
“the Tuskegee Airmen's civil rights protests served more directly to pressure the military to 
begin desegregation efforts, even as World War II raged on,” writes F. Michael Higginbotham. 
“At the risk of their military standing and physical well-being, black soldiers integrated base 
facilities."113 
 The “double V” was, in fact, double-edged. On the one hand, the battle against Hitler 
discredited racism and gave new force to black people’s demands for an end to discrimination. 
On the other, a wide range of political leaders used the emerging Cold War with the Soviet 
Union to discredit and purge the Left from the American mainstream. People who spoke out 
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against segregation were discredited with the “communist” label. In the face of government 
repression, the NAACP abandoned Du Bois, one of its founders.114 On college campuses, the 
SNYC was “red scared into oblivion” by 1949.115 Black colleges in the South faced reprisals 
when they showed even a hint of support for change, and many faculty members (and even some 
college presidents) were forced out of their jobs.116 These anti-communist purges stymied civil 
rights organizing and for a time, the movement was effectively retarded.117 When activists (at 
Tuskegee, as elsewhere) began to organize for civil rights in the 1950s, they had to overcome the 
legacy of fear, intimidation and the paralyzing anti-communist attacks. 
 The anti-communist witch-hunts of the 1940s – started by liberals and pursued 
aggressively by southern segregationists – retarded the black freedom struggle, but could not kill 
it. Through migration, two world wars, political organization, and as much as they could, formal 
schooling, black people transformed themselves and the nation. In the next decade, the 1950s, 
the ice cracked, and black people launched a new series of challenges to the racial status quo, 
north and south. As discussed in the next chapter, Tuskegee’s community was a part of that new 
uprising. Just as they had in decades past, students often took the lead. In the 1950s, it was 
Tuskegee’s faculty who opened the door to the student movement. In that decade, they broke 
with the school’s tradition and openly declared that they should be allowed to exercise a most 
basic democratic right: the vote.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Marable, Race, reform, and rebellion, 27. 
115 Rogers, Black Campus Movement, Patterson, Chronicles of Faith, 53. 
116 This intensified in HBCUs in the 1950s and 60s. See, for example, Joy Ann Williamson, “‘This Has Been Quite a 
Year for Heads Falling’: Institutional Autonomy in the Civil Rights Era,” History of Education Quarterly Vol 44, 
no. 4 (2004): 554–576. 
117 Marable, Race, reform, and rebellion, 17. 
 
 
Chapter 3: The Struggle for Voting Rights in Tuskegee, Alabama, 1950 to 1960 
 
Class and Race in Tuskegee, Alabama 
 The indignities of segregation in Alabama were countless, ranging from the profound to 
the mundane, from being barred from the voting booth to the humiliation of segregated shopping. 
For example, a white person could try on shoes in one of Montgomery’s downtown department 
stores, but a black person could not. Every rule, of course, had its exceptions. One day in the 
early 1960s, a handsome, blue-eyed scion of a well-to-do family widely considered Macon 
County “aristocracy” (and dating its time in the county back before a black college came into the 
picture) entered just such a department store, accompanied by a dark-skinned young man he 
introduced to the clerk as his servant. “I came in here to buy my boy some shoes,” the blue-eyed 
boy told the clerk. Here was one such loophole: a black person could try on shoes in a downtown 
department store if directed to do so by his white employer, the real customer in that case. 
“Those shoes fit you, boy?” the aristocrat barked. “Yes sir,” his companion replied meekly. “You 
like them?” “Yes sir.” He turned to the clerk with cash in hand. “All right, I want to buy this boy 
these shoes.”1 
 The two young men left the store in fits of laughter. To people who knew him in and 
around Tuskegee, Sammy Younge, Jr. was a blue-eyed, fair-skinned son of a prominent black 
family, and his dark-skinned companion, Wendell Paris, was his best friend.2 What appeared to 
be strict adherence was, for them, a delicious resistance to the rules of segregation. Their joke on 
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the system was one they were uniquely capable of making. Most black people in Macon County 
did not have the complexion to pass for white. A dark-skinned Tuskegee professor, Charles 
Gomillion, had attempted to shop in one such store nearly forty years earlier, but walked out 
angrily when the clerk mistook him for a minister because he was wearing a suit; he vowed 
never to return.3 Even if they could “pass,” most Macon County residents were not college 
professors. They possessed neither the cars, clothes, money, nor the education and language to 
carry off such a prank.  Sammy Younge had spent his high school years in one of New England’s 
finest boarding schools, Cornwall Academy. He and Wendell Paris were different from most 
black people in 1965, but they were not different from most black people they knew. Like many 
of the other young people who grew up in proximity to Tuskegee Institute, their parents had gone 
to college, had professional jobs, nice homes, cars, and a corresponding sense of confidence and 
entitlement.4 
 There was a civil rights movement in Tuskegee, as in many other southern towns. Unlike 
other southern municipalities, however, the concentration of middle-class black people in the 
town of Tuskegee shaped the movement in unique ways. Tuskegee faculty and staff embraced 
elements of the militant ethos of the time, but in ways that did not violate their sense of 
propriety. They wanted change, but not too much, and not too fast. In the rapidly moving events 
of those years, today’s militants could quickly become tomorrow’s compromisers, however. 
Faculty led the earlier phase of struggle, but by 1965, students — like Sammy Younge, Jr. and 
Wendell Paris — were setting the pace of events. Whereas the faculty cherished their social 
position, the students explicitly challenged it. The trappings and outlooks of middle-class life 
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that faculty members saw as a weapon in their struggle for political equality, became a liability 
in the eyes of many members of the student movement.  
 
The Struggle for Voting Rights and Booker T. Washington 
 Before the publication of Robert J. Norrell’s 1998 book, Reaping the Whirlwind: The 
Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee, few people appreciated the role that Tuskegee University’s 
faculty and staff played in the struggle for voting rights nationwide.5 The lawsuit that Tuskegee 
plaintiffs eventually brought all the way to victory in the United States Supreme Court case, 
Gomillion vs. Lightfoot, in fact set an essential precedent for securing basic voting rights for 
black people across the country. It not widely remembered today, but at the time the battle over 
voting rights in Tuskegee was national news. One staff researcher at Tuskegee Institute collected 
over three thousand pamphlets, magazine and news articles about the conflict between 1957 and 
1959.6 
 The central organizer of the campaign to win voting rights, the lead plaintiff in the 
famous court case, Tuskegee professor Charles Gomillion, saw his work as a definitive break 
from Washington’s legacy. Gomillion is known to have said, “Booker T. Washington came to 
teach the Negroes how to make a living. I came to teach them how to live.”7 Norrell insists, 
however, on emphasizing continuity with Washington. “Gomillion and Washington agreed on 
one especially important point: change in Macon County was a slow process,” he wrote. “While 
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he was not nearly as patient as Washington, Gomillion was prepared for a long struggle.”8 The 
duality in Norrell’s account is more to the point: Gomillion both broke with Washington by 
pressing directly and openly for political equality and that he adhered to Washington’s formula 
by consciously attempting to contain that struggle within certain limits that he knew to be 
acceptable to white people (which was the reason for “going slow”). While “going slow,” 
Gomillion was willing to go further than the old leadership. In the 1960s, Tuskegee students 
wanted to go further still. They took up a more militant approach, pushed past the boundaries 
Gomillion had marked out, and began moving toward the ideas of Black Power.  
   
Education, Civil Rights, and the Economic Boom 
 Tuskegee students did not build their movement from nothing; rather, they inherited a set 
of political and educational ideas about social change from adults who stepped forward in the 
1950s to challenge their disfranchisement. Gomillion, like other black educators in that decade, 
found himself grappling with new opportunities and challenges. Foremost among rapid changes 
in Tuskegee in the second half of the twentieth century, were the dramatic economic 
transformations of the region. By 1950, the South was nearly one-half rural and one-half urban. 
In the preceding decades, the number of people employed in agriculture declined sharply, and the 
number employed in manufacturing, transportation, and services increased dramatically. What 
would these changes mean for black educators and black schools? At a 1954 Tuskegee 
symposium titled “The New South and Higher Education,” leading educators and businessmen 
from across the nation gathered to contemplate the meaning of the new situation. “The South is 
moving rapidly toward an industrial and commercial economy which is organized around cities 
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and metropolitan centers,” one participant, Donald J. Bogue, a sociologist from the University of 
Chicago, wrote in his prepared remarks. “Cotton, like many monarchs these days, is king in 
name only and lives in exile in California.”9 
 The educators and businessmen gathered at Tuskegee agreed that better schooling was 
essential for black southerners to take full advantage of the new economic opportunities. School 
was increasingly to serve as an employment ladder. More people need to go to high school, 
Edward C. Ackerman, an executive of the Tennessee Valley Authority, said. “This increasingly 
will be, if it is not already, the door through which the worker must pass in order to get into a 
better job, a better paying job.”10 “Workers will have to be better educated and more highly 
skilled,” said another, Benjamin U. Ratchford, a professor of economics at Duke University. 
“There will have to be more managers and supervisors and they will have to be better trained and 
more experienced.”11  
 These leaders, however, also saw that the changing economy would open the door to 
political changes — namely, the end of Jim Crow. “It is a queer thing that this booming 
industrial South inherits, from its agricultural past,” George S. Mitchell, the executive director of 
the Southern Regional Council told the assembly, “a solid structure of political undemocracy,” 
an undemocracy built upon “Negro exclusion from the franchise.”12 Anticipating the clash over 
desegregation, Tuskegee’s administrators also saw themselves as providing “wise leadership” in 
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the transition. Charles H. Thompson, Dean of the Graduate School at Howard University, said 
that he expected higher education to “develop a highly intelligent and socially responsible 
leadership, as well as highly trained technicians.” Black students in particular, Thompson argued, 
needed “to develop a dynamic and realistic philosophy of race relations.” Unfortunately, he 
concluded, most “college-bred Negroes” have learned, at school, to “accommodate themselves to 
the status quo, even beyond the call of legal necessity.”13 
 The symposium concluded, on the second day, with the inauguration of Tuskegee’s new 
president, Luther H. Foster. Foster skillfully linked Tuskegee’s past and present, evoking the 
need for both continuity and change. Tuskegee could play the role of preparing students for full 
political participation, he said. “While focused on a core of vocational content,” Foster told the 
gathering, Tuskegee would also work to develop in each student “an appreciation for personal 
qualities associated with effective citizenship.” Building on Washington’s theory of “race 
relations,” Foster expanded Tuskegee’s charge to the improvement of “human relations” 
generally. “Tuskegee Institute must work to improve human relations,” Foster said. “People of 
goodwill applaud the current trend to judge individuals on their merit, and to have their rights, 
duties, and opportunities assigned accordingly.” In addition to these responsibilities, he 
concluded, Tuskegee had another: “There is the added institutional duty to speak out for truth 
and justice in the general society.”14 Over the next two decades, Tuskegee faculty and students 
would take these words to heart, and put them into action. In some cases, however, the 
imperative to retain good “relations” would come into conflict with the obligation to “speak out 
for truth and justice.” 
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 By the time Foster took over the helm of Tuskegee, the town around it had grown into a 
uniquely prosperous village of several thousand black people. The anchors of the community 
were the approximately 1,800 black people employed either at the veterans hospital or at 
Tuskegee Institute.15 The percentage of black people in town with yearly income above $5,000 
was higher than in any other county in the state of Alabama, Gomillion noted.16 When my father, 
Robert Jones, first arrived in Tuskegee in 1957 as an 18 year old from Inkster, Michigan, he 
recalled that the Institute “was one of the most beautiful sights I had ever seen.” Everywhere he 
looked, black people were in charge. “I had never seen institutions of this size that were operated 
by people of color,” he said. “You had physicians, attorneys, professors... these people lived 
well. I had never seen people of color live like that. I had never seen swimming pools in 
backyards.”17 The prosperity in Tuskegee did not necessarily flow to the rest of Macon County, 
however. A few short miles from Tuskegee’s neatly trimmed lawns and well-appointed homes, 
rural Black Belt dwellings often had dirt floors and lacked indoor plumbing.18 One observer of 
the county’s contradictions noted that “in this county, black hands daily perform the most 
intricate and delicate surgical operations known to medicine in the large veterans’ hospital while 
other black hands till the earth under conditions characterized by the most primitive superstition 
and backwardness.”19 
 Tuskegee was in transition from an institute to a university. Robert Jones observed that, 
in the late 1950s, Tuskegee began de-emphasizing “industrial education” in the form of training 
in skills such as carpentry and shoe repair, and began transforming into a university. “I saw 
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evidence that that was a dying era, that the school was transitioning to a liberal arts school with 
more emphasis on engineering and those kinds of disciplines.” And yet, some of the old ways of 
the Institute remained. Participation in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was still 
mandatory for male students, as was attendance at weekly chapel services. Students were 
required to attend chapel services twice on Sundays, in the morning and again in the evening, 
Jones remembered, “and there was also a service on Wednesday evenings. If you missed three 
church services they would send you home.” In the 1960s, mandatory chapel would become a 
target of student organizers. In the 1950s, however, there was a more subterranean mode of 
resistance. As they entered chapel three times a week, students dropped a ticket with their name 
on it into a collection box. “Of course,” Jones added, “there was a good side business of people 
dropping other people's tickets in the box.”20 
 For the children of the 1,800 professionals employed at the university or the Veterans 
Hospital, life was cozy and sheltered. Lucenia Dunn, who later became the first female mayor of 
Tuskegee, remembers the sense of safety she had as a child. “The only rule that we had was: be 
home by dinner. We could ride our bicycles all over the place and do all kinds of things. We 
were so adventuresome, going out into the woods and picking plums and blackberries. Going 
into streams and swimming in ponds.”21 The resources of the campus were available to the 
town’s youngsters. “If we wanted to go swimming, we went swimming up on the campus at the 
pool. If we wanted to play basketball in a gymnasium, then we went to the gymnasium on the 
campus,” Wendell Paris recalled. “I'm saying it was just an idyllic place really if you look at it in 
terms of having black people in charge of everything but the local political apparatus,” he said. 
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“Sometimes we would go maybe a week or two without even seeing a white person.”22 To Guy 
Trammell, it was a place to grow up without a sense of inferiority. “The only people that I knew 
could do anything ever, were black people,” he said. “All the stores were owned by blacks, all 
my teachers were black.”23 Wendell’s older brother George recalled, with pride, that Tuskegee 
“was a totally independent African-American community.” “We had our own banks,” he noted. 
“We had two hospitals. We had the university. Everybody’s dad, mom, had a decent job. It was a 
black middle class community. We used to say that Tuskegee is surrounded by Alabama, not a 
part of Alabama, but surrounded by Alabama.”24  
 Some young people experienced the class nature of the Tuskegee community as 
snobbery. Kathleen Neal (later known as Kathleen Cleaver, a leader of the Black Panther Party) 
grew up in Tuskegee, where her father was on the faculty. “If your kid hasn't gone to a white 
liberal prep school in Massachusetts a year or two,” she recalled, “then you're just nowhere.” She 
remembered that “middle class people” from the campus or the hospital didn’t associate with 
poorer black people at all, “except when the poor people are their maids and housekeepers and 
children-keepers,” she said. “The whole thing is a parody of white society.”25 Melvin Todd grew 
up in a working-class family in Birmingham, but when he arrived at Tuskegee, he noticed class 
differences among black people, for the first time in his life. “When I went to Tuskegee, I 
thought I was middle class,” Todd said. “It was only when I got there and took sociology that I 
learned that I was poor,” he recalled with a laugh. Todd found Tuskegee students to be friendly, 
but there was a certain social distance. “A lot of them had kind of bourgeois attitudes during that 
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time, too,” he said. “A lot of them appeared to kind of look down on people who were not from 
Tuskegee because they knew if you weren't from Tuskegee, that you didn't have the social 
graces, the social experiences, that they had had.”26 The students came to expect a certain level 
of service on campus. “We didn't wash our own clothes. We didn't clean up our own rooms,” 
Gwen Patton remembered. There were staff members who would “come and pick up our laundry 
and return them,” she said. “How class conscious, how bourgie can you get?”27 
 The middle-class culture of Tuskegee’s black professionals shaped the character of the 
struggle for voting rights, as it gathered force in the 1950s. However, in the swiftly moving 
events of the next decade, the middle-class children of Tuskegee’s black professional class 
would seize the initiative from their elders, and, in doing so, develop a critique of the society in 
which they were raised. What their parents had so carefully constructed seemed, in the new 
context, as if it were part of the problem. Above all, they sensed that change was, in fact, 
happening rapidly on a global scale. “Going slow” began to feel like going backward. 
 
On a Collision Course with Jim Crow 
 If the growing economy of the South put black people on a collision course with Jim 
Crow segregation, the political environment retarded that collision. Activists struggled for equal 
rights and desegregation nationwide, but anti-communist witch-hunts pushed many black leaders 
to censor themselves for fear of attracting the “red” label. The NAACP and other organizations 
increasingly pursued change through the courts, and discouraged civil disobedience.28 This 
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approach bore fruit, however: notably the landmark U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Brown vs. 
Board of Ed decision that segregated schooling was unconstitutional. In this context, the return 
of mass mobilization — the Montgomery bus boycott — just 30 miles away from Tuskegee, 
which began in December 1955, contributed to a profound re-shaping of the political landscape. 
The old compromises with Jim Crow upon which Tuskegee was founded began to crumble. 
 The Montgomery bus boycott was both a reflection of the changing status and 
consciousness of black people, and a struggle that in turn further transformed that consciousness. 
A boycott was an effective weapon because black people were now, increasingly because of their 
migration, an urban people. The black workers who rode the busses weren’t wealthy — the 
median annual income for a black worker in Montgomery in 1956 was under $1,000 — but they 
paid for the ride (unlike the local ministers who could afford to own private cars).29 The bus 
boycott was an indicator that black people had achieved a financial status that gave them greater 
confidence to assert themselves politically and socially. The boycott also changed their view of 
themselves. Rosa Parks was a frustrated activist for years who was convinced that “nothing 
would happen” in Montgomery, the cradle of the Confederacy, “because blacks wouldn’t stick 
together.”30 To everyone’s surprise, they did stick together and walked to work for over a year. 
“Our non-violent protest in Montgomery is important because it is demonstrating to the Negro, 
North and South,” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., commented, “that many of the stereotypes he has 
held about himself and other Negroes are not valid. Montgomery has broken the spell.”31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Marable, Race, reform, and rebellion, 40; Jeanne Theoharis, The Rebellious Life of Mrs. Rosa Parks (Cambridge: 
Beacon Press, 2013). 
30 Charles M. Payne, I've got the light of freedom: The organizing tradition and the Mississippi freedom struggle 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 2007), 72. 
31 Quoted in Bloom, Class, Race, and the Civil Rights Movement, 144. 
   
Page 121 
 The Montgomery bus boycott also changed the dynamics of black leadership. For 
previous generations, leadership meant serving as a channel for white beneficence. Whatever 
resources could be gotten from white people were obtained this way, and therefore white elites 
effectively controlled (and often selected) black leaders. The Montgomery bus boycott produced 
a new leadership on an entirely new basis. 
The struggle undermined black accommodationist leadership, Jack Bloom concludes. “In an era 
when most blacks’ backs were bent from stooping, their own bent backs were not out of place,” 
he wrote. “But when the whites drew back and in effect labeled all blacks alike, as dissenters, 
and would grant no concessions, the whites removed the basis of the old leadership's 
predominance in the black community.”32 This is precisely the dynamic that would play out in 
Tuskegee a few years later. 
 While the bus boycott made national and international headlines, a future Tuskegee 
student leader, Gwendolyn Patton, was there in Montgomery, as an adolescent, and got her first 
taste of organizing. Patton grew up in Detroit and Inkster but spent summers with her 
grandparents in Montgomery. Her grandmother owned a rental property that was used as a base 
for civil rights organizations. Through her grandparents, Patton became something of a junior 
aide to the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), the organization established to 
coordinate the boycott. Patton witnessed the planning and organization from the inside.33 At ten 
years old, she was assigned to gather donations to support the cause, specifically collecting shoes 
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to replace those that people were wearing out by walking.34 She went to the MIA office, “all the 
time,” listened to organizing meetings, and would run errands for the adults.35 
 Besides the organizational experience, Patton learned about what the struggle against 
segregation did — and did not — mean, to the people involved. Her grandmother taught her that 
the bus boycott wasn't about sitting next to white people. Patton recalled,  
One time, there were no white people on the bus and so I went back there and said, 
“Mommy, why are you sitting in the back of the bus?” And she says, “Gwendolyn, it was 
not about sitting next to white people. It was about sitting anywhere you please. And I'm 
pleased to sit right here.” I had to get a whole other outlook on what is this Movement 
about. It ain't about sitting next to white folks.36 
 
 Meanwhile, just a thirty-minute drive from Montgomery, a confrontation with white 
supremacy was brewing in Tuskegee. Black people in the town of Tuskegee had long 
outnumbered white people, roughly four to one by the late 1950s. By 1961, 84 percent of Macon 
County was black, the highest percentage in the United States.37 The Tuskegee political science 
professor Charles Hamilton counted nine black people for every white person in Macon County, 
yet no black person had every held public office since Reconstruction. “The smooth-working 
accommodation system conformed to the pattern many felt had been advocated by Booker T. 
Washington, the Negro founder of Tuskegee Institute,” Hamilton wrote. “Whether this is an 
accurate representation of Washington's position is not important. The central point is that many 
-- both Negroes and whites -- believed it to be.”38 The long-standing compromise, Hamilton later 
co-wrote with Stokely Carmichael (later Kwamé Ture), was a division of labor in which “the 
blacks would run Tuskegee Institute and the V.A. Hospital while the whites would provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Richard D. Benson II, “Interview with Gwendolyn M. Patton,” Journal of Civil and Human Rights 1, no. 2 
(2015), 183-4. 
35 Patton, interview. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Taper, “Gomillion versus Lightfoot:” 37; 64. 
38 Hamilton, Minority Politics, 1. 
   
Page 123 
commercial services (banks and stores) and hold all political offices -- thus overseeing law-
enforcement, the assessing and collecting of taxes, the public school system and so forth.”39 
 It was through the smooth functioning of this system that Tuskegee enjoyed a reputation 
as a “model” of “good race relations” in the South. Many observers noted the absence of social 
tension in Tuskegee. In its place, was a culture of courtesy and formality in the way people 
related to each other.40 Bernard Taper, a journalist sent to cover the campaign for voting rights in 
Tuskegee for the New Yorker, observed that the difference between Macon County and other 
Black Belt counties that “continually impressed” him, “was the absence of menace from the 
atmosphere, and, more than that, the courtesy displayed in nearly all casual encounters between 
the races.”41 Unlike other parts of the Black Belt, Hamilton and Carmichael wrote, “Macon 
County remained relatively free of overt acts of violence and intimidation during the forties and 
fifties.” This, they argued, “contributed to the façade of ‘good race relations’ in the county.” 
 The façade cracked when, for the first time since Reconstruction, a black person filed to 
run for public office. Mrs. Jessie P. Guzman, the director of Records and Research at Tuskegee 
Institute, ran for a seat on Macon County’s school board in 1954. Less than one thousand black 
people were registered to vote out of nearly 7,000 county residents, and the vote was split on 
racial lines.42 Guzman lost, but the election transformed Tuskegee’s image among the white 
people in Macon County. “For the white community, Mrs. Guzman's candidacy seems to have 
been a considerable shock,” Taper observed, noting that it coincided with court decisions in 
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favor of school desegregation, Montgomery’s bus boycott, and the advent of voting rights 
legislation moving through Congress.43  
 For the first time in its history, Tuskegee Institute was no longer a reliable partner in the 
maintenance of the status quo and white supremacy. Samuel M. Engelhardt, Jr., a Macon County 
farmer-merchant, entered politics specifically to challenge the threat of black political power. To 
him, Tuskegee was no longer an ally, but an enemy. His successful campaign for state senate 
featured ads that highlighted his opponent’s presence on Tuskegee’s board of trustees.44 
Segregationists increasingly viewed Tuskegee as a source of disloyalty to the status quo. “One 
white citizen stated that the real trouble started in 1944,” Hamilton wrote, “when the college 
discontinued the practice of reserving special seats in the college chapel for the white 
townspeople.”45 By the end of the 1940s, white people hardened against black people’s demands. 
If Tuskegee would not accommodate to white supremacy, then white supremacy would no longer 
accommodate Tuskegee. “The accommodationist approach that leading [white] conservatives 
had taken at the time of the founding of Tuskegee Institute,” Norrell wrote, “had now been 
forsaken entirely.”46 
 The number of black registered voters was small, but ticking upwards, making a 
confrontation inevitable. From 29 black voters in 1940, the number had risen to 855 by 1954: a 
“clear trend” Hamilton wrote, that could result in “political catastrophe” for white officials if it 
persisted.47 Whereas before black people in Tuskegee historically accepted political 
subordination, now, in light of the shifting regional context, doing so no longer seemed 
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acceptable or necessary. They began to feel that there was no need to “submit to the system of 
accommodation of an earlier time,” Hamilton wrote. “They could have economic security and 
political participation simultaneously, and they were beginning to believe that anything less was 
a denial of their dignity and self respect.”48 Otis Pinkard, who later became a plaintiff in the 
Supreme Court case spearheaded by Gomillion expressed the view of many black war veterans 
when he said, “After having been overseas fighting for democracy, I thought that when we got 
back here we should enjoy a little of it.”49 By 1959, there were more than one thousand black 
voters registered in Macon County.50  
 Macon County’s board of registrars was the main line of defense. They perfected more 
than a dozen techniques to limit or prevent black people from participating in local politics.51 
Registrars would fail to show up to their office on registration days, or arranged for registrations 
to take place at another location with no notice, or arrived late and left early, or worked slowly so 
the fewest possible people could register. If all else failed, they would resign. Gomillion recalled 
that, because of frequent resignations, “sometimes there would be no Board of Registrars from 
anywhere to three to eighteen months.”52 For those lucky few who actually made it inside the 
registrar’s office, the next hurdle was usually an elaborate literacy exam. In Tuskegee, the 
ridiculousness of such tests linked to voter registration was obvious. “I can understand why one 
must demonstrate his literacy,” a black potential voter said, while waiting to register. “But 
certainly it shouldn't have to take me an hour and a half or two hours of reading and writing to 
prove that I can cope with the English language,” he said. “It didn't take me that long to 
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demonstrate my competence in French -- and German as well, for that matter -- when I took my 
Ph.D. exams at Boston University.”53 
 Gomillion was indeed a patient and persistent activist, whose work spanned nearly three 
decades. In 1928, Gomillion passed up an opportunity to sell life insurance for a living, opting 
instead to accept a one-year position teaching history at Tuskegee Institute’s high school 
program. He stayed for five years, until he was promoted to the college program, where he 
stayed for the next several decades. In his 50s, Gomillion took a break from teaching, enrolled in 
Fisk and earned a doctorate in 1959.54 Long before he was “Dr. Gomillion,” in 1941 he 
participated in re-organizing the Tuskegee Men’s Club into the Tuskegee Civic Association 
(TCA), a political club that admitted women as members.55 Gomillion was the President of the 
Tuskegee Civic Association from 1941-45, then from 1951-68 and again in 1970.56 In a moment 
when historic changes were sweeping through the region, Gomillion stood in a middle ground 
between the old and the new — a radical stance in the 1940s and even the 1950s, but one that 
quickly came to be perceived as retrograde by the end of the decade. 
 
Gomillion and the Tuskegee Civic Association 
 Professor Gomillion’s strategy for winning voting rights was both a break from 
Washingtonism, and a reformulation of it. He broke with Washington by forthrightly and 
publicly asserting black voting rights. He preserved elements of Washington’s “race relations” 
concept by emphasizing the idea that black people had self-improvement work to do in 
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preparation for citizenship, and by carefully restraining black people’s demands within limits he 
thought would be acceptable to forward-thinking white people. 
 In a sense, Professor Gomillion’s strategy was to embrace what contemporary scholars 
and activists call “respectability politics.” This approach placed Gomillion squarely in the 
mainstream of civil rights activism in the 1950s. For most of the middle class leadership, pushing 
for civil rights was about asserting the deservingness of black people, highlighting their loyalty, 
patriotism, and law-abiding nature. As much as it aimed to win voting rights, the officers of the 
Tuskegee Civic Association began by emphasizing the shaping of the citizenry. They 
“considered their major responsibility to be that of the civic education of all citizens in the 
community, Negro and white,” Gomillion wrote, “and facilitation of intelligent civic action on 
the part of an increasing number of Negro citizens.”57 They wanted more black voters on the 
rolls, however. “But I was of the opinion that we needed not only voters, but knowledgeable 
voters,” Gomillion clarified,  “and that was the reason for this so-called responsible citizenship 
course in political science.”58 
 There was a powerful logic to this approach. The Brown decision signaled that black 
people had the nation’s laws on their side — the segregationists, not they, were the law-breakers. 
Under Gomillion’s leadership, the TCA aggressively and systematically organized attempts at 
voter registration, and then carefully documented the ways in which the law was violated to deny 
them the vote. When the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was founded in 1957, the TCA began 
sending to it “a stream of petitions and meticulously documented complaints about the 
systematic denial of their suffrage rights -- more such complaints than there were from any other 
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county in the United States.”59 Over seven long years the TCA compiled a detailed record of 
every single black person who attempted to register to vote in Macon County. Their records 
showed that from 1951 to 1958 precisely 1,585 black people had applied, but only 510 voter 
certificates were granted.60 
 Like Washington, Gomillion was sensitive to dominant white opinions, and cultivated a 
message of moderation — the TCA did not want to “take over” city or county governance, 
Gomillion frequently asserted; rather, they wanted to “co-manage” alongside white people. 
“There is no good reason why white and Negro citizens in Macon cannot develop a community 
which would be a model of democratic living,” Gomillion told the Alabama House of 
Representatives in Montgomery in 1958.61 The TCA avoided any activity that would besmirch 
its upstanding image, even if that meant organizing with one hand tied behind its back. The 
TCA’s leading officers feared feeding stories to reporters because they “did not want to give the 
impression that the TCA was trying to solicit the aid of the press.” Whereas the activists in 
Montgomery had solicited funds from northern supporters, the TCA refused to do so, lest its 
character as an indigenous southern organization be questioned or it be perceived as a “money-
grabbing organization.”62 
 White elites were not assuaged by such moderation — those who ruled by excluding 
black people from politics were frightened by any deviation from the status quo, and decided to 
act. Those elites, led by state senator Sam Engelhardt, re-drew the city boundaries to remove the 
possibility of black voters gaining a majority.63 On July 13, 1957, as the number of black voters 
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approached the one thousand mark, Governor Patterson signed into law a bill to change the shape 
of Tuskegee’s city limits from a simple square to “a curious twenty-eight-sided figure 
resembling a stylized sea horse.”64 Nearly 3,500 black residents (out of a total of 5,000) and 
roughly 400 out of 410 black voters now found that they lived outside of Tuskegee’s city 
limits.65 
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Figure 1. A map of the boundary of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama before the gerrymander (the 
whole rectangle) and afterwards (the 28-sided shape in bold). Source: Guzman, Crusade for 
Civic Democracy, 91. 
 
The gerrymander was part of a regional pattern of “massive resistance” to desegregation 
and black voting rights. Gomillion and the TCA attempted to appeal to white liberalism just 
when this wave of resistance swept the South, stamping it out. In the late 1950s, “All over the 
South the lights of reason and tolerance and moderation began to go out,” C. Vann Woodward 
wrote. In the first three years after the Brown decision, 712 southern school districts were 
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desegregated; white resistance reduced that number to thirteen by 1958.66 Segregationists 
brooked no dissent. Moderate and progressive whites, to whom Gomillion and the TCA 
appealed, were silenced or driven from town by elite whites committed to white supremacy. In 
Tuskegee, Norrell notes that a “small group of wealthy men” were “determined not to relinquish 
control of Macon County to the blacks.”67 In 1958, a liberal circuit judge and former Tuskegee 
Institute trustee named George C. Wallace ran for governor of Alabama with the support of the 
black electorate and the NAACP.68 He lost to John Patterson, who campaigned as a staunch 
segregationist. Defeated, Wallace concluded, “no other son-of-a-bitch will ever out-nigger me 
again.”69 
 The gerrymander utterly shocked Tuskegee’s black middle class. A Tuskegee student, 
Ernest Stephens, observed, “All the time, the intelligentsia in Tuskegee had had the impression 
that white people regarded them as different from the black folks who worked on farms and so 
forth. The white folks showed them that there was no difference.”70 Tuskegee’s black 
professionals felt that their degrees, manners and lifestyle separated them from the mass of black 
people in the Black Belt. “For decades, many Negroes believed that their problems stemmed 
from a handful of white politicians and that, when glaring injustices were exposed, all the 
‘decent thinking white people’ in the South would protest,” Hamilton wrote: “most of the whites 
who were previously ‘friends’ were nowhere to be found… there was an intense feeling of 
betrayal.”71 The gerrymander threw cold water on their sense of status and forced them into a 
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coalition with their poorer rural cousins. Professor Stanley H. Smith, a Tuskegee sociologist 
conceded that “It was the gerrymander that brought us together.” He went on to argue  
Before that, we professional people had the feeling that it was possible for us to go 
downtown and obtain special privileges. When this happened -- the gerrymander -- we 
discovered that the whites who ran things didn't regard us as different in any significant 
way from the most backward members of our race, and that historically this had always 
been so, and we had just never faced it. We were shocked into the realization that we 
were still Negroes, with all the disabilities attached thereto in the sovereign state of 
Alabama. The country people found our comeuppance rather amusing and, I think, subtly 
satisfying. They didn't rub it in, but there was some chortling. “Well now, join us” was 
their attitude at the first… meeting. “Welcome home.”72 
 
 Tuskegee’s middle class professionals weren’t so easily defeated — they were a 
confident class — and one that possessed resources. Before the governor signed the gerrymander 
bill, the TCA responded to the proposal by calling for a “selective buying” campaign — 
essentially a boycott. This tactic was effective as a means of escalation because it was based on a 
source of strength — black middle-class incomes. Between 1940 and 1950 the number of black 
people in white-collar positions grew in Tuskegee by 172 percent, nearly doubling the town’s 
black middle class, and, Norrell noted, adding substantially to the human and financial resources 
at the TCA’s disposal.73 It was these employees who provided much of the funding necessary for 
legal action, because local city and state authorities had no ability to fire any of them. It was 
these “financially secure persons,” Gomillion said who made the TCA’s strategy possible.74 At 
the June 25, 1957 meeting of the TCA, as the legislature considered a bill to re-draw the map of 
Tuskegee in order to exclude black voters from its boundaries, Gomillion told the assembly, 
“spend our money wisely, spend our money with those who would help us, not oppress us.”75 
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 The next month, as the gerrymander went into effect, so did the Tuskegee boycott, 
widening the social and psychological schism in town. Business receipts in town were cut by 
nearly seventy percent immediately and almost twenty businesses closed.76 The boycott had the 
effect of furthering the social separation of black and white people in town. “I remember early, 
early in my life, first grade, second grade, so forth, when we went downtown,” Dunn recalled. 
“Then when they did the gerrymandering we never went back downtown. In our community we 
had everything that we needed…”77 One white store clerk said he thought black people were 
moving too fast. Echoing Washington, he said they should instead focus on “uplifting the riff-
raff among Negroes instead of trying to force them on us.” As Norrell observes, experiencing the 
total absence of black shoppers as a siege of black people was “a telling commentary on some 
whites’ perception of reality.”78 
 By the end of the decade, some black people’s patience with Gomillion’s strategy was 
wearing thin. The boycott, and the careful documentation of legal violations dragged on for the 
next few years. Eager for further escalation, TCA members at various moments proposed 
marching or public demonstrations, but each time the leadership de-emphasized those ideas. In 
1959, after several weeks of letter-writing and petitioning, a mass march on the state capitol was 
proposed at a TCA meeting and tabled.79 One female member of the TCA executive cabinet said, 
“Ours is not a mass action group. We just don't operate like that.”80 The idea surfaced again later, 
and this time the motion passed. The TCA agreed to march on February 15th -- the same date the 
US Senate would begin debating a civil rights bill. However, neither the executive nor the 
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general group ever discussed it formally in subsequent meetings. The fifteenth of February came 
and went without any march, and without any mention of it in further meetings.81 Gomillion’s 
personal hostility to the idea of marching was well known. “He was berated by some for this,” 
Hamilton wrote. When confronted by a student on this point, Gomillion replied, “Any dumbbell 
can march, no dumbbell can do what I'm doing.”82  
 Gomillion was not alone. Tuskegee professors, despite their relative economic 
independence, were reluctant to associate themselves with “rabble rousers” — or even with the 
most prominent civil rights movement leaders. When Dr. King came to Tuskegee in the late 
1950s, university officials did not allow him to speak on campus (apparently fearful of reprisals 
from the white community). King spoke at a nearby church instead. A Tuskegee student who 
attended the event noticed that there was not a single Tuskegee professor in attendance — except 
for Charles Hamilton. “At a time when many people (both black and white) saw King as an 
outsider whose methods of nonviolent protest would only stir up more trouble for black people,” 
the student, Wilbur C. Rich, recalled, “Hamilton stood on stage with King and even had his 
photograph taken with him.”83 In 1960, after frequent clashes with Gomillion and the TCA 
leadership, Hamilton’s contract with Tuskegee was not renewed.84 
 No matter how carefully, cautiously, or patiently Gomillion proceeded, advocating for 
black voting rights made him a radical in the eyes of segregationists. Some attempted to pin the 
“red” label on him. Gomillion’s later involvement as a board member in other civil rights 
organizations — the Highlander Folk Center, The Southern Negro Youth Congress, and the 
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Southern Conference Educational Fund, drew suspicion because they had all been accused of 
being communist front groups.85 As the widely recognized leader of the TCA, Gomillion became 
a target. In 1958, he received an anonymous letter from a member of the White Citizens Council 
in Louisiana. The author claimed to have had several black friends, but given what the race “is 
trying to pull” the author’s views changed: “Now I hate all niggers.” The letter concluded by 
assuring Gomillion that “you and your associates are fighting a losing battle” and with a promise 
for “another civil war” if necessary, to preserve segregation.86 “You err when you say that my 
associates and I are ‘fighting.’ We are not ‘fighting,’” Gomillion replied in a polite, even-handed 
open letter. “We are simply working hard to be good, productive Americans.” Gomillion assured 
readers of the open letter, “We do not want to fight; we want to learn and earn. We do not want 
to shed blood; we want to maintain the peace.”87 
 As months dragged on with little to show for their efforts and white opinion hardening 
against them, Gomillion and the TCA leadership continued to hold out an olive branch to Macon 
County’s white people. There was a growing debate within the TCA; one member described its 
methods as apologetic: “What was really done for a year and a half? Just letters and petitions.”88 
Gomillion insisted that the TCA stood for bi-racial governance. “The idea that our people want 
to take over the government is simply not true,” he was quoted by the press as saying. “It’s just 
poppycock.”89 Gomillion told Taper that, by not fighting against white people, he was following 
in Washington’s footsteps. “We think it should have been possible to move peacefully and 
intelligently toward a new relationship -- one of true mutual respect and dignity,” he said, “not 
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just the outer forms of these.” There was a “glorious opportunity” to do so in Tuskegee, 
Gomillion argued, specifically because of its middle-class nature. “With such a large pool of 
educated Negroes, Tuskegee could have become a model of partnership and cooperation -- if the 
whites had only been flexible enough, realistic enough, to perceive the possibilities.” Ideally, 
black people would get the vote without white people becoming “embittered and disillusioned in 
the process”90 
 In August 1958, Gomillion and eleven other members of the TCA sued the mayor of 
Tuskegee, Phillip Lightfoot. Their lawsuit, dubbed Gomillion vs. Lightfoot, traveled all the way 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, and set an important national precedent in the voting rights 
struggle.91 Thousands of dollars in legal fees over two years were paid primarily by Tuskegee’s 
black middle class.92 On November 15, 1960, the court, citing “the inevitable effect” of 
excluding black voters with the gerrymandered city boundaries, ruled unanimously for 
Gomillion. The precedent it set, Norrell noted, was both for basing a decision on effects of 
discrimination, not intention, and a precedent for the Court’s power to negate a political 
boundary set by a state.93 The Supreme Court sent the case back to a federal district court, where 
Judge Frank M. Johnson ruled in February of 1961 that the old boundaries be restored.94 The 
next month Johnson issued a “sweeping decree” ordering the Macon County registrars, in very 
specific, detailed instructions aimed at removing any opportunity for obstruction, to begin 
registering black voters.95 As a result, by 1962, for the first time ever in Macon County, black 
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voters outnumbered white voters.96 Their success came too late for the 1960 elections, so the first 
black officials since Reconstruction were not elected in the county until 1964.97 
 Gomillion and the Tuskegee faculty had won an important victory, but it was not theirs 
alone. The willingness to carefully document violations of the law and pursue justice through a 
series of court cases was necessary to this legal breakthrough, but not sufficient. Reforms are 
never granted by elites without tremendous pressure, and in this case much of the pressure came 
from elsewhere. Gomillion believed in “slow change,” but actually reaped the work of activists 
pursuing “fast change” in other parts of the region. The nearby Montgomery Bus Boycott shifted 
the landscape of politics in Gomillion’s favor, adding to the pressure on the federal government 
and local authorities, and certainly gave Tuskegeans the confidence to launch a boycott of their 
own (even as they hesitated to associate themselves with an “outsider” like King). Because of the 
ferocity of the “massive resistance” to voting rights and desegregation, Gomillion’s legal victory, 
like others in the era, were rendered meaningless without a movement to make them a reality on 
the ground. After Montgomery, the southern civil rights movement did not re-emerge on a mass 
scale until black college students took action at the very top of the following decade. When their 
professors went into motion in the 1950s, Tuskegee students watched and learned. But in the 
1960s, the students took action on their own, both building upon and rejecting aspects of their 
elders’ outlook. Like Gomillion, they would reckon with the legacy of Booker T. Washington in 
the process. Before the decade was out, the students would teach their teachers a thing or two 
about social change. 
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Chapter 4: The Student Wave, 1960 to 1965 
 
 The victory of the voting rights struggle in Tuskegee coincided with profound shifts in 
global and domestic politics, which in turn set the stage for a truly mass movement of black 
college students in the United States. In 1960 alone, some seventeen African countries gained 
independence from European colonial powers.1 These newly liberated countries, their leaders — 
and the many pupils they sent to study at Tuskegee — would have a tremendous effect on the 
student body in the years to come. At the time, Alabama state senator Engelhardt articulated a 
direct connection between voting rights and decolonization. Given the TCA’s victory, the choice 
for local whites, he said, was either to leave the county, or “submit to Negro rule and await a 
situation comparable to the Congo, with local Lumumbas coming forward in ever increasing 
numbers.”2 
 Engelhardt’s fears were misplaced, to say the least. Despite the legal victories, “massive 
resistance” by whites had successfully retarded desegregation. By 1960, six years after the 
Supreme Court’s Brown decision, only 17 southern school districts were desegregated.3 Nowhere 
had the success of the Montgomery bus boycott been replicated. “All of Africa will be free 
before we can get a lousy cup of coffee,” author James Baldwin lamented.4 While the movement 
overall stalled, black college attendance swelled. Between 1953 and 1965 the number of black 
students in four-year colleges nearly doubled (63,000 to 119,000).5 In growing numbers, they 
came to campus with raised expectations and confidence. “Their youth had been marked by 
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sweeping changes in the economy, in demography, in national and international politics, and in 
American attitudes about race,” historian Harvard Sitkoff wrote. “All this had conspired to raise 
their aspirations, to fuel their hopes. But the promise of change far outran the reality.”6 
 In February 1960, black college students initiated a new phase of the civil rights struggle, 
making it, for the first time, a genuine mass movement on a national scale. Bypassing the 
cautious, legalistic approach pioneered nationally by the NAACP and locally by the TCA, they 
shifted to mass direct action. Four students from a local college sat down at a segregated lunch 
counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, on February 1, 1960, unwittingly launching the largest 
mass movement for civil rights in the twentieth century. By 1961, sit-ins swept one hundred 
southern cities, involving some 50,000 people. Roughly 20,000 activists were arrested between 
1961 and 1963.7 By one estimate, nearly one out of every four black college students in the 
South participated in the sit-in movement during the years 1960-1961.8 
 Future Tuskegee students Michael Wright and Gwen Patton were both energized as 
teenagers by the sit-ins. In 1960, Wright joined a picket line in New York City. “As a matter of 
fact, my first picket line was picketing Woolworth’s—a department store’s-- headquarters in 
Harlem in order to support the student sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1960,” he 
recalled. “I was thirteen years old.”9 Gwen Patton remembers that in 1960, “when I was sixteen, 
I wanted to go to Raleigh, North Carolina for the historic sit-ins, but I couldn’t.” However, the 
next year she came to Tuskegee and was able to join the movement there.10 
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 At Tuskegee, young people leapt into action. Future Tuskegee student George Paris was 
inspired. The sit-in movement, he remembered, “just opened our eyes. Opened up a whole new 
world for us. There IS something we can do!” He and his friends began thinking of how to 
desegregate everything everywhere. “We can go to Montgomery and sit in at a lunch counter, 
you know and we can go to Auburn, go to the swimming pool.”11 At Tuskegee Institute, roughly 
400 students decided to march off the campus, through downtown Tuskegee carrying placards 
calling for voting rights and civic equality.12 Robert Jones – a junior at Tuskegee – decided to 
join the protest. The administration worried about their safety, Jones thought. “Dr. Foster was 
very much opposed to this,” he said. “A few days later Dr. Foster had an assembly where the 
impression I got was that things were happening throughout the South and our business is 
academics and we should probably stay out of it for now.”13 No doubt Foster was aware that 
Alabama State College, under pressure from Governor Patterson, expelled nine students for their 
participation in similar protests happening at the same time.14  
 If Tuskegee administrators feared for the safety of their students, they shared with them a 
profound sense of optimism that the world was changing in their favor, for the better. President 
Foster’s 1960-1961 annual report to the alumni brimmed with optimism about the world, 
witnessing “miraculous breakthroughs in science” and the “abundant flow of material goods” 
which has “freed man for thought and action above the subsistence level.” In America, there “is 
more impressive involvement of Negroes in civic affairs and in political responsibility. 
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Desegregation of public facilities and services is proceeding noticeably — slowly but surely — 
in many a Southern community.”15 
 A similar sense of optimism pervaded the student movement. The sit-in activists decided 
to form a new national civil rights organization, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) in April of 1960. Their founding statement affirmed their view that love 
would conquer hate: “Nonviolence as it grows from Judaic-Christian tradition seeks a social 
order of justice permeated by love,” they wrote. “Through nonviolence, courage displaces fear; 
love transforms hate. Acceptance dissipates prejudice; hope ends despair. Peace dominates war; 
faith reconciles doubt. Mutual regard cancels enmity. Justice for all overthrows injustice.”16 This 
confidence was not unfounded; nonviolent civil disobedience was, for the time being, a winning 
formula. By the end of 1961, the use of public accommodations in upper and border South states 
was transformed as almost two hundred cities began to desegregate.17 
 No Tuskegee students were present at SNCC’s founding convention at Shaw University, 
but some immediately joined, and links with SNCC developed quickly over the next few years. 
Gwen Patton joined SNCC in 1962 and would continue working with the group for the next five 
years.18 At Tuskegee, students formed a new civil rights organization, the Tuskegee Institute 
Advancement League (TIAL, an organization that would fade and then re-organize itself two 
years later); through its auspices SNCC chairman John Lewis was invited to speak to the campus 
community.19 
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 Some administrators saw an opportunity to develop programming on campus that would 
tap into the students’ desire to participate in social change. In the summer of 1963, Bertrand 
Phillips, a recent graduate from Columbia University’s Teachers College, was recruited by 
Foster to be the dean of students. When Phillips and his wife arrived in Macon County, they 
were struck by what they saw. “We drove around and saw a lot of poverty… we also saw a lot of 
people who were trying to help themselves,” he recalled. “It kind of inspired us.” In his second 
semester on campus, Phillips suggested to an assembly of students that they follow the examples 
of Booker W. Washington and George Washington Carver, who “didn't hide themselves on the 
campus. They reached out into the community, they made this institute a living part of Macon 
County and some of the surrounding counties.” Phillips issued a challenge: “To those students 
who really are interested and think that they can bring about some change, why don't you meet 
me in the morning and we'll talk about it in the gym,” he said. “I’d like you to be there at 5 in the 
morning.” Remarkably, at 5am the next day, Phillips met with 150 students in the gymnasium. 
They decided to call their mission a “domestic peace corps,” with the idea that students would 
“use our talents to help people repair their homes if they were trying to repair their homes, to 
grow their crops if that's what they were doing, to tutor the children who wanted to get further 
ahead in their schooling, to just relate to the needs of the community,” he said.20 
 Venturing out into the surrounding communities, Phillips’s volunteers would find 
themselves again and again in the company of SNCC workers. SNCC quickly distinguished itself 
as the boldest of the civil rights organizations. It sent students (often, ex-students, actually) into 
the Deep South to challenge segregation and disfranchisement in the most dangerous contexts. 
Much of this work took place in the Black Belt. Given Tuskegee’s location in the center of that 
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region, it is not surprising that Tuskegee students were involved in all of SNCC’s Black Belt 
campaigns. Like other SNCC workers, Tuskegee students were radicalized by the resilience of 
rural black people and the murderous southern regimes they braved in order to assert their rights. 
SNCC recruited a small number of Tuskegee students for their voter registration, freedom 
school, and community center projects in the Black Belt in the fall of 1964.21 Fourteen Tuskegee 
students worked in Mississippi on the mock election that propelled the SNCC-initiated 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party into open conflict with the national Democratic 
leadership at the party’s convention that year in Atlantic City.22 By this time, some SNCC 
members, guided by James Forman, had moved on from the ideas of Christian nonviolence and 
began organizing study groups on Marxism, the Cuban revolution, and African liberation 
struggles.23 As young people in SNCC explored increasingly radical ideas, the state of Alabama 
observed their movement with growing alarm. 
 
The Alabama Legislative Commission to Preserve the Peace 
 Leading the charge against the “communist menace” was the newly elected governor of 
Alabama, George Wallace. Wallace rarely missed an opportunity to link civil rights, the federal 
government, and communism. In 1963 he appeared before the US Senate Committee on 
Commerce to voice his opposition to a bill to desegregate interstate public accommodations. He 
began by noting the recent push to desegregate all facilities on military bases. Whereas black 
civil rights leaders hoped to connect desegregation to military victory, Wallace made the 
opposite case. “Is the real purpose of this integration movement to disarm this country as the 
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Communists have planned?” he asked. In the next several pages of his prepared remarks he 
attempted to portray civil rights leaders as communists and to shame the federal government for 
bowing to them. “As a loyal American and as a loyal Southern Governor… I resent the fawning 
and pawing over such people as Martin Luther King and his pro-communist friends and 
associates,” he wrote. Furthermore, “I charge that Senate Bill 1732 constitutes the first step 
toward land reform — a long step in a socialistic scheme of government which will bring the 
total destruction of private property rights.” Interestingly, while a staunch segregationist, 
Wallace aggressively promoted expansive funding for public education. Again and again he 
emphasized his support for “up-lifting of the Negroes in Alabama,” through education. Wallace 
noted that during his first year in office, “we have increased the appropriation to Negro 
educational institutions 22 per cent,” he wrote. “We are building three new trade schools to train 
them for the jobs that we are making available to them by a fast growing industrial expansion in 
our state.”24 
 Tuskegee’s practice of allowing radical (including communist) leaders to speak on 
campus provoked outrage among conservative white Alabamians. In 1961, Tuskegee sponsored 
a sixteen-day speaking tour by a black journalist, William Worthy, who traveled to several 
colleges to talk about his recent trip to Cuba, criticizing the Kennedy administration’s anti-
communism, and the “hatchet job” the U.S. media was doing on Cuban leader Fidel Castro.25 In 
1963, Tuskegee’s student government invited U.S. Communist Party leader Gus Hall to speak — 
but then rescinded the invitation under pressure from the campus administration. The Campus 
Digest printed President Foster’s defense of the reversal alongside a student rebuttal. Foster 
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claimed that communism was a worthy topic of intellectual discussion, but that it was better to 
hear about it from an expert, “rather than one whose presentation would… be oriented strongly 
to his political views and to the fulfillment in some significant way of his political purposes.” 
The student respondent, O’Neal Smalls, called the cancellation an “infringement upon the right 
of academic freedom” and “not in line with democratic principles.” “I dissent from the belief that 
our students are intellectually incapable of debating these ideas when they are combined with 
such articulate personalities,” he wrote.26 
 Anticommunism became institutionalized in Alabama in the early 1960s. Following 
Wallace’s lead, the state legislature created the Alabama Legislative Commission to Preserve the 
Peace (ALCPP) in 1963 to investigate civil rights and campus activism in the state. The 
ALCPP’s purpose was to “study, investigate, analyze and interrogate persons, groups and 
organizations who may be engaged in activities of an unlawful nature against the sovereignty of 
the State of Alabama.” The new commission was charged with reporting to both houses of the 
legislature and to the governor.27 For the rest of the decade, the ALCPP wrote breathless, 
hysterical reports that attempted to confirm the connection between black activists and a global 
communist conspiracy. The ALCPP made a study of the political activity of churches in 1964 
and distributed 25,000 copies to law enforcement agencies and political leaders around the 
country. The commission reported that SNCC “is extensively Communist dominated, and its 
leadership substantially follows the Communist Party line.” The ALCPP found “that SNCC is an 
agent for the Communist conspiracy and measures up to every definition of a Communist Party 
Front.” The CPUSA’s goal, the commission’s report alleges, is “using civil rights as a 
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Springboard [sic] to achieve a Soviet America.” The ALCPP noted that SNCC members, 
including John Lewis and James Forman had traveled to Africa and had met with communist 
leaders in Algeria. “The danger signal cannot be ignored,” the report warns. SNCC must be 
watched closely and “eventually it must be controlled by legal action,” or else “the State and 
nation will court major disaster.”28 
 There are two important truths here. One is that anti-communism, while at times 
hysterically exaggerated, gained force in the South because it expressed anxiety about real 
changes in progress — primarily the decline of the old system of white supremacy. Historian Joy 
Ann Williamson-Lott is correct to conclude that the “southern brand of academic McCarthyism 
was informed by fear and anxiety about social change as much as concerns over communism.” 
She argues that anticommunism cannot be reduced to a simple “disguise” for racism. “Instead,” 
Williamson-Lott writes, “in the South fervent anticommunism and racism were inextricable.”29 
The Alabama legislators who created the ALCPP frankly acknowledged that their purpose was to 
criminalize dissent, to “hold a new club over race agitators.”30 The second conclusion is that the 
anti-communist hysterics, while exaggerated, contained a grain of truth — there was a 
radicalization among young people in the civil rights movement that did lead many of them to 
explore communist ideas. While the Governor and the ALCPP imagined that local people were 
mere dupes or puppets of an international conspiracy, the truth of the matter is that activists were 
inspired by global events and took cues from them, but they also developed ideas and acting on 
them in ways that were entirely resonant with their own experiences in the U.S. South. 
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Radicalization On and Off Campus 
 At Tuskegee, the student movement did radicalize quite quickly, although it did so 
largely in the absence of any local communist organization or any “line” to follow. The 
generation of young black people who went to college in the 1960s confronted a contradiction 
between raised expectations, and a power structure (white and black) resistant to change. At 
Tuskegee, the largely middle-class students came to campus with high hopes that change was 
possible without any radical rupture with American ideals and structures. By the end of the 
calendar year, 1965, such a rupture seemed both inevitable and to some, desirable. For the first 
two months of the year, however, the future appeared bright. 
  At the start of 1965, Macon County was enjoying the fruits of the national and regional 
economic boom, which contributed significantly to the sense that progress was inevitable. In the 
summer of 1965, Governor Wallace boasted that $406 million worth of new industry came into 
Alabama. Businesses were seeking out Alabama, he said, because they “appreciate our stand for 
free enterprise and local government.”31 In 1965, the Department of Labor reported that 16 
percent of county’s population was self-employed, as opposed to 13 percent in the state and 12 
percent  in the nation.32 Macon County’s residents’ household income in 1964 had increased, on 
average, by $500 from the year before. That was a 10 percent increase, higher than the average 
household increase in the state (8 percent ) or in the nation (5 percent ).33 Remarkably, 25 
percent of that income was provided directly by the federal government in the form of salaries or 
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subsidies.34 By 1965, Macon County residents consumed a remarkable 34 percent more goods 
and services than they did just one year before.35 
 Nationwide, the number of black students continued to climb, contributing to a sense of 
possibility and change among young people and their families. In the mid-1960s, college 
enrollment for black people reached unprecedented heights — more than 100,000 — boosted by 
civil rights activism, the Civil Rights and Higher Education Acts of 1964 and 1965, and the 
growing availability of federal scholarships.36 Tuskegee enrolled a record-breaking 700 freshman 
in 1965.37 President Foster expressed the hope that Tuskegee would provide students with a 
unique opportunity for personal development. In February, at the mandatory weekly Sunday 
service at Tuskegee Institute’s chapel, Foster optimistically boasted that the “strength and 
happiness of Tuskegee is its people.” He said that the school would strive to “find the ways to 
encourage every student, faculty, and staff member to involve himself truly in this exciting 
educational enterprise which goes on here on this campus.”38 One of the students in attendance 
was Melvin Todd, who had just started his career at Tuskegee in January. “The feeling that I got 
when I first went to campus was that I'm stepping into history,” he said. “There have been many, 
many great souls that have walked these sidewalks and these pathways, that I have to do well.”39 
 By the start of 1965, however, many black college students’ optimism lay in their hopes 
for social change, not merely personal growth. Michael Wright, who also started as a freshman 
that year, was introduced to protest politics right away. In his first few days on campus, he saw a 
group of female nursing students on a picket line. He discovered that one of their classmates had 
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been expelled for violating curfew. “I was the only guy on the picket line but it made perfect 
sense to me,” Wright said. The following day athletes were picketing on campus about not 
receiving financial aid, Wright recalled, and he supported them, too. Wright quickly fell in with 
students associated with SNCC, as well. Because of the campus’s location — a highway that 
traverses the Black Belt counties runs right through campus — SNCC activists in the Deep South 
frequently used the campus “as a place for rest and rehabilitation and socialization,” Wright 
recalled. In his first semester he joined the staff of the student newspaper (the Campus Digest) 
and became acquainted with SNCC people, including Sammy Younge, Jr.40 Sammy was one of 
the 211 Tuskegee students who marched peacefully in double-file lines through downtown 
Tuskegee in February in sympathy with the voting rights movement in Selma, Alabama, where 
activists had recently been attacked by police.41 
 In addition to collaborating with SNCC, Tuskegee’s leading student activists wanted to 
create an organization of their own. In February 1965 the Tuskegee Institute Advancement 
League (TIAL) re-emerged.42 One of the first actions of the new TIAL was to lead a second 
march of 300 Tuskegee students into the downtown area, also in solidarity with the Selma 
activists.43 TIAL worked with and remained independent of SNCC. Patton in particular was wary 
of northern activists coming into the South through SNCC. “We didn't like people coming to 
liberate us,” Patton said, comparing the dynamic to a condescending benefactor who would come 
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in order to “civilize the noble savages,” as she put it. “It was insulting.”44 Instead TIAL members 
sought out a formal relationship with the TCA; the TCA declined the offer.45 
 While activists saw educational facilities as a resource for their agendas, governor 
Wallace also remained invested in education for his own reasons. Upgrading Alabama’s 
educational facilities was a top priority for the segregationist governor. By the end of 1964 
Wallace had successfully pushed for the establishment of eleven new junior colleges and twenty-
four trade schools.46 In February of 1965 Wallace drafted a speech for the Alabama legislature in 
which he would ask for dramatic increases in funding for schooling at all levels. In notes he 
prepared for the speech, he called for a 10 percent raise in teacher salaries across the board. 
Wallace also recommended a 20 percent increase for all colleges in the state, citing a 23 percent 
increase in enrollment. The Governor also called for a one-time capital outlay to purchase 
textbooks for every child, in order that education rise to meet the needs of the “surge of new 
industry coming to our State,” he wrote. Finally, he warned that this extensive state-sponsorship 
of textbooks was not to be confused with socialism. “I suppose that I have been spat upon by 
more socialists and have been threatened by more socialists and have had my automobile 
attempted turned over by more socialists than anybody in Alabama,” he said. The real threat, 
Wallace warned, is the federal government, which “goes beyond that which the communists 
authorize in the passage of the so-called Civil Rights Act,” and “has gone completely wild in 
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setting regulations and saying that they will cut the funds off from the schools in this State unless 
they are signed.”47 
 Not unlike the educators and businessmen who gathered at Tuskegee to mark the 
inauguration of Foster’s presidency, Wallace saw education as an essential vehicle for taking full 
advantage of Alabama’s industrial boom. He and they agreed that schooling should be a ladder 
that carried students into various technical, managerial, and supervisory professions essential to 
Alabama’s growing economy. Calling for double digit increases in salaries and budgets across 
the state, however, was an effective way to promise both upgraded educational facilities to black 
citizens and segregated facilities to white citizens. After all, increasing the budgets of black and 
white schools across the board would preserve the inequality between them.48 The state of 
Alabama’s overall appropriation for higher education for white students was roughly four times 
greater than for black students.49 Wallace’s speeches about black education notwithstanding, he 
would, in the years to come, develop a specific animosity toward Tuskegee. Beginning with the 
TCA boycott, and continuing through the school desegregation battle, and later, the Tuskegee 
student movement, Wallace came to see Tuskegee as a center of radicalism and disloyalty.50  
 In the same month as Wallace’s speech to the legislature, and less than two weeks before 
he was assassinated in Harlem, Malcolm X spoke at Tuskegee, expressing ideas that challenged 
and inspired the three thousand students in attendance. “I remember when he was sitting in my 
office waiting to go to the auditorium to speak,” Phillips recalled. Malcolm said, “Well Dean, I 
want to tell you that people think I'm down here to try to incite some type of riot or something. 
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I'm not, I'm just simply here to speak some truth to your students.”51 Having recently broken 
with the Nation of Islam (NOI), Malcolm was now committed to a program of social action and 
he challenged the students to get involved. When asked about his relationship to NOI leader 
Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm said, “Elijah believes that God is going to come and straighten 
things out. I believe that too. But whereas Elijah is willing to sit and wait, I’m not willing to sit 
and wait on God to come. If he doesn’t come soon, it will be too late. I believe in religion, but a 
religion that includes political, economic, and social action designed to eliminate some of these 
things and make a make a paradise here on earth while we’re waiting for the other.”52 
 The hope in peaceful change that had animated SNCC’s first gathering was quickly 
transformed by bitter experience. Malcolm’s message resonated with that experience; in many 
speeches he was giving that month, he predicted that violence against the black movement would 
increase.53 Melvin Todd remembers that Malcolm spoke about his life being in danger. “He said 
that if anything were to happen to him that it would not be done by white men,” Todd recalled.54 
Malcolm X was assassinated by members of the NOI on February 21, 1965. Five days later, the 
young activist Jimmy Lee Jackson was murdered by state troopers raiding a mass meeting for 
voting rights in Marion, Alabama.55 The succession of bloodshed shook the optimism of 
Tuskegee students. James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality was the next guest speaker 
on campus. He suggested that, the movement was entering a new phase that would go beyond the 
issue of civil rights.56 Citing Malcolm’s assassination, attacks on marchers in Selma, threats on 
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Dr. King’s life, and war in Vietnam, Tuskegee student Peter Scott, II wrote in the Campus Digest 
that “Malcolm X was right when he said that this would be the longest, hottest, bloodiest year 
ever.”57 
 
Marching on Montgomery 
 Tuskegee students would experience a small dose of this violence the next month. In 
March, they marched on the capital building in downtown Montgomery, and then tried to meet 
with the Governor; instead, they were attacked by police and some were briefly arrested. After 
Jimmy Lee Jackson’s murder, King and other civil rights leaders began planning a march from 
Selma to Montgomery. When marchers were beaten by state troopers in Selma on the Edmund 
Pettus Bridge (“Bloody Sunday”), TIAL started raising money from Tuskegee students to join 
the march in Montgomery. Sammy Younge even telephoned some of his former classmates at 
Cornwall Academy to ask for donations.58 “This is a time for sober reflection,” The Tuskegee 
News editorialized after Bloody Sunday, “a time for learning from hard experience.” The paper 
didn’t hesitate to point out the difference between Tuskegee and Selma: “Tuskegee can be 
thankful that it has been spared the agony which has characterized voter registration efforts in 
Selma.”59  
 The Tuskegee administration forbade students to go to Montgomery, “invoking the 
doctrine of in loco parentis,” and Dr. King balked at violating a federal judge’s injunction 
against the march, but a mass meeting of Tuskegee students decided to go to Montgomery 
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anyway.60 Ruby Sales, a freshman, decided to go to the march because Gwen Patton came to her 
dorm to talk to students about it.61 In general, Tuskegee’s adults were concerned that the youth 
were moving too fast. George Paris remembers that they cautioned his classmates to “slow 
down.” The students were undaunted. “Yeah, we never listened to that,” Paris recalled. His 
peers’ attitude was, “we’re going to solve this problem, this afternoon.”62 Despite threats of 
expulsion, roughly 700 Tuskegee students — including Edith Washington O’Neil, Booker T. 
Washington’s great granddaughter — boarded buses and cars to travel to Montgomery on March 
10, 1965.63  
 When they arrived, however, the city and state police blocked the entrance to the capitol 
and threatened to arrest anyone who didn't leave. The governor refused to meet with a student 
delegation, and troopers intervened in the ensuing standoff. They used horses to disperse parts of 
the crowd, and arrested two students (who were later released). After a while, about 500 left and 
roughly 300 stayed, refusing to leave the capitol, singing freedom songs.64 “A hard core of about 
300 students vowed to sit-in in front of the Capitol until Governor Wallace decided to meet with 
them,” Patton later wrote that the incident radicalized Tuskegee students. “The pilgrimage had 
started out with naive, idealistic students marching for freedom. Fourteen hours later on a chilly 
March night, the 300 emerged as insurgents.”65 Police surrounded them. Anyone who left 
wouldn't be allowed to return, so those who remained were forced to relieve themselves on the 
spot. They did so in a circle blocked by picket signs, until a steady stream of urine ran down the 
capitol steps. “Thus did the great ‘pee-in at the Alabama Capital’ join the civil rights lore,” 
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Patton wrote.66 Tuskegee student Ruby Sales remembered this as the first time she was 
“confronted with white terrorism,” and “the understanding that I was not my mother's daughter, 
— I mean that somebody would really hurt me.”67 
 The march ended in frustration, which provoked a heated debate among the students. At 
2am it was raining and they decided to seek shelter in the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church.68 
Much to their surprise, the deacons wanted the students to leave. They cut off the heat and turned 
off the water. “They knew the terrorism of the south... they were terrified,” Sales surmised.69 
Some students blamed SNCC leaders for prolonging the action in Montgomery. George Ware 
recalled that, in class, “instructors would say that TIAL was being manipulated by SNCC... that 
students should be very wary, first of SNCC and second of that little radical core in TIAL.”70 
Gwen Patton described the march as a breaking point. “After the march, a lot of people couldn't 
take Tuskegee anymore,” she said. “They had come to a realization within themselves; they had 
seen what their education was doing to them. But some of them weren't strong enough to deal 
with it -- defying their parents, defying the school, defying the whole society.”71 
 At the same time Tuskegee students were questioning their upbringing and education, 
President Foster appealed to the governor in their defense. One week after the student march, the 
governor received a four-page memo from Foster, which he had prepared in preparation for an 
in-person meeting (which Wallace indefinitely postponed). Foster’s memo communicated that he 
and his colleagues at Tuskegee had been “deeply troubled… as we observed the slow progress in 
this State toward full democracy for all citizens.” Foster called on the Governor to ensure equal 
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voting rights, appoint black people to positions in his administration, desegregate the schools, 
and speak out against police brutality. “We call on you urgently as the Governor of all the people 
of Alabama to speak out against injustice and to use every resource of your office to assure that 
this state moves forward,” Foster wrote.72 Wallace took the opportunity instead to publicly insist 
that the marchers were the real problem. “Any pre-conceived ‘march’ along the public highways 
of this state is not conducive to the orderly flow of traffic,” he wrote in a prepared public 
statement. “Such action would not be allowed on the part of any other group of citizens, or non-
citizens, of the State of Alabama and will not be allowed in this instance.” Once again, he 
concluded by noting the importance of education in solving the problem. “These matters will be 
solved best by increased educational opportunities and by the growth of the economic standing 
of all of us. We have a concentrated program in Alabama to further the education of all our 
citizens and to provide jobs for them.”73 
 The march was taken seriously by students, administrators, and the legislature’s anti-
communist commission. “At last Tuskegee students are no longer apathetic to civil rights!” the 
Campus Digest Editor-in-Chief boasted.74 The Montgomery march produced a core of 
organizers. Some of Tuskegee’s marchers later became full-time SNCC workers, including 
Jimmy Rogers, Jennifer Lawson, George Ware, Simuel Schutz. Others remained active while 
still enrolled in school, including Gwen Patton, Wendell Paris, Warren Hamilton, and Sammy 
Younge, Jr.75 Despite his prior admonitions, even Foster had praise for the marchers. “I am 
impressed by the growing interest of students in this crucial current issue of civil rights,” he told 
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an all-Institute assembly. “You make us proud.”76 Some argued the march had larger results. 
Gwen Patton thought the student “march that wouldn’t turn around” helped to pressure King to 
complete the Selma to Montgomery march.77 To the governor’s anti-communist commission, the 
arrival of King and several thousand others in Montgomery symbolized the strength of the 
communist threat. The commission collaborated with local law enforcement officials to film the 
final march when it arrived on March 25th, and to analyze the footage in order to document the 
attendance of communists and “revolutionary forces” there. The commission noted James 
Forman’s presence. “He is a vicious revolutionary with a violent hatred for all whites,” the 
commission reported. “This feeling he makes known freely when talking with Negro groups, 
including our own agents.”78 
 Despite the commission’s fears of Forman’s influence, the radicalization at Tuskegee that 
month had more to do at this point with questioning the Tuskegee administration’s rules and 
regulations. While Foster praised the student marchers, he also insisted on sending home a 
permission slip to all parents to allow (or prohibit) their children to participate in any further 
movement activity.79 “You have to understand that when I went to Tuskegee we [still] had 
parietals,” Sales recalled, referring to the strict in loco parentis rules that had long governed 
student life on campus. “You couldn't even have a man in the dormitory. You couldn't even go 
downtown without your parents' consent,” she said. “They had a curfew. If you were not in by 9 
o'clock you could get expelled from school.” And yet suddenly, the old rules no longer seemed 
to apply. “To go from that [old system], to make the radical move to going to Montgomery, and 
also people going out into the county without any parental consent,” Sales said, “and then 
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coming into the lobby of the dormitory to make speeches, -- it really changed the social 
landscape at Tuskegee.”80  
 The change was intellectual and deeply emotional. Sales recalled, “I think something else 
is going on that is very significant here, you are being opened up and realizing how much you 
don't know, and how much you'd like to know.”81 Forman began spending more time working 
with Tuskegee student activists. Many of them, he wrote, “simply could not deal with the 
contradiction between Tuskegee Institute and the life for which it was preparing them, and the 
events which had taken place only thirty minutes away in Montgomery.” Tuskegee, as Forman 
put it, said to students “Get an education and you won’t be a nigger.” The movement, on the 
other hand, said to them “You’re a nigger no matter what you do.” In the process of trying to 
decide which was real, Forman reported, four students had nervous breakdowns that spring.82 
 Red scaremongering threw students back on the defensive. The issue re-emerged when 
students invited the Marxist historian Herbert Aptheker to speak on campus on March 17, 1965. 
His topic was “Communism: Menace or Promise?”83 That same day, the ALCPP warned 
members of the Alabama’s House of Representatives that “Today is a day of rather unusual 
events.” The “unusual” in this case was Tuskegee students protesting on the steps of the state 
capitol, the President sending a voter registration bill to Congress, and Herbert Aptheker 
speaking at Tuskegee. The report quotes the CPUSA’s newspaper, The Daily Worker, which 
called Aptheker a “communist spokesman.”84A Tuskegee resident sent a letter to the Campus 
Digest warning the students about the “strategies and tactics [communists] use in order to 
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manipulate people, especially impressionable and uninformed minds.” George L. Knox, Jr., 
student chairman of the lecture series responded. “When the alarms are sounded and bells are 
rung, every time an ‘agent of the communist conspiracy’ is invited to speak on a college campus, 
there is one point… which seems constantly to be overlooked,” he wrote. “It is this. We are not 
afraid of communism. We have faith enough in the free enterprise system to believe that it can 
stand toe to toe with communism, exchange blows and emerge unscathed.”85 In fact a minority 
of students — those working most closely with SNCC — were beginning to ask questions about 
the free enterprise system. Sales remembered when veteran SNCC activist Willie Peacock came 
to Tuskegee as a graduate student. “He was the first person that I ever knew who mentioned the 
word, ‘Capitalism,’” she said. “It was one of those ‘Aha!’ moments that just began to open the 
floodgates for me….”86 
 
TICEP and TIAL 
 For the rest of the semester, students explored various ways to channel their energies. In 
April, Gwen Patton ran for president of Tuskegee’s Student Government Association. She won 
with 75 percent of the vote, becoming its first female elected president.87 “She was a real 
fireball,” Melvin Todd recalled. “I was very impressed with her. She was a little short girl, very 
good speaker.”88 “I'd never seen a Black woman in a position that Gwen Patton was carrying 
out,” Ruby Sales remembered, “I mean she had some authority, — she had some real clout on 
campus.” Furthermore, “she had clout not because she was a beauty queen but because she was 
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talking about issues.”89 Melvin Todd took photographs for the main newspaper of the southern 
civil rights movement, the Southern Courier, and helped Caroline Hilton get work there as a 
freelancer, too.90 TIAL grew more ambitious — taking aim at the local economy and beyond. 
Student members picketed a local A&P market for four days, then halted their pickets when the 
manager conceded to hiring black people “on a non-discriminatory basis.”91 Meanwhile other 
TIAL members traveled to Lowndes County to participate in a “Freedom Day” voter registration 
drive alongside SNCC workers.92 
 Several hundred Tuskegee students were also radicalized by their participation in Dean 
Phillips’ service program. In the summer of 1965, Tuskegee received a $500,000 federal anti-
poverty grant to fund Phillips’ “domestic peace corps,” now called the Tuskegee Institute 
Community Education Program (TICEP). With that money, TICEP was able to pay 700 
Tuskegee students to work as tutors in a dozen Black Belt counties.93 The tutoring was meant to 
supplement the public school education, but Phillips hoped it would raise the consciousness and 
expectations of people in the Black Belt. “Most importantly,” Phillips told an interviewer, “the 
program helped kids and their parents to become critical of the education they can get in 
Alabama now.” Most people, Phillips said, “had no idea before this summer that they should 
want or expect anything better.”94 Given the long history of Black Belt activism, this was 
certainly an overstatement. 
 For many Tuskegee students, the tutoring program took them out of their sheltered lives 
and put them in direct contact with people in the Black Belt. For Lucenia Dunn, it was a life-
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changing experience. “I learned about the Black Belt and I learned about what it meant to be 
really poor,” she said. “You walk into a house and the dirt floor with children with the extended 
bellies and mucus running out of their noses. Just abjectly poor. I’ve never seen anything like 
that.” Working as a teacher had a profound effect on her. Teaching English one day, she heard 
one of her adult students shout, “Lord have mercy, lord have mercy! I can finally write my 
name!” She recalled that everything stopped “and chills just went up all over my arm.” The man 
no longer had to write “X” to sign his name. “That right there said something to me about what I 
had to do,” she said. “That cemented my commitment to black people.”95 Tuskegee student 
Cozetta Lamore remembers that her students had “joyous smiles” and exuded confidence. As 
Phillips had hoped, the program raised their sense of expectations — for themselves and for their 
schools. Lamore remembers the attitude was “We’re finally doing something to get out of this.”96 
 Through tutoring, Tuskegee students also learned about the bravery of rural people in the 
face of racist terror. In May of 1965 Todd joined the TICEP program. “I was deeply moved by 
the courage and passion and hospitality of the people that lived in the Whitehall community of 
Lowndes County,” he said. “They embraced us Tuskegee kids, and we did our best to plug gaps 
in the education of their children.” TICEP placed him in the middle of one of SNCC's most 
radical projects -- building a political organization called the Black Panther Party. Todd was 
housed for part of the time with the Jackson family. Matthew Jackson, Sr. was one of the 
founding members of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, which later became the Black 
Panther Party. “Matthew Jackson, Sr. basically lost his life coming from a voter mass meeting 
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one night,” Todd recalled. “His truck ran off the road and they found him dead the next morning 
in his truck,” he said. “We assumed that was an accident.”97 
 TICEP students learned about such “accidents” first hand. Dunn picked up a car full of 
children in her car to take them home from tutoring. When everyone stopped talking at one point, 
she recalled saying to herself, “Oh-oh.” She looked in the rearview mirror. “There was a truck 
full of white men,” she said, “it was right on my tail and they had guns.” She thought, “Oh god, 
I’m on a dirt road. Ain’t no houses, nothing around in case something happens.” The murder of 
Emmett Till flashed through her mind, and she stepped on the gas pedal. “I was shaking,” she 
said, “the children were shaking. That’s terror… I had never had that sense of terror and here are 
people who have it every day of their lives.”98 A few months later, a white civil rights worker, 
Viola Liuzzo, was killed on the same road that Tuskegee students used to travel to their TICEP 
appointments in Lowndes County. On the way there, Melvin Todd recalls passing the spot where 
her car had come to rest. “The tire marks still looked fresh,” he said. “There was a fresh flower 
funeral wreath placed on the site.” All of the students in his van “became silent for the rest of the 
trip,” he said. “We were scared.”99 
 For some students, the TICEP experience propelled them into direct action and 
confrontational protests, while for others, it cemented a commitment to providing direct service. 
Chester Higgins, Jr. was the business manager of the TICEP Journal. For a time, he viewed 
TICEP as basically fitting the agenda of the civil rights movement, “just like hand to a glove.” 
However, he concedes that the exposure to danger in the Black Belt had a radicalizing effect. 
“Perhaps,” he said, “this combination of civil rights mission and the activism of the students who 
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put their lives in sometimes precarious positions encouraged the questioning that later would 
lead to the confrontation between the students and the administration.”100 Some students 
concluded that direct service, not protests, would be more effective at making change. Writing in 
the Campus Digest, student Edwina Hayes argued that protesting and “handing out pamphlets” 
wouldn’t accomplish much. The only way to promote genuine freedom, equality and democracy, 
she wrote, was through “the unselfish and relentless efforts of our students.” Echoing Phillips’ 
call for a “domestic peace corps,” (and perhaps speaking from her experience in TICEP) she 
suggested that the “agricultural majors could teach the farmers… Nursing majors could aid in the 
attending of the young unwed mothers of children… and sociology majors could meet with 
destitutes and alcoholics and try to point out hidden qualities of worth…”101 
 In the spring and summer of 1965, a small but influential group of students turned their 
attention away from service and toward civil disobedience. In particular, they targeted the town 
of Tuskegee, and pushed for immediate and complete desegregation. Dr. King — who now, five 
year later, in a changed political moment, was welcomed on campus — no doubt contributed to 
their confidence when he spoke to Tuskegee’s graduating class that May. The civil rights 
struggle in Alabama, he said “has suffered not so much from the violence of bad people as from 
the silence and indifference of good people.” Echoing the students’ sense of urgency, he 
continued, “The timid will say, ‘Don’t push too hard. Let’s cool off awhile. Time will solve the 
problem.’ The forces of bad will have often used time better than the forces of good will.”102 
Tuskegee’s most militant students — mostly members of TIAL — adopted this perspective.  
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 Not unlike Patton’s grandmother, TIAL members were not concerned with “integration” 
as such. Rather, they sought desegregation — the removal of racial barriers proscribing the use 
of all community facilities. For them, desegregation protests were a means of peeling away 
Tuskegee’s façade, of  “challenging racism in supposedly interracial Tuskegee,” Forman wrote. 
“They were a way of exposing the lie of ‘the model town.’” Yet Tuskegee’s middle-class 
leadership continued to cling to the façade and defend it. Boycotting the A&P for not hiring 
black people raised the ire of middle-class black people in town. To the black middle class, 
Forman wrote, TIAL activists “were just ‘wild,’ ‘irresponsible,’ dungaree-wearing ‘kids’ who 
threatened to rock the Model Town boat” and some community members even accused TIAL of 
being a communist group.103 “Folks didn't like the way we dressed,” Wendell Paris remembered, 
“and they would tell us that.”104 Undaunted by the opposition from elders, TIAL launched a 
series of protests over the summer that led them into conflict with Tuskegee’s black middle class 
leadership: Gomillion, the TCA, and the Tuskegee administration. 
 Sammy Younge, Jr. and other TIAL students decided to desegregate the city swimming 
pool at the end of May. When black students showed up to swim, all of the whites fled and the 
activists swam alone. The next day someone put a baby alligator in the pool. Soon after, students 
found glass shards sprinkled on the diving board, followed by manure and acid in the water. The 
city drained the pool on June 2 and refused to refill it. The next week a delegation of white 
people appeared at the city council asking for the pool to remain segregated.105 Younge directly 
confronted Gomillion in a public forum for not supporting the effort to desegregate the 
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swimming pools. “Gomillion, you're supposed to be the leader of the Negro people. What are 
you doing?” Gomillion didn't respond.106 
 TIAL also clashed with the TCA and the Tuskegee administration on voter registration. 
So as not to frighten white people, Gomillion and the TCA wanted to "go slow” on voter 
registration. Despite their majority (in 1964, there were 3,733 black voters and 3,479 white 
voters) the TCA only supported running two black people for the city council (out of five 
available seats), and they sent limited numbers of people to register at any one time so as not to 
give the impression that they wanted to take over.107 “If it is evil to have all-white government,” 
Stanley Smith, a Tuskegee sociologist who was one of the two black people elected to the 
council said, “then it is also evil to have all-Negro government.”108 TIAL thought everyone who 
was eligible should register to vote immediately, and let the chips fall where they may. When 
TIAL heard that the TCA had agreed to bring no more than twelve people per day downtown to 
get registered to vote, Wendell thought, “What kind of craziness is this?” TIAL also came into 
conflict with the Tuskegee leadership. “Needless to say, we bumped heads with the 
administration on the campus a lot of times,” Wendell recalled. He understood that TIAL might 
be messing with Tuskegee’s image and ability to fundraise, and was of course concerned with 
student safety, “and so [Foster] really was kind of skeptical about Tuskegee students just leaving 
campus, going all over every which way to do voter registration when our parents thought that 
we were at school studying.”109 
 In the context of growing pressure from activists and from the federal government, some 
of Tuskegee’s white leaders decided to head off the growing civil rights movement in the town 
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and retain their “model city” image. Several local businesses began hiring black people ahead of 
the deadlines for the imposition of federal mandates.110 The Tuskegee Chamber of Commerce 
took out a full-page ad in the Tuskegee News stating that “in light of recent developments in 
ALABAMA,” the organization felt an obligation to proclaim “what it believes to be right.” 
“First,” the ad read “we believe in the full protection and opportunity under the law of all our 
citizens, both Negro and white.”111 Ever since Neil O. Davis, a white newspaperman known for 
racial liberalism, purchased the Tuskegee News in 1964, the paper repeatedly editorialized 
against Governor Wallace’s attempts to obstruct voting rights for black people and against his 
use of violence against protesters.112 These shifts demonstrate that the black movement 
successfully created a split among white southerners. Their struggle cracked the “solid South” — 
in Tuskegee, as in the region — but could not yet claim total victory. 
 As much as they denounced Tuskegee’s middle-class leadership, TIAL was itself led, 
predominantly, by middle-class youth. “Tuskegee's budding young adult-children came home 
from the New England prep schools,” Gwen Patton wrote of her newly-radicalizing peers. “It 
became abundantly clear that rubbing shoulders with upper-class white kids activated their thirst 
for Black freedom.”113 Forman described Sammy Younge, Jr.’s political trajectory as a process 
of  “rejecting middle-class standards and affirming” his “identity with blackness.”114 The 
activists in TIAL gave themselves elaborate titles —  Younge was Chairman of Voter 
Registration, Simuel Schutz was Chairman of Direct Action, Wendell Paris was Project Director 
— which, Wendell Paris conceded with a smile, “didn’t mean a whole lot,” but spoke of the 
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activists’ sense of themselves.115 Melvin Todd joined some of TIAL's demonstrations, but felt 
the group was somewhat elitist. Todd said that the leadership “were mostly kids from Tuskegee, 
who were in that cluster of middle class Tuskegee families.”  They had an “air,” he recalled with 
a laugh, “of being a little bit more advanced that the rest of us, you know, who came from other 
parts of town.” He included Younge in that characterization. He was not easy to get to know, 
Todd remembered. “He had an air about him that, you know, he had gone out, he had done a 
little time in the Navy, and I think he felt that he could do stuff and get away with it, that we 
couldn't do, the average guys couldn't do,” Todd said.116 
 TIAL essentially was led by middle-class youth who were explicitly criticizing the class 
politics of their elders. In the pages of their newsletter, The Activist, George Ware wrote that 
TIAL had to “take to the streets” in order to get results, but the established leaders hesitated to do 
so because of their class position, he argued. “The middle class Negro views with disdain any 
fight for rights which occurs in the streets, however,” Ware wrote, “because he associates ‘the 
streets’ with rabble-rousing and believes that the correct way to obtain justice is through the 
courts.” But the court victories didn’t come out of thin air — rather, Ware asserted, they were 
movement victories. “We all know that this is a guise because the major decisions which have 
come from the courts are a result of outraged Negroes projecting issues into the public eye by 
taking the issues into the streets,” he wrote.117 TIAL member Patricia Bailey assumed a 
leadership role for middle-class black people, even if they were reluctant to accept the part. “The 
lower-class Negroes are waiting for the middle-class Negroes to lead the way for them,” she 
wrote, “but the middle-class Negroes do not like our methods of solving the problems in Macon 
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County.”118 Wendell Paris further developed a class analysis by discussing the fact that the 
county contained poor people “of both races.” However, he argued, “Macon County is so busy 
trying to help the middle class Negro to enjoy total equality that it has forgotten its under-
privileged brother.” Poor black people are “continuously exploited by the white man” and poor 
people “suffer humiliation from both races, by economic pressure from the white man and social 
pressures from the Negro.”119 The social pressure to conform to middle-class norms is part of 
what students rejected. Forman thought that Younge was drawn to SNCC because he found a 
group of people whose purpose was “real,” not like “the Tuskegee world with its concern for 
status and status quo.”120 
 
Entering the House of God 
 In the summer of 1965, no campaign was as effective at pricking Tuskegee’s self-image 
as TIAL’s effort to desegregate local churches. On June 27, twenty-two students and some 
faculty split up into groups to desegregate three churches in Tuskegee.121 Not one church even let 
them in the door; some faced mean shouts and taunts; others just had the doors shut and locked 
in their faces.122 At the First Methodist Church, an usher told the group that they would “break 
up the congregation” if they entered. “If as Christians you deny other Christians the right to enter 
the house of God,” George Ware replied, “then your congregation is already broken up.”123 
When the service was over at the Southern Presbyterian Church, Reverend Steve Bacon came 
out with another minister. “He seemed shocked to hear that we had been unable to come inside. 
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He came over and shook hands with us and said that he was truly sorry that we had not been able 
to worship, and that he hoped some day, we would be able to worship together. He then led us in 
prayer.” He did, however, concede that the lock-out represented “the will of some in the 
congregation.”124 
 After the church demonstration, TIAL declared its aims in writing. That week, TIAL 
published its first issue of The Activist, and the Tuskegee News reported that the new group 
distributed 800 copies around the campus.125 “There is a strong, unyielding, but more important, 
fairly unconcerned white power structure in Macon County and throughout the South,” the 
opening editorial, written by Elizabeth Shields, stated. “TIAL intends to break this power 
structure in Macon County -- not because it is white, but because it does not represent the 
majority of the people.”126 Shields pointed up the growing contradiction between American 
ideals and the reality for black people. “As Americans we learned to value and to expect certain 
hopes and dreams,” she wrote, “but as Negroes we learn that these dreams can never be 
realities... Hence, the present revolution.” The Activist declared TIAL to be non-violent. “But 
non-violence does not imply moderation,” Shields cautioned. “Our philosophy is based on 
action... We hope to mobilize Macon County's Negro population so that it can become an 
effective voice in this community and continue to be so on its own momentum.”127 An article by 
Sammy Younge, Jr., titled (with intentional irony) “The Great Society,” highlighted what he saw 
as the contradictions in the town. “Tuskegee isn't what its [sic] published to be,” he wrote. “If 
Tuskegee is so great, why can't we go to church together? Why was the city pool closed? Why 
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wasn't anyone prosecuted for throwing acid and rubbish in the city pool?”128 Through direct 
action and its newsletter, TIAL increased pressure on city leaders to move quickly – and they 
did. During the same week the newsletter appeared, Tuskegee’s City Council, following the 
“letter and spirit of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” voted to create a special advisory committee to 
“facilitate further changes and improvement” in the city, especially the desegregation of public 
accommodations.129 
 The church desegregation campaign escalated quickly. The next Sunday, TIAL returned 
to the First Methodist Church with roughly 500 people and the media. They went early, so some 
of their people actually got inside, but were still thrown out violently.130 One white churchgoer 
who had been locked out along with the demonstrators commented, “These people have no 
interest in getting into church. It’s a communist conspiracy.”131 The next week, July 18, Sammy 
Younge, Wendell Paris, and Simuel Schutz were the main leaders of the third attempt at First 
Methodist.132 A mob of two-dozen white men was waiting for them. Several of the activists were 
beaten and some were hospitalized. Wendell was hit in the head with a Coke bottle and needed 
six stitches. Sammy and George were chased away by a man wielding a .32-caliber pistol.133 
George and Wendell’s father swore, George recalled, that “a white man would never again harm 
a child of mine and live.” George Paris, who at this point had graduated and joined the military, 
returned from basic training in time to participate in the church protests. He remembers that on 
the Sunday he arrived, his father was standing on the corner near the church, “with his overcoat 
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on, in August” — concealing a shotgun.134 This was no department store prank; Sammy and 
Wendell were now risking life and limb in open defiance of Tuskegee’s Jim Crow traditions. 
 The church desegregation campaign led TIAL directly into conflict with the school’s 
administration. “The administration asked us to ease some of our civil-rights activity,” Patton 
remembered. “White/Negro interaction was approaching model human relations, we were 
told.”135 Later Patton claimed that Dean Phillips threatened to expel any TICEP student who 
participated in the demonstration, on the grounds that by joining a federal program, they could 
not participate in protest activity.136 Phillips claims just the opposite — saying instead that he 
was, in discussions with President Foster, defending students’ right to participate in protests, as 
long as TICEP students didn’t do so “on the clock.”137 Patton wrote later that she was summoned 
to Foster’s office. Foster allegedly told her that she “was not to encourage nor to lead the next 
Sunday's march to the churches.” Patton replied that “the march would go on with or without me, 
and that the administration had overestimated my control over students.” For safety, TIAL 
sought out assistance from an armed defense group, the Deacons for Defense and Justice from 
Bogalusa, Louisiana (it is unclear whether or not they actually came).138 The violence at the 
protest (and, perhaps the administration’s stance) cowed the students. Only seven TICEP 
students participated on the next Sunday.139 
 The students were proved right — church desegregation hit a nerve, especially with the 
established black leadership. Patton recalled that on many occasions Sammy Younge, Jr. tried to 
appeal to older black leaders. “They couldn't understand Sammy and the others at all,” Patton 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 G. Paris, interview. 
135 Patton, “Insurgent Memories.” 
136 Forman, Sammy Younge, Jr., 160-1. 
137 Phillips, personal communication, July 2016. 
138 Patton, “Insurgent Memories.” 
139 Forman, Sammy Younge, Jr., 162-3. 
 
Page 172 
said. “They began calling [TIAL] communists. Sammy was ostracized.” Forman later wrote that 
Sammy's parents received death threats and that the Deacons for Defense came to guard his 
house for a few weeks.140 The students may have alienated some black people, but Tuskegee’s 
white power structure felt pressure from TIAL. Remarkably, three white men identified from the 
church incidents were arrested and charged with assault and battery.141 TIAL succeeded in 
provoking a crisis, but never gained admission to white churches. The Tuskegee News issued a 
front-page editorial appealing for calm in July and admonished citizens “not to take the law into 
their own hands.”142 The Tuskegee News also printed letters from white citizens calling on fellow 
Christians to open their hearts. “How many children do you suppose watched the peregrinations 
of their parents and friends who ran from door to door at the Baptist Church in a concerted effort 
to see that no “niggers” gained entrance?” one letter from Mrs. Wilhelmina R. Jones asked. 
“How can they come to terms with God in churches filled with hate and injustice?”143 One 
hundred demonstrators gathered at Tuskegee’s Methodist Church a week later for another 
attempt. With a large contingent of police looking on, they were told to “leave church property.” 
And they did.144 
 
The Campus Revolution is Here! 
 As the summer came to an end and the 1965 fall semester approached, American society 
continued to seethe. That August — in yet another confirmation of Malcolm X’s prognosis — 
black residents of Los Angeles took to the streets by the thousands for the largest urban rebellion 
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to date.145 At the end of the month, Jonathan Daniels was murdered in Lowndes County, 
Alabama, as he and other civil rights workers were being released from jail. A Tuskegee senior, 
James Rodgers, reported that he had witnessed Tom Coleman shoot Daniels with a shotgun. A 
few minutes later, as Rodgers knelt over Daniels’ corpse, some white men approach him and 
said, “Nigger if you don’t leave here, the same thing will happen to you.”146 
 That fall, the Tuskegee administration tried once again to embrace the students’ sense of 
urgency for social transformation. In September, Tuskegee welcomed its largest freshman class 
ever — more than 700. In an address to faculty and staff, president Foster warned that “this is no 
time to be timid, complacent or procrastinating,” but rather this is the time to embrace change.147 
The Campus Digest published an op-ed by Foster entitled, “No Cliches, Just Facts.” Foster made 
the case for reimagining the role of Tuskegee in the context of America’s “crucial struggle 
within itself.” In some ways anticipating the sentiments of students who would hold him hostage 
in less than three year’s time, Foster argued for reimagining higher education as an instrument 
that could “reach into our big city slums and rural areas to bring distressingly vast numbers of ill-
trained, socially rebellious, and negatively motivated young and middle-aged adults into a 
positive relationship with their society.”148 Two weeks later he emphasized to the arriving 
freshmen that “loyalty to self — a respect for one’s identity and an abiding insistence on 
personal integrity” were the key to understanding the complexities of life.149 
 Students, however, increasingly felt that “change” wasn’t happening fast enough, 
especially on campus. In a strident editorial indicative of the new mood, Peter Scott, II argued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, and Otto Kerner, Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, March 1, 1968. US Government Printing Office, 1968, 20. 
146 Valia Wallace, “TI Student Is Eye Witness,” Campus Digest, October 9, 1965, 3.  
147 “Foster Urges Tuskegee Staff To Be Ready For Much Change,” Tuskegee News, September 16, 1965, 1.  
148 President Foster, “No Cliches, Just Facts,” Campus Digest, September 18, 1965, 5. 
149 “Dr. Foster Cites Responsibility of Staff to Students,” Tuskegee News, September 30, 1965, 1. 
 
Page 174 
that students needed to seize the opportunity to participate in transforming college life. “All 
students who are satisfied with ‘just going to college’ should stop and think!” he wrote. “All 
administrators who are bent on the fascistic or dictatorial rule should stop and evaluate! The 
campus revolution is here!”150 Among other policies that were slow to change, students resented 
being mandated to attend religious services in the chapel. “I think that no administration should 
be given the right to make up a college student’s mind,” student Grace Gilmore told the Campus 
Digest, “I don’t believe in compulsory chapel.”151 The rule never made sense to Caroline Hilton. 
“I didn't see any reason why I should have to go there,” she said.152 And even though only a 
small minority of students had participated directly in the campaign, anger over TIAL activists 
being shut out of Tuskegee’s segregated churches lingered, too.  
 The barrier between on and off campus politics began to break down. That fall, Tuskegee 
students voted 3-2 against routing their homecoming parade through downtown Tuskegee, an old 
tradition that was stopped during the TCA boycott and had never been resumed. The mayor had 
hoped the parade could “contribute very much to a better understanding and unity of everyone.” 
But Peter Scott, a Tuskegee student responded that if the city wants to improve relations, “it can 
prosecute the men who beat Tuskegee students attempting to attend church services at the all-
white First Methodist Church this summer.”153 Soon afterwards, the student assembly voted to 
present a series of demands to the administration, including the end of compulsory chapel, and 
the placement of students on curriculum, entertainment, and other committees, with voting 
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rights.154 As 1965 drew to a close, students’ expectations for change, in their town and in their 
classrooms, were rising. 
 
Tutoring the Tutors 
 From 1960 to 1965 Tuskegee students began to take action, and, through a series of 
approximations, tried to break out of their comfortable middle-class “bubble” and come to terms 
with the reality of their society and their place within it. Some volunteered their time in Black 
Belt counties, hoping to effect change as tutors, and ended up being tutored by the rural families 
they met. All were bothered by big questions: What would it take to transform the conditions of 
the Black Belt? Why should black people in Tuskegee and beyond continue to submit to the 
humiliation of segregated public facilities? If American society needed to change, didn’t that 
mean Tuskegee Institute had to change, too? As Tuskegee students began to question Tuskegee 
Institute, they inevitably had to confront the legacy of Booker. T. Washington.  
 Not since the student strikes of 1903 and 1940 had Tuskegee Institute seen so much 
agitation among students. At the end of the fall 1965 semester, Tuskegee’s administration still 
held out hope that dialogue with students could smooth things over and reconcile the two parties. 
In December, two thousand Tuskegee students, faculty and administrators gathered at a forum 
entitled, “Student Unrest and Its Implications.” The event was prompted by a wave of protests 
over everything from bad food, to compulsory chapel, to teaching methods. In a single week, 
students dumped their food trays in the cafeteria, boycotted chapel, or walked out during the 
service, and some marched on the president’s residence. “We want to be involved in governing 
the campus,” student government president Gwen Patton said, admitting the administration’s 
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refusal to let the Supremes sing on campus was “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”155 
Professor Paul Puryear praised the students, and TIAL in particular, for their courage, and called 
on the administration to follow their example. Dean Phillips said mistakes had been made on 
both sides. “We’re a very good college on our way to greatness,” Phillips said. “But we won’t 
get there unless we change the climate on campus.”156 The “climate” was, at this point, 
comparable to well-publicized protest movements on other campuses nationwide. A photo essay 
in Tuskegee’s Campus Digest about the recent protests on campus was titled, “No Berkeley, But 
A Tuskegee.”157 
 Tuskegee’s movement was not yet “on the map” as Berkeley’s was at the time. But this 
was about to change. As the calendar year 1965 drew to a close, two men who would play a large 
role in shaping the southern black student movement — and consequently, national and even 
global politics — met in Lowndes County, Alabama. When black people were evicted from their 
homes for trying to register to vote in that county, Sammy Younge, Jr. was one of many young 
activists who leapt into action, helping to set up tents as temporary housing, which became 
known as “tent city.” SNCC activist Stokely Carmichael was there, too; he was surprised to see 
Younge. Younge was failing his classes and had taken a break from the movement to try to get 
his grades up. “What's happening, baby?” Carmichael said, greeting him. “I can't kick it, man,” 
Younge replied. “I got to work with it,” he said, referring to the movement. “It's in me.” On New 
Year's Eve, Carmichael and Younge were together again, discussing Younge’s idea for building 
an independent political party in Macon County, modeled on the Black Panther Party SNCC had 
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built in Lowndes County.158 Younge’s instinct was well-founded: the turn toward the ideas of 
Black Power was just around the corner, mere days away, accelerated by events in the first few 
weeks of 1966. Stokely and Sammy, in life and in death, would leave their mark on the next 
phase of the struggle. 
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Chapter 5: The Rise of Black Power at Tuskegee, 1966 to 1967 
 
“We Will Fight Until We Die” 
Running an errand for cigarettes during a late-night SNCC meeting on January 3, 1966, 
Sammy Younge, Jr. spied a Standard Oil service station near Tuskegee’s campus on Highway 
80. Younge pulled his car into the station and asked the white attendant, 69-year old Marvin 
Segrest, if he could use the restroom. Segrest told him to use the one in back of the station. 
Younge said that he refused to use a segregated bathroom, and according to a bus driver 
eavesdropping from the depot next door, a shouting match ensued. Segrest brandished a pistol 
and chased Younge off the premises. Younge went to the police station on foot to report the 
incident and then returned to the Standard Oil station to retrieve his car. A second shouting 
match began, but this time Segrest fired a shot at Younge and missed. The bus driver approached 
Segrest to try to deescalate the situation, while Younge hid behind his car. Younge found a golf 
club near the bus station and approached Segrest a third time. Segrest fired another shot, at 
approximately 11:45pm, hitting Younge in the head and killing him instantly.1 
 When a cab driver discovered his body just after midnight, news of Younge’s death 
traveled swiftly on campus. “I was the one that was called at 2:00 in the morning to come down 
to the station, the gas station, and identify his body,” Bert Phillips recalled.2 George Paris 
remembers his father getting an early morning call as well. Paris and his father “loaded for 
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battle,” and went to the bus station, where they too saw Sammy’s body.3 “Sammy Younge's 
death really was a key turning point for us in terms of how we were going to move,” Wendell 
Paris said. “Simuel Schutz that same night said, ‘We will fight until we die. We will be fighting 
injustice in the United States and around the world until we die as a result of the death of Sammy 
Younge.’”4  
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Figure 2. The gas station where Sammy Younge, Jr. was murdered. Source: Tuskegee Institute Archives. 
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From Civil Rights to Black Power 
 Beginning with the murder of Sammy Younge, Jr., Tuskegee student activists began 
organizing under the banner of Black Power. Younge’s murder destroyed any veneer of progress 
in the town of Tuskegee and gave activists and the wider student body a sense that the need for 
greater change was urgent. Elsewhere, the rise of Black Power is often described as primarily a 
northern phenomenon that emerged as the result of frustration with the Great Migration and the 
limitations of civil rights legislation to transform life in the urban North. This chapter builds on 
recent scholarship on the southern roots of Black Power.5 Its story reveals three distinctive 
features of Black Power in the United States South. First, Black Power at Tuskegee was a 
movement for democracy, a demand for immediate and full participation in local political life 
that was resisted by municipal and, to some extent, by Tuskegee’s leadership. The school 
leaders’ hesitation further radicalized the students. Second, while the global context of 
decolonization and national liberation — especially in Africa — gave black students in all 
regions of the country inspiration, language, and tools of analysis to understand their situation, in 
the Deep South the colonial analogy was particularly apt, especially in Macon County, where 
black people outnumbered white people four to one. If black people could take over and run their 
own nations, why not the county? Third, given Tuskegee’s origins as a site of colonial 
educational practices with connections and influence in global colonial enterprises, the anti-
colonial linkages made by Tuskegee students in this period represents quite a significant reversal 
of this aspect of Booker T. Washington’s legacy.6 
 This is also a story about the ways in which a political movement can lead people 
towards new educational ideas. In the context of such global and regional changes, many 
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Tuskegee students began to feel that the “normal” operations of their school were oppressive and 
antiquated. Experiencing a newfound power to change the world, students eventually turned their 
attention to changing Tuskegee Institute. Beyond the cultural dimensions of self-love and 
affirmation, “Black Power” demands for self-determination and democracy applied to the 
campus meant greater student power to shape curriculum and instruction. For this reason, both 
Alabama segregationists and Tuskegee administrators found “Black Power” too frightening, too 
much, too fast. The issue for Tuskegee Institute’s leadership (as it had always been) was how 
much to accommodate (or “go slow”) because of the fears of powerful white people. The new 
slogan, “Black Power” communicated (more than the old slogan, “Freedom”) the idea that black 
people were no longer willing to wait for white people to accept their demands. 
 Reporting in three newspapers – Campus Digest, the Southern Courier, and the Tuskegee 
News – captures the changing ideas of Tuskegee students, administrators, faculty, and, to some 
extent, of Alabama’s governors, George Wallace and later, Lurleen Wallace, his wife who 
succeeded him in office (when his term limit expired), as the movement unfolded. Letters, 
memos, and other documents from Alabama’s state archives and from the Tuskegee archives 
help to fill out the picture of this rapidly changing political landscape. Tuskegee students 
Michael Wright, Gwen Patton, and Ernest Stephens in particular did the most in these years to 
record their views in newspapers and publications at the time and after the fact. Interviews with 
former Tuskegee students and with two former administrators provide greater insight into the 
meaning of these events. 
 This chapter covers only two years — 1966 and 1967 — but quite a lot happened in that 
relatively short period of time. These events, propelled largely by the January 1966 murder of 
Sammy Younge, reveal the political and educational ideals underlying the “Black Power” slogan 
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as it became manifest in the student movement at Tuskegee. Tuskegee students stepped off 
campus and transformed the political landscape of Macon County; returning to campus, they 
proposed the most radical revision of Tuskegee’s educational paradigm to date.  “Tuskegee’s 
image as a ‘model community’ lay in ruins,” wrote Mary Ellen Gale, a journalist for the pre-
eminent journal of the southern civil rights movement, the Southern Courier, “destroyed by the 
same bullet that ended Younge’s life.”7 Institute professor Arnold Kaufman offered a similarly 
blunt assessment in the pages of The Nation: “Tuskegee has been living a lie.”8 
 
“Tuskegee Came Unglued” 
 The effect of Younge’s murder, Gwen Patton wrote years afterwards, was that “Tuskegee 
came unglued.”9 However, for the first few months, the tragedy seemed to bind the campus 
community closer together. Nearly 3,000 people marched downtown the day after he was shot, 
January 4th. The Campus Digest noted that this was “almost the entire Tuskegee Institute student 
body (2,700) and faculty, staff, and community persons.”10 Students who previously felt 
protected from the worst effects of racism experienced a sensation of vulnerability. “That really 
brought it close to home,” Caroline Hilton remembered. “We read about things and saw it on the 
news that things happened in other campuses, but that was Tuskegee, that could have been any 
one of us.”11 Cozetta Lamore called it a “wake up call.” She thought, “maybe we're not as 
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8 Arnold Kaufman, “Murder in Tuskegee: Day of Wrath in the Model Town,” The Nation, January 31, 1966, 119. 
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10 “Tuskegee Student Slain,” Campus Digest, January 8, 1966, 1. 
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insulated as we thought we were and this is not the Mayberry town that people might like to 
think.”12 
 Tuskegee’s administration, led by President Luther H. Foster, and the students, led by 
Gwen Patton, each sought to take advantage of Younge’s death to accelerate the pace of change 
in town, although by different means. At the very moment Patton led the January 4th marchers to 
City Hall to demand an audience with the mayor and the City Council, Foster was already 
meeting with the city’s political leaders.13 Student activists felt that Foster was attempting to 
wind down their movement (by, among other things, inviting the already exhausted student 
leaders to long meetings with him), while they were trying to escalate it.14 At the steps of City 
Hall, Patton directed her words to the mayor. “You (the city and the press) have told us that this 
is a model city where white and Negroes get along together… you have told us how good the 
Tuskegee image is… you have invited us downtown for a homecoming football parade… yet,” 
she said, “you closed the city swimming pool and barred us from your churches… now, we want 
to know what you are going to do?”15 The Southern Courier quoted Patton as also saying, “The 
students at Tuskegee Institute will tear this town to bits, if justice is not sought.”16 
 The widening gulf between Tuskegee students and the town’s white leadership was 
evident in parallel mid-January editorials in the Tuskegee News, controlled by white liberals, and 
the Campus Digest, controlled by Tuskegee students. The Tuskegee News lamented the tragedy 
of the shooting and called for calm and patience. “Progress cannot come… out of an 
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emotionally-charged atmosphere,” the editors cautioned.17 The Campus Digest, by contrast, 
encouraged a greater sense of urgency. “Will Tuskegee citizens wait on a city government that 
promotes a ‘phony image’ of race relations?” Peter Scott, II, Campus Digest editor-in-chief, 
asked in a lead editorial. Whereas the Tuskegee News regularly extolled the wisdom of the 
Tuskegee Civic Association (TCA), the Campus Digest suggested that the Tuskegee Institute 
Advancement League (TIAL) leadership was more fitting.18 “Or,” Scott continued, “will 
Tuskegee citizens support the ‘do-nothingism’ of the TCA and keep the idea of the city’s false 
image?” He added, “will Tuskegee’s citizens support an effort for honesty and action advocated 
by TIAL?”19 The Digest also claimed that the murder revealed Tuskegee’s class fault-line. 
“Negroes who profit from and enjoy the upper-middle class status that they have attained almost 
totally from the proximity of Tuskegee Institute and the Tuskegee Veterans Hospital, have 
neglected and blatantly refused to bring needed community issues to a head,” the editors wrote. 
“We believe that Tuskegee is a ‘model’ city — a model city of deception and inefficiency.”20 
 Sammy’s life and death were an inspiration to activists to redouble their efforts and their 
commitments. “Sammy was a dedicated civil rights worker,” Michael Wright recalled, 
explaining that his death marked a moment of escalation. “At that point I never went back to 
class for a couple of years.” Instead, he began working with SNCC full-time doing voter 
registration work in Macon County and pushing for desegregation.21 Singer and activist Harry 
Belafonte praised Younge in a fundraising letter for SNCC. “Many Americans believe the battle 
for racial justice is won,” Belafonte wrote. “Sammy Younge’s death proves how far we still have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Progress, Yes, But Also Calm And Prudence,” Tuskegee News, January 13, 1966, 2. 
18 The faculty-led struggle for voting rights, organized through the TCA, and the rise of a student-led civil rights 
organization organized through TIAL are described in chapter two. 
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to go.”22 Activists searched for ways to “go” further. “Here is my bosom buddy killed,” Wendell 
Paris said. “What do you do? Do you just give up? Do you roll over? Do you do something 
foolish? Do you try to come forward with some constructive way of combatting, of addressing 
the issues that led to his death? I still wrestle with that. We knew we needed to defend ourselves. 
We just didn't plan to roll over and die.”23 
 George and Wendell Paris were traumatized by the death of their close friend, but James 
Forman felt responsible for Younge’s murder, Wendell believed, since Forman had done so 
much to bring Younge into the movement and to work with him. “He really did feel the weight 
of the death of Sammy,” Paris said.24 Two years later Forman published a book-length tribute to 
his fallen comrade, Sammy Younge, Jr.: The First Black College Student to Die in the Black 
Liberation Movement.25 Walking from Sammy’s memorial service to his car, Forman wrote that 
he was “crying as I never cried before.”26 Forman wasn’t the only civil rights leader to feel the 
weight. While mourners gathered in Macon County, representatives from SNCC and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference gathered for a funeral service for Younge at the 
Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC.27 
 For the next week several hundred Tuskegee students held a consistent schedule of 
protests. Funeral services at Tuskegee were held on January 5th and all classes were canceled. 
TIAL led 250 students on a January 6th march to City Hall where Patton presented a 14-point 
desegregation proposal to the mayor. On January 7th, 300 people marched against segregation 
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downtown. Wendell Paris spoke, rejecting Booker T. Washington’s policy of moderating black 
people’s demands. “We got this statue out here of that man who’s supposed to be lifting up the 
veil,” he told the crowd. “Man, he’s putting it back on!”28 On January 8th, 400 students started to 
march downtown but were stopped by police, so they sat-in to block the road. After an hour they 
were allowed to continue along their route. Students also picketed City Hall on January 10th and 
11th. On January 12th TIAL held a teach-in in the town square on the city’s segregation 
practices.29 In Melvin Todd’s view, “the student body was like 100% unified. They were really 
behind the student leaders.”30  
 The students were united among themselves, and felt, for a time, that they were united 
with Tuskegee Institute’s administration, too. In addition to the tensions that emerged on campus 
at the end of 1965, the murder of Sammy Younge, Jr. shifted Tuskegee’s leadership into a 
posture of pressing for immediate desegregation downtown. On January 6th, before nearly the 
entire school, President Foster reaffirmed the right and responsibility of Tuskegee Institute 
members to participate in civil rights activities. This statement was “an event of considerable 
symbolic significance” Tuskegee professor Arnold Kaufman wrote, for it “completed the break 
with the Booker T. Washington philosophy that had been in process since Rosa Parks decided to 
stay put in a Montgomery bus some 30 miles away and more than ten years ago.”31 A 14-point 
desegregation proposal was drawn up by an ad-hoc committee (led by President Foster) in 
collaboration with TIAL. It included: establish an open employment policy (especially in the 
public sector), prohibit segregation in public facilities, and desegregate public housing in 
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Tuskegee.32 “We… do not share the view that the killing of Samuel Younge was the isolated act 
of one individual,” Tuskegee professor Paul Puryear, a member of the committee, said. “It is our 
firm belief that Mr. Younge’s murder is symptomatic of much deeper and more pervasive evils 
in our community.”33 
 The deeper evils were never far from sight. On Saturday, January 15th at another protest 
in the city square, a police officer tried to arrest a Tuskegee High School senior on an unrelated, 
previous charge. A crowd of Tuskegee students gathered around the officer as he began beating 
the high school student with a blackjack. Other officers arrived and shouted “Get back!” The 
Campus Digest reported that this “melee” (the Southern Courier called it a “riot”34) lasted for 
about five minutes. Word traveled back to campus quickly, and 1,200 Tuskegee students 
immediately marched downtown. White men in unmarked cars with no license plates circled the 
protesters until students chased them away, hurling bricks and bottles. In the process, students 
broke windows in eleven downtown buildings.35  
 In these volatile days the “glue” was strained, but held. The Campus Digest editors 
praised Foster for standing with students and not calling for a moratorium on protests, despite the 
fact that property damage put him in a “dubious position.” “Dr. Foster is closer to more students 
now than he has been for quite some time,” the Campus Digest editors wrote. “This is how it 
should be.” Seconding Foster and TIAL, the editors also called for students to “follow the 
principle of non-violence or decline to participate.”36 A Tuskegee faculty member wrote a letter 
to the Campus Digest praising the moderation of student leadership at the protests. “As long as 
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they show this type of deliberation, consideration, and responsible thinking,” he wrote, “we need 
not fear how and where this student leadership will go and act.”37 Meanwhile, Tuskegee News 
decried the violence of bottle-throwing students and called for a return of the “intelligent, 
dedicated” leadership of the TCA. “If Tuskegee is fortunate, the TCA leadership will exert itself 
again in these trying times,” the editors wrote.38 Some black citizens let it be known that they, 
too, thought the students were in the wrong. Decrying “SNCC-type” people who were coming in 
from “outside,” one woman wrote a letter to the Tuskegee News supporting “equality of 
opportunity,” and adding, pointedly, “but we are not radical street demonstrators.”39 Two weeks 
later the ad-hoc alliance of administrators, faculty and radical street demonstrators scored a 
victory: a desegregation ordinance passed the council by a five to one vote after a particularly 
stormy session.40 
 
One Big Classroom 
 For the next several months, Tuskegee student activists essentially sought to complete a 
program of similar reforms. Reforming the structure of power in town, however, did not yet 
imply a similar overhaul on campus. Joining “the movement” was considered primarily an off-
campus calling, but the boundaries were blurring. On January 31st, a student-faculty round-table 
discussion debated whether or not civil rights activism interferes with academic goals.41 Gwen 
Patton was the only participant to challenge the terms of the discussion. “Civil rights is part of 
the educational process,” she said. “It can’t interfere with it. I have learned more from my civil 
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rights activities than in any class.”42 The next month Jennifer Lawson dropped out of school to 
work for SNCC full time. “To me, this is just a big classroom right here in Alabama,” Lawson 
said. “In a classroom, you hear all about the great theory of democracy and you swear that it’s 
working,” she said. “Out here, you know it isn’t.”43 By the end of the year, Patton and other 
Tuskegee students would extend Patton’s and Lawson’s argument further, no longer fearing 
“interference” with their present education, but increasingly finding its form intolerable. 
 As students and their allies racked up some victories in 1966, President Foster defended 
student activists, while the Governor’s ire grew. The appearance on campus of Communist Party 
leader Gus Hall in February spurred a heated correspondence between George Wallace and his 
supporters about what could be done to stop the spread of communism at Tuskegee.44 Foster and 
his administration stood by the students. The university defended one of its student teachers who 
was not accepted in a field training assignment in a local school because of her civil rights 
activism.45 In April President Foster presented a report to Tuskegee’s Board of Trustees, noting 
concern over “intra-group conflicts” and “students’ frustrations that result from racial barriers.” 
In his report to the trustees on civil rights activism in Tuskegee, Foster defended the school’s 
policy of allowing students to express themselves within the boundaries of law and democracy, 
and argued that the incidents involving property damage did not “reach truly riotous 
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proportions.”46 To some extent, the Tuskegee community had successfully isolated the 
segregationists, and as desegregation proceeded, white and black leaders hoped student activism 
would wind down. In mid-July, twenty-five years of segregation at the city swimming pool 
ended quietly, the Southern Courier noted, “without a splash.”47 
 
Taking Sides on Vietnam 
 Among the ripple effects of Younge’s murder was increasing willingness of civil rights 
individuals and organizations to speak out against the war in Vietnam. For a long time, many 
civil rights organizations operated within the ideological limits of Cold War liberalism. Both the 
Congress of Racial Equality and the NAACP purged communists from their ranks to prove their 
loyalty to the United States in the war against communism.48 The NAACP’s president, Roy 
Wilkins, argued that “civil rights groups [do not] have enough information on Vietnam, or on 
foreign policy, to make it their cause.” The Urban League’s Whitney Young agreed. “Johnson 
needs a consensus,” Young said, “If we are not with him on Vietnam, then he is not going to be 
with us on civil rights.”49 For all its fiery rhetoric, even the Nation of Islam censured Malcolm X 
when he described the assassination of United States President John Kennedy as an example of 
America’s violence in Vietnam (“chickens”) reverberating domestically (“coming home to 
roost”).50 But as the war expanded, so did critical views of it. There were 25,000 United States 
troops in Vietnam at the start of 1965, rising to 184,000 the next year, and to more than half a 
million in the three years to follow. Black soldiers were only 10 percent of all of the armed 
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forces, yet they were concentrated in front-line units that faced combat, such that they were 22 
percent of all Army casualties by November 1966.51 SNCC members on the front lines of battles 
for democracy and human rights in the Deep South, were, by the mid-1960s, drawing 
connections between such domestic and international conflicts, and were breaking from the Cold 
War liberalism of their elders.52 
 Tuskegee students were well acquainted with the war. At least twenty-two people from 
the town and campus combined were killed in Vietnam, including two TIAL members, Laurence 
Dudley and William Boone.53 Tuskegee’s long-standing mandatory ROTC program meant 
students were in a pipeline to Vietnam — as officers. George Paris graduated from Tuskegee in 
1964 and went to Vietnam as a second lieutenant. For him, spending time in the military meant 
preparing for a global revolution. “I had 50 men, 5,000 pounds of ammunition, a set of mortars, 
two Jeeps, and full combat gear, on one C-141 Air Corps Troop Carrier,” he recalled. “That was 
one of the reasons that I went, and some more of my friends went. We were convinced that there 
was going to be a shooting revolution in the United States. Where best to learn how to fight than 
in the United States Army?” Whether from their experience in Vietnam, or fighting for 
democracy in the U.S. South, SNCC and TIAL activists’ skepticism about the war was quickly 
turning into outright opposition. Sammy Younge’s murder was, in George Paris’s view, “the 
straw that broke the camel’s back.”54  
 In November of 1965 SNCC leaders agreed to make a statement on Vietnam, but nothing 
came of it until Younge’s murder. “Release of that declaration was triggered by the murder of 
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Sammy Younge, Jr.,” Forman wrote in his autobiography. “For myself, Sammy's murder marked 
the final end of any patience with nonviolence -- even as a tactic.”55 The statement, released two 
days after Younge’s murder, marked the first time a civil rights organization spoke out against 
the Vietnam War. The SNCC declaration represented more than a break from Cold War 
liberalism. It was a reversal of its terms, expressing solidarity with the official enemy. SNCC 
positively identified its struggle with that of the Vietnamese, comparing it to the work of Sammy 
Younge. “The murder of Samuel Young [sic] in Tuskegee, Alabama, is no different than the 
murder of peasants in Vietnam,” the statement read, “for both Young [sic] and the Vietnamese 
sought, and are seeking, to secure the rights guaranteed them by law. In each case, the United 
States government bears a great part of the responsibility for these deaths.”56 
 The ripples of Younge’s murder spread all the way to the halls of the United States 
Congress. One month earlier, in December 1965, the 26-year-old SNCC leader Julian Bond had 
been elected to Congress from Atlanta, Georgia. Since Bond, as SNCC Communications 
Director, was one of the principal authors of SNCC’s anti-war statement, Congress refused to 
seat him in January of the following year on the accusation of being disloyal and “un-
American.”57 Bond took his case to federal court, and ultimately to the United States Supreme 
Court, which ruled in his favor, finally allowing him to take his seat nearly one full year after he 
was elected.58 Appearing at Tuskegee Institute soon after his court victory, Bond defended the 
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rising militancy of southern activists. “Black means us,” he said. “Power is the ability to 
influence others toward your desires.”59 
 
What We’re Going to Start Saying is “Black Power!” 
 The linking of those two words, “Black” and “Power,” gathered force when newly-
elected SNCC president Stokely Carmichael popularized the slogan in June of 1966 while 
continuing the march through the South that had been started by James Meredith (and halted, 
while he recovered from a gunshot injury).60 It struck a chord with young people nationwide, and 
became an enduring way of framing new developments in the student movement and beyond.61 
“Black Power” marked a shift from self-description as “Negro” to “Black,” signaling a reversal 
of attitudes, refusing to accept the denigration of — and further, taking pride in — the very thing 
that had been stigmatized for so long: blackness. “Black” was no longer to be associated with 
degradation, but with a proud political and cultural stance.62 In this new, militant race 
consciousness, black identity itself was “the soul of a new radicalism.”63 The slogan has been 
associated with urban insurrections in the North and armed self-defense organizations in the 
West, although recent historical scholarship has broadened our understanding of the scope of 
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Black Power activities by including the work of women, school teachers, welfare rights 
organizers, health care activists, and more.64 
 From the perspective of activists at Tuskegee Institute, the new attitude had already taken 
root before Carmichael raised it in Mississippi. “When you look at it,” Wendell Paris 
commented, “the death of Sammy Younge is what ushered in the Black Power movement.”65 
Younge was dead less than a month when national civil rights leaders told The New York Times 
that they were “watching current racial unrest in Tuskegee” and interpreting it as a sign that 
“coalition” governments with white people may no longer work. The NAACP continued to 
defend the ideal of bi-racial political leadership, but SNCC leader John Lewis was quoted as 
saying that “it might be necessary to have all-Negro government before you can have a workable 
interracial government.”66 By the time Stokely Carmichael shouted “Black Power” on a 
Mississippi highway, Sammy Younge had been dead for six months and some white people in 
Tuskegee were already bracing for escalating conflict. Two weeks earlier the Tuskegee News 
warned about the danger of Black Nationalism to “race relations” in Tuskegee. “The Negro 
leadership in Tuskegee has feared and fought against such a reactionary approach to the problem 
of equal rights,” the editors wrote.67 A new leadership, however, concentrated among Tuskegee 
students, was already embracing Black Power and debating its meaning. In the spring of 1966, 
Michael Wright wrote a letter challenging the idea that merely wearing an Afro constituted a 
significant political stand.68 While working for the Campus Digest, Melvin Todd supported the 
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turn toward Black Power. “I was definitely on the Black Power end of the spectrum,” He said. “I 
felt that we as Tuskegee students should be on the leading edge of reporting the news to our 
student body that would inspire them to do things for the uplift of the black community.”69 
 Several leading activists described the goals of Black Power as essentially a realization of 
democracy and self-determination in the Black Belt. Michael Wright highlighted these themes in 
notes he drafted to explain the concept to Tuskegee students. “Black Power is simply a process 
whereby Black people can unite to control the resources, both politically and economically, in 
their areas and make the decisions upon matters which affect them,” he wrote. “Every other 
ethnic group has done this, so why not Blacks in America?”70 Gwen Patton felt that TIAL had 
“absolutely” sought Black Power all along. “If we want to control it, we're going to control 
everything,” she said. “The supermarkets. We want a theater downtown. If they had listened to 
us, they would have a thriving community. We didn't want to have to come in contact with white 
folks first and if we did, it would have to be on a fair basis, a fair basis of negotiation... That was 
the difference between TIAL and TCA.”71 The idea that Black Power might represent basic 
fairness was lost on most media accounts of the movement, but avoiding misunderstanding was 
no longer a priority. “For once, black people are going to use the words they want to use,” 
Carmichael wrote, “not just the words whites want to hear. And they will do this no matter how 
often the press tries to stop the use of the slogan by equating it with racism or separatism.”72 
 For some students, words they wanted to use included “revolution,” causing significant 
alarm in the corridors of power. A Tuskegee student, Ernest Stephens, believed that the urban 
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rebellions were a harbinger of a deeper social transformation. He argued that black students 
could form the leadership of a coming Black Revolution. In order for black students to 
“formulate a program of action on black campuses and implement the bread and butter fight of 
black Americans,” he wrote, they would have to “fight the administration, the faculty, and, yes, 
even the student body for the right to pursue this course.”73 Tuskegee students were spreading 
this militant attitude across the state, the governor’s anti-communist commission, the ALCPP, 
believed. In September, the group sent a confidential memo to George Wallace warning that 
several Alabama towns were “at a point where trouble of considerable proportions could erupt,” 
including Tuskegee. As the “rumblings grow louder,” the memo concluded that they seem “to 
eminate [sic] from Tuskegee campus.”74 In his fall 1966 convocation address to the Tuskegee 
Institute community, President Foster tried to quell the rumblings, arguing that violent revolution 
was outdated and that the nature of change going forward would be largely technocratic. 
“Problems of this day are essentially those of know-how,” he said, “and of the strategies and 
techniques required to make a better world society.”75 
 The technocratic ideal, however, was losing its grip on the political imagination of 
students. The Black Power movement also represented an intellectual awakening. Students — 
especially activist students — read, discussed, and debated widely, and mostly outside of class. 
Books and articles circulated among students in these years by Amiri Baraka, Nikki Giovanni, 
Stokely Carmichael, Sonia Sanchez, H. Rap Brown, Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, Martin Luther 
King, Jr., W.E.B. Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, Kwame Nkrumah, and Malcolm X.76 
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“Everybody had a copy of The Autobiography of Malcolm X,” Wendell Paris recalled, “You just 
had that in your back pocket.”77 Some of the faculty encouraged the ferment among students. 
One Tuskegee professor, writing in the Campus Digest, argued that black people were more and 
more divided between assimilationists and revolutionists. The assimilationists (who were 
“usually educated, middle-class Negroes”) sought to enter white society and maintain the status 
quo. The revolutionists, on the other hand, “are tired of maintaining a system of near slavery,” he 
wrote. “They are Negroes with self respect and who wish to end the great white brainwash.”78 
 The message of self-respect and militancy was echoed repeatedly by a series of guest 
speakers who came to Tuskegee in the mid-1960s. Tuskegee students didn’t only read Martin 
Luther King, James Forman, or Malcolm X, they met them in person.79 Chester Higgins believes 
that Tuskegee’s status as a privately-funded school gave it more leeway to invite controversial 
speakers. “Politically, we were exposed to the kind of things that were not available at a publicly 
supported state school like the nearby Alabama State University,” he said.80 One of the biggest 
events on campus was the appearance of the young man perceived to be the national leader of the 
black student movement: Stokely Carmichael. 
 Carmichael’s arrival in the fall of 1966 was also an opportunity for Tuskegee student 
activists to address the campus as a whole. Two thousand students, faculty and staff packed into 
a hall to hear him. Wendell Paris, who had recently graduated and Oscar Sykes, a freshman, gave 
opening remarks.81 Sykes used the opportunity to speak out against mandatory chapel. “What 
gives Tuskegee the right to make students attend religious services when Jesus himself didn’t 
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compel anyone to hear him?” he asked. Paris riled up the audience by comparing “good niggers” 
and “bad niggers” — the former being those who wait politely for change, the latter being those 
who “stand up to the white man and tell him he doesn’t care about him.” The Campus Digest 
reported that the audience “burst into applause,” adding: “Paris urged the students to ‘be a bad 
nigger.’”82 
 Carmichael, the featured speaker, explored the personal, political, and educational 
implications of Black Power. “[I]n order for us to be free we must accept our blackness and force 
the white man to accept it,” he said. Carmichael had traveled to at least two dozen other colleges 
and universities that year, and made a point of addressing the connection between politics and 
education.83 Carmichael challenged the idea that the purpose of education should be individual 
career advancement. Rather, he suggested that black people should stop trying to prove 
themselves by success in traditional professions, but instead should “go back to the ghettos and 
black communities where there is much work to be done,” he said. “What good is an education if 
you are going to use it as a ticket into white society?” Rather than asking for acceptance, 
Carmichael argued that black people must recognize the actual power relations of society and act 
accordingly. “This country is not run on love, brotherhood and non-violence but on power,” he 
said, “therefore the Negroes must overcome his fear, and he must stand up and fight for 
power.”84  
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  Figure 3. Stokely Carmichael speaks at Tuskegee Institute. Source: Southern Courier, 
October 22, 1966.  
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The Postcolonial Roadmap 
 Tuskegee Institute had always been concerned with power. In its origins, however, 
Tuskegee was bound up with another kind of power: that of European and North American 
colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.85 Like many other black thinkers 
and educators in those years (including W. E. B. Du Bois), Booker T. Washington believed that 
bringing “civilization” to Africans would benefit them.86 The mid-twentieth century anti-colonial 
revolutions changed the way black Americans saw Africa. For some Tuskegee students in the 
1960s, their view of who was civilizing whom transformed. 
 As national liberation in Africa became a tidal wave, it was inevitable that black people 
in the United States would not only draw inspiration from it, but also begin to see the transition 
from colonialism to independence as a roadmap for their own struggle. “The American Negro 
shares with colonial peoples many of the socio-economic factors which form the material basis 
for present day revolutionary nationalism,” the iconoclastic scholar Harold Cruse wrote in 1962. 
“From the beginning, the American Negro has existed as a colonial being.”87 In 1966, Stokely 
Carmichael went further, from “sharing factors” with colonized Africans to black neighborhoods 
being identical to colonized African nations. “The colonies of the United States—and this 
includes the black ghettoes within its borders, north and south—must be liberated,” he wrote.88 
 Tuskegee student activists began following national liberation struggles closely. Chester 
Higgins was drawn towards the African students on campus because of their study habits, and 
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they exposed him to anti-colonial literature. Higgins’s African classmates showed him books by 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first president of Nigeria, and others by Kwame Nkrumah, the president of 
Ghana. “Then somebody turned me on to [Jomo] Kenyatta,” he recalled. “It's not somebody that 
African-Americans would read, and want to be seen with a book with a funny name.”89 Gwen 
Patton remembers that it was South African exiles teaching at Tuskegee who encouraged 
students to read Kenyatta’s book, Facing Mount Kenya and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the 
Earth.90 Melvin Todd got access to global literature through writing for the school newspaper. In 
the office of the Campus Digest “we would get newspapers from all over the world,” Todd 
recalled. “We would get papers from Cuba, from the Communist Party, everything that you can 
imagine,” he said. “I read everything that came because I wanted to be knowledgeable about the 
world.”91 Some student activists began writing about global politics. To spread an understanding 
of the connection between black people in the United States and African national liberation, 
Michael Wright drafted a series of in-depth essays for SNCC. He explained the historical origins 
of colonialism and capitalism, tracing the growth of major corporations, their investments — and 
consequent political commitments — in colonial and neocolonial regimes all over the world.92  
 As they looked to anti-colonial, national liberation struggles for theoretical and practical 
guidance, some students were breaking from the outlook of one black middle class (in Tuskegee) 
and embracing the outlook of another black middle class (in Africa). In the 1960s, nationalist 
leaders in African and Asia came from the same milieu — middle class, college-educated 
students and young professionals. The Black Power movement in the United States drew its 
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leadership from the same set.93 Che Guevara, Kwame Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon shared this 
class position with Gwen Patton, Samuel Younge and Michael Wright. The pattern was the same 
across black campuses in the United States. Although the ideas of Black Power were adopted by 
all classes of black students in the United States, Jeffery Turner notes that “Private campuses 
tended to foster the most militant versions of Black Power.” Elite black schools with wealthier 
students, he concludes, “were more likely to pursue separatism and educational goals influenced 
by black nationalism.”94 
 Some of the new heads of state in the so-called “Third World” advocated for the ideas of 
socialism, but as they attempted to survive in a hostile capitalist world, this meant using the 
existing state apparatus to nationalize industry for the purpose of reform and development.95 The 
Black struggle in the United States shared similar impulses, as had global revolutions for more 
than a century.96 As Bloom pointed out, the American Civil Rights Movement was more or less 
fought under the slogans of the French Revolution.97 Middle classes are well positioned to lead 
these charges. Neil Davidson notes that in historic European revolutions, the middle class, 
standing outside of society’s central productive processes, was able to speak for the “nation” and 
articulate slogans and ideals that rallied different classes in the struggle against feudalism.98 
Samuel Younge in the Black Belt and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana were not unlike Maximilien 
Robespierre in France, who, two hundred years earlier, galvanized a coalition of classes against a 
recalcitrant old order. The ideas animating militant Black Nationalism were also not dissimilar 
from those involved in nation-building projects centuries earlier. The ideas of social revolution 
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and anti-capitalism were “in the air,” but not translated into immediate strategies as Wallace and 
his advisors feared. More sympathetic observers understood that, under the banner of Black 
Power, insurgents in the US were most immediately fighting for democratic reforms.99 
 From their perspective at Tuskegee in 1966, the meaning of the events in Africa was clear 
to Tuskegee students: black people were fighting the Europeans and winning. Wendell Paris’s 
local activism was inspired by events in Africa. “Black Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, now, is 
standing up,” he said, describing the time. “You needed to understand that folk were rising up, 
not only in your local community, but all over the country and all over the world.” Paris 
furthermore believed that these developments had urgent implications for Macon County. “It was 
necessary to have an international perspective, a global perspective,” he said, “but more 
importantly, you needed to understand what was going on in your local community and how you 
could impact what was happening there. That's how we spent the majority of our time just trying 
to bring our people to the point where they would move, in spite of their fears, to make 
constructive change.”100 
 Working towards constructive change, however, frequently brought Tuskegee students 
face to face with armed agents of the status quo. Tuskegee activists working in the Black Belt 
reported being followed by FBI agents.101 Even the ostensibly non-political Tuskegee Institute 
Community Education Program (TICEP) volunteers found themselves subject to intimidation, 
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followed by white men with guns, their cars run off the road.102 Melvin Todd admired SNCC 
workers because he saw that they were risking their lives to register people to vote. Stokely 
Carmichael introduced him to a rural family that housed him when he joined the campaign. Todd 
was impressed with the generosity of people in the Black Belt, but also came face to face with 
mortal danger. In Lowndes County, two black men approached him one day and asked him what 
he was doing. Assuming that, as black people, they would be sympathetic, Todd explained the 
voter registration drive. One of the men pulled out a revolver and put it to his head, saying, 
“Nigger, if you don't get out of here, I'll blow your head off.”103 
 Intimidation, terror, the threat of violence, and violence — especially the murder of 
Tuskegee student Sammy Younge — drove home the idea that black people in Macon County 
were in a situation perhaps more than analogous to that of colonized Africans. In a county where 
black people outnumbered white people by nearly five to one, democratic voting could only 
mean the rise of black political power.104 In Macon, some black people began thinking that the 
problem of violence and power could be overturned together in one stroke: by electing a black 
sheriff. 
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The First Black Sheriff Elected in the South Since Reconstruction 
 Military veteran Lucius Amerson attended Tuskegee on the G.I. Bill, and worked long 
hours in the housekeeping department at the school to support his growing family. One night the 
police hauled him to the Macon County jail on a domestic disturbance charge, where he had an 
epiphany. Noticing the disorganized, inefficient and cluttered atmosphere of the jail, Amerson 
had an idea: “If I was sheriff I could run this place 100 percent better.” Amerson thought of 
Sammy Younge’s “blood-soaked body lying on the ground in the rain,” and then, according to 
his memoir, he had “a revelation that I could run for the office of sheriff and win!”105 Although 
he had no political experience and little law enforcement credentials to speak of, the Tuskegee 
student was correct —Younge’s murder did, in fact, propel Amerson into public office.106  
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 Amerson’s victory is evidence of a shift in political clout and leadership — from 
Tuskegee faculty assembled in the TCA to Tuskegee students affiliated with TIAL. Charles 
Gomillion believed that the office of sheriff should be the last one for black people to seek, given 
its power to arouse white fears. Meanwhile, students from TIAL and SNCC teamed up to 
campaign aggressively for Amerson.107 Hostility between Amerson and the TCA leadership 
came out into the open, Norrell noted, when students rigged a sound truck for Amerson and 
drove around Tuskegee decrying the failed leadership of “middle-class niggers.”108 With the help 
of student activists from Tuskegee, Amerson narrowly defeated his challenger in the Democratic 
Party primary in June 1966 and then prevailed in a landslide (3,868 to 2,002 votes) in the general 
election in November.109 The students reveled in their power. “We elected the first black sheriff 
in the South since Reconstruction,” Wendell Paris remembered with pride.110 
 Amerson’s election was widely recognized as a watershed event. “One chunk of Alabama 
soil is no longer the political province of the white man,” a New York Times Magazine article 
declared.111 The election echoed in headlines nationwide, reporters converged on Macon County, 
and Amerson received a congratulatory telegram from Vice President Hubert Humphrey and an 
invitation to the White House.112 In 1970, Hollywood released a feature film starring Jim Brown, 
based on Lucius Amerson’s story.113 As the news spread, others followed in Amerson’s 
footsteps. In the years immediately following his victory, black sheriffs were elected in several 
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other Black Belt counties.114 Thus, it is not surprising that Macon County in general and the city 
of Tuskegee in particular were on the minds of two activists who sat down to lay out a book-
length explication of the meaning of Black Power.  
 “Tuskegee, Alabama, could be the model of Black Power,” Stokely Carmichael and 
Charles Hamilton wrote in what became one of the most influential books of the era, Black 
Power: Politics of Liberation in America.115 Carmichael — who later changed his name to 
Kwame Ture — had plenty of opportunity to observe the political dynamics of Tuskegee in 
person. Carmichael had spent a great deal of time working with Tuskegee student activists and 
Charles Hamilton had been a Tuskegee professor.116 Seeing firsthand the acceleration of events 
after Sammy Younge’s murder, including the election of Lucius Amerson, the authors devoted 
an entire chapter in this short book to an analysis of Tuskegee’s potential as a center of Black 
Power. “It could be the place where black people have amassed political power and used that 
power effectively,” they wrote.117  
 The Black Power movement is, in the popular imagination, associated with guns and 
incendiary rhetoric. The month before Amerson’s election, two community college students in 
Oakland, California, Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, borrowed the symbol from the electoral 
campaign in Lowndes County, Alabama and founded the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. 
The vision laid out in Black Power, however, had more to do with grabbing hold of ballots than 
bullets. Furthermore, recent historical research has unearthed a broad tapestry of Black Power 
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activism — including by the Oakland Panthers, and including electoral campaigns.118 
Carmichael had discussed with Younge the week before his murder, the idea of creating a new 
political party in Macon County. “The black people of Tuskegee could play a major role in 
building an independent county political organization which would address itself to the needs of 
black residents along lines we have already indicated,” Hamilton and Carmichael wrote. 
Carmichael had tried to raise this idea with other civil rights activists but met with resistance.119 
In Tuskegee, some student activists were ready to break from the Democratic Party, whose 
emblem in Alabama was the rooster and whose official slogan remained “white supremacy.”120 
Wendell Paris spoke out at a forum on campus to say that black people should not “vote for the 
white rooster” anymore because “the whole thing is corrupt.”121 In Black Power, the authors 
stressed that figures such as Amerson alone could not make significant change without an 
independently organized party. “Such an independent force would give greater meaning to the 
election of Amerson by creating a genuine, organized base of power,” they argued, “not merely 
putting one black man, however valuable, into office.”122 
 The expectations for what could be achieved in Tuskegee by electoral means were 
measured. “It would be naïve to expect that the operation of Black Power in Tuskegee could 
transform Alabama state politics,” Hamilton and Carmichael wrote, “But it could establish in 
that one area a viable government based on a new and different set of values -- on humaneness -- 
and serve as an example of what civilized government could be in this society.” In this way, 
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“[p]ockets of Black Power” could become “illustrations of what legitimate government really is -
- a phenomenon we have not experienced to date in this society.”123 But even these modest 
expectations immediately ran into resistance from white officials. Civil rights activists charged 
Tuskegee’s white mayor with deliberately demoting black police officers to open up space for 
more white officers in order to undermine Amerson.124 Amerson disputed the inadequate 
allocation of funds to his office by the Macon County Board of Revenue, alleging a pattern of 
discrimination.125 The newly elected Alabama governor, Lurleen Wallace, also apparently 
attempted to thwart the black sheriff by appointing white people as special constables in 
overlapping jurisdictions.126 
 The independent power base that Hamilton and Carmichael imagined in Tuskegee did not 
come together, and Amerson did not see himself as accountable to the movement that put him in 
power. Amerson explicitly challenged the idea of building an independent political party. “[T]he 
Democratic Party has the best policy,” he said, “and I don’t think the other party will get very 
far.”127 Amerson had actually been clear with Tuskegee students from the beginning of his 
campaign that he was not a “Black Power candidate” and that he wanted them to help him as 
individuals, not as TIAL.128 Still, in the months and years to follow, the black students who 
supported him pointed proudly to the fact that Amerson arrested a white man accused of raping a 
young black woman, and in an even more spectacular reversal of the social order, arrested a 
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police chief and a state trooper for threatening and brutalizing a black man.129 Wendell Paris 
believed that Amerson’s presence meant that “we have police powers here,” and that black 
citizens finally had cause to believe that “your voices have to be heard.”130 
 The results of the movement in 1966 and 1967 were, at best, mixed across the Black Belt. 
While some black sheriffs were elected, they did not entirely end police brutality, as some had 
hoped. Even more modest efforts to desegregate Tuskegee stumbled and struggled. Tuskegee 
students and faculty continued Younge’s effort to desegregate Tuskegee’s white churches, but 
after three attempts in the summer of 1966, the doors remained shut to black worshippers.131 
Under court order, Tuskegee high schools were set to be integrated in the fall of 1966, but the 
reality of student allocation remained predominantly segregated.132 In their strongest Black 
Power demonstration project to date, activists built popular support for an independent black-led 
political party in nearby Lowndes County, but widespread voter fraud, terror and intimidation 
explained why, in a county that was 81 percent black, their party failed to gain a single seat in 
the November elections.133 
 The election of Lucius Amerson is a twist on the story of Black Power and the tradition 
of armed self-defense in the South. Given their overwhelming numbers in the county, Tuskegee 
student activists sought to seize control of the state apparatus — including its monopoly on 
“legitimate” violence — by electing a black sheriff. Black Power advocates in Oakland wielded 
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weapons openly to police the police, while in the Black Belt their counterparts wanted black men 
to become the police. While Tuskegee students saw his election as a step toward the kind of 
decolonization that was sweeping the African continent, Amerson saw himself as part of the 
mainstream of American law enforcement, not as a Black Power activist or agent of 
decolonization.134 In his memoir, Amerson claims that Stokely Carmichael once asked him how 
he would use his position to support the Black Power movement. “I am too busy performing my 
duties as sheriff to be concerned with black power,” Amerson replied.135 Before the twentieth 
century’s first black sheriff swore the oath of office, however, the legal system delivered another 
blow to the student movement at Tuskegee: a verdict for Younge’s murderer. 
 
“To Hell With Alabama!” 
 Like the defeat in Lowndes County, the trial of Marvin Segrest showed that Alabama’s 
white power structure was far from beaten. In November of 1966, Segrest’s lawyers successfully 
petitioned to have the trial moved to Opelika in the majority-white Lee County. The defense 
argued that protests had created a feeling of resentment against Segrest, and the judge agreed.136 
“What the attorneys were really saying,” the Southern Courier editorialized, “is that no white 
man accused of killing a Negro should have to face a jury of independent Negroes.”137 Indeed, 
Segrest stood before twelve white jurors who, in mid-December, found him not guilty of murder 
after only seventy minutes of deliberation.138 A SNCC member in the courtroom kicked the floor 
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and stormed out, shouting, “to hell with Alabama!”139 “There is a rotten and foul branch of this 
community that must be uprooted before we can have a just society,” wrote one member of the 
Tuskegee Institute community in a letter to the Tuskegee News. “We see roads paved, city limits 
extended, police integrated, more Negroes registered to vote and sitting on juries, even anti-
segregation ordinances adopted, and all accompanied by something that looks like white 
benevolence and black accommodation,” he continued, adding: “But you can still get yourself a 
nigger in Tuskegee.”140 “Let us ask ourselves seriously,” Tuskegee student Ernest Stephens 
wrote in his self-published broadsheet, Black Thesis, “is it against the law for white folks to kill 
niggers in this country?”141 
 Little was left of Tuskegee Institute’s “glue” following the verdict. Three hundred 
students gathered in Logan Hall for an impromptu meeting.142 They decided to march into the 
town, and as they did, their numbers grew. The headline of the December 19th edition of the 
Campus Digest read, “Slayer Goes Free; Students Riot” and the article reported that 1,500 
students protested downtown.143 Students smashed windows of thirteen downtown businesses 
and mounted the statue of a confederate soldier in the town square, painting the face black. They 
put a yellow stripe down its back and wrote, “Black Power” and “Sam Younge” on its base.144 
Dr. Foster immediately chastised the students, saying that “the struggle for human rights must go 
on,” but it is “serious” and won’t progress through “flippant discussion, careless planning, or 
precipitous action.”145 Following the protests, President Foster gathered the entire Institute 
community for a meeting. Activists were angered that he failed to say anything about the verdict, 
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directing his comments only to student actions.146 While the school administration did not 
oppose peaceful protest, Foster said, “Tuskegee Institute does very definitely oppose and counsel 
against any protest which grows out of careless planning, confusion as to purposes, and disregard 
of orderly processes.” Demonstrations and marches “had their place at times in the past,” Foster 
continued, but going forward more “sophisticated strategies” are needed, adding that Tuskegee is 
an educational institution, warning that it is “not a place for the professional civil rights 
advocate.” The Tuskegee News editors called it a “wise statement.”147 
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For a time, the legacy of Tuskegee’s founder and that of its fallen student martyr 
appeared to be in direct competition. To some, Younge’s murder gave urgency to the calls for 
Black Power and sweeping change, and the acquittal of his murderer revealed the true nature of 
White Power. To others, the militants had simply gone too far. An anonymous white Tuskegee 
merchant, invoking the proud legacy of Booker T. Washington, ridiculed Black Power as 
essentially a slogan of vandalism and burglary. “Are the officials of the Tuskegee Institute going 
to sit quietly by and thus show their approval of this Black Power jaunt?” he asked.148 The next 
month the bi-racial city council rejected a proposal from Tuskegee students for a permit for a 
downtown march to commemorate the first anniversary of Younge’s murder.149 The black sheriff 
who owed his office to the students agreed. Amerson let it be known that, in his opinion, “no 
worthwhile purpose is going to be served by continuing demonstrations and uproars in the 
city.”150 In truth, the uproars were just getting started. 
 
A Black University? Or a White One? 
 The political transformation of many of Tuskegee’s young people during 1966 and 1967 
led them to question the nature of their education. They were changed as people and as students. 
When Sammy Younge was murdered, they saw the school the school as culpable — Tuskegee’s 
historic policy of accommodating white supremacy had resulted in the murder of one of their 
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own, they believed. “Sammy was killed, and we blamed the school,” Patton said.151 Also, as 
students gained experience challenging and changing city and county politics, their expectations 
for change on campus grew as well. In the wake of Sammy Younge’s murder, students “started 
making much more demands on the administration to change some of those Neanderthal 
practices that were still in place,” Wendell Paris recalled, “people weren't accepting the old 
Tuskegee practices that we had.”152 Students simply stopped going to chapel, a trend that was 
later ratified by the administration: attendance ceased to be mandatory.153  
 Sammy Younge’s murder coincided with a shift in black student activism nationwide. 
Historian Robert Cohen notes that, while black students were crucial to initiating, in 1960, the 
mass phase of the civil rights movement, they were slower than white students to take aim at 
their own campuses.154 It wasn’t until the spring of 1966 that Black student unions began to 
appear, for example.155 Tuskegee played a leading role in developing a conscious movement of 
students thinking about their role as students. In April of 1966, Tuskegee hosted the first annual 
Student Human Relations Conference, attended by students and professors from ten Alabama 
colleges. Featured speakers included Bettina Aptheker, Stokely Carmichael, William Kunstler, 
Howard Zinn and Gwen Patton, with performances from Joan Baez and Judy Collins. Attendees 
decried the state of black colleges, heavy-handed administration, and strategized about how to 
democratize higher education.156 The next semester Patton took her campus organizing skills on 
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the road, resigning from student government to accept a position as a “campus traveler” for the 
Human Relations project of the United States National Student Association.157 
 Tuskegee was both ahead of the times and behind them. Tuskegee Institute had promoted 
change off campus but not on campus. Tuskegee faculty had led the charge for voting rights, and 
the administration signed off on the TICEP program, sending students into the Black Belt as 
tutors just as civil rights activism was heating up, but the educational experience in classes and 
on campus went unexamined.158 “Tuskegee was so backwards,” Michael Wright said, that “in 
1966 there was only one ‘Negro history’ class in the entire college. And the students had to fight 
tooth-and-nail for that.”159 The kinds of ideas that flowed freely in the SNCC-sponsored 
Freedom Schools were, for the most part, not yet available in Tuskegee classrooms.160 In the 
summer of 1966, Wright addressed an “Open Letter to Black Youth,” to advertise what they 
would learn in Freedom Schools, especially the history of Africa. “We really have something 
beautiful to identify with,” he wrote, “and I ain’t talking about the white man’s history that we 
study in Social Studies in school.”161 In 1966 and 1967, students began expressing the desire for 
similar changes in Tuskegee’s classrooms. 
 In these years, students, faculty, and even trustees re-evaluated Tuskegee’s historic role 
in relation to white supremacy and to the larger society. “Is it our role to assume the qualities of 
the white educational structure, or must we direct our development along different lines?” Ernest 
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Stephens asked in the Campus Digest in the fall of 1966.162 In their own way, the trustees were 
asking themselves the same question at the same time: How could Tuskegee prove itself 
invaluable to Southern society in a moment of turmoil and change? One white trustee suggested 
that Tuskegee Institute need to “show the South what it could do educationally and socially,” 
before tapping Southern donors.163 For many students, what Tuskegee “could do” was clear: it 
could help them to “make it” in society.164 Professor Arnold Kaufman thought most Tuskegee 
students were “apathetic” because “they fear that civil rights militancy could endanger their 
future career success.”165 At the end of 1966, Gwen Patton was part of a minority of students 
who wanted black colleges to focus more on social change and less on training students to climb 
the American ladder. In an op-ed for the Southern Courier, Patton argued that the future of black 
colleges was in doubt if they didn’t “wake up” and “starting thinking BLACK.”166 
 By 1967, however, Patton’s sentiment had become an organized current. Seventy-five 
students, SNCC workers (including H. Rap Brown, Courtland Cox, and George Ware) and some 
faculty (Nathan Hare from Howard) and Tuskegee deans gathered for a National Student 
Association conference at Tuskegee in February to discuss the state of black colleges. Students 
debated whether black colleges were just “service stations for white society,” or whether white 
people needed to be “kicked out” in order to reorient the school towards teaching black people 
about their own interests.167 LeRoi Jones came to Tuskegee that month and told an audience that 
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college is “a freak factory” and that black colleges produce students who are “half white.”168 
Jones’s visit prompted protest in the pages of the Tuskegee News for his use of course language 
(“gutter talk”) when reading his poems about life in Newark. A Tuskegee student replied, 
poignantly, that it would make more sense to be “shocked at the fact of the obscene ghetto,” she 
wrote, “not at the words a poet might use to describe the experience of being caged there.”169 
 The political state of Tuskegee’s student body in the spring of 1967 is probably best 
described as polarized. Warren Hamilton was elected student body president by a margin of only 
forty votes out of roughly one thousand cast, squeaking by an opponent who tried to hurt him by 
playing up Hamilton’s association with “outside” influences, especially SNCC.170 At the very 
moment that black students at Alabama State College were marching in large numbers, 
boycotting a new student center building, and presenting the administration with demands,171 
some Tuskegee faculty and students complained of student apathy, that classmates “glide” 
through four years without becoming “excited” by Vietnam, the draft, or “tyrannical 
administrative policies.”172 A visiting student, Tony Mohr, reported that the atmosphere was 
neither academic nor radical, that there were “undercurrents” of Black Nationalism and civil 
rights activism present at Tuskegee, but that they were “buried in the frenzy of student 
government activities, parties, fraternities, sororities.”173 Mohr’s piece provoked a debate in the 
Campus Digest about Tuskegee and what it could or should be. One professor argued that the 
entire freshmen year should be “scrapped” and replaced with “Negro-African studies.”174 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 “Jones Visits Campus,” Campus Digest, February 28, 1967, 1. 
169 Elizabeth Keen, “To the Editor,” Tuskegee News, March 9, 1967, 2. 
170 Mary Ellen Gale, “SNCC an Issue In SGA Election,” Southern Courier, April 22, 1967, 2. 
171 Barbara Flowers, “Two Weeks of Protest at Alabama State,” Southern Courier, April 29, 1967, 3. 
172 Marvin McMillan, “Up From Apathy,” Campus Digest, April 15, 1967. 
173 Tony Mohr, “Southern Stereotypes,” Campus Digest, May 1, 1967, 1. 
174 Tom Robischon, “An Open Letter to Marvin McMillan,” Campus Digest, May 6, 1967, 2. 
 
Page 219 
 As similar ideas began spreading among black students nationally, one of the first 
comprehensive reformulations of the role of black colleges as educational institutions was 
published in the spring of 1967 in the civil rights journal, Freedomways, by a Tuskegee graduate 
student (and friend of Sammy Younge), Ernest Stephens.175 Stephens may have been inspired by 
a manifesto produced at Howard University that semester calling for the “overthrow of the Negro 
college” and its replacement by a “militant black university.”176 Thinking along similar lines, 
Stephens asked: “How long will it be before black leaders and educators take hold of Negro 
colleges and transform them from ‘training schools for Negroes’ into universities designed to fit 
the real needs of black people in this nation?”177 The problem with black colleges, he argued, 
was that they “programmed” students “in white supremacy and self-hatred,” with “little or no 
emphasis” on a “realistic analysis of the Negro’s plight.” Furthermore, “Compulsory religious 
and military activities are examples of indoctrination, not education,” Stephens wrote. Black 
colleges suffer, he argued, from the fact that they are controlled by white-dominated Boards of 
Trustees. “[I]f the tone of education at Negro universities strays too far from white sanction,” he 
wrote, “the university will suffer financial loss.”178 
 Stephens proposed an education that would help students to grapple with the realities of 
black life. “The black university should speak to the needs of the nation by speaking first to the 
needs of its oppressed black population,” he wrote. This meant re-thinking the curriculum to 
include three hundred and fifty years of oppression, since, as he put it, there “can be no realistic 
solutions to black oppression until the problems are clearly understood.” Trustees, administrators 
and faculty were not likely to push through this program, Stephens believed. “If these changes 
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are to become a reality in the black university, students themselves must initiate them.” Students 
should not be surprised, however, to find that their “struggle for liberation is suppressed within 
the very framework of our own black educational institutes.”179 
 In the September issue of Negro Digest Tuskegee students could read another landmark 
proposal for revising the paradigm of black colleges, written by their former professor Charles 
Hamilton.180 Black students are not like other students, Hamilton argued. They have been shaped 
by their deliberate exclusion from the benefits and services of society. “In our haste and quest to 
make middle-class people out of black students,” he wrote, “we have probably overlooked the 
fact that those black people have insights that we should heed.” Hamilton laid out a proposal for 
a different type of college. “I propose a black college revolutionary in its purposes, revolutionary 
in its procedures, revolutionary in its goals.” Instead of a college oriented toward the 
technocratic, dominant white society, “I propose a black college that would quickly understand 
that Western technology is not the criterion of greatness.” Instead of a college mired in self-
hatred, “I propose a black college that would deliberately strive to inculcate a sense of racial 
pride and anger and concern in its students.” Hamilton even suggested “one of the criteria for 
graduating summa cum laude would be the demonstrated militancy of the candidate.”181 Michael 
Wright endorsed Hamilton’s “Black University” idea in a letter he drafted to Tuskegee students, 
indicting Tuskegee as a symbol of the “sickness” that plagued higher education.182 
 Students continued to debate the meaning of Black Power for Tuskegee University in the 
pages of the Campus Digest. “There is a revolution going on,” Digest editor James Norton, Jr. 
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wrote in November of 1967. “This revolution is a change from a white-conscious environment to 
one which exemplifies black consciousness or consciousness of self.” Norton cited the tendency 
of black people to orient toward imitating white people. But now, that is changing, he wrote. 
“There is a growing awareness of Negro culture. Negroes are beginning to realize the greatness 
and beauty which surrounds their culture.” Norton concluded with a call to fashion: “So black 
brothers and sisters, wear your afros, African clothing and whatever that exemplifies the culture 
which we have been deprived of for so long a time.”183 Thomas Schmidt wrote a letter the next 
week in reply, arguing that Norton only described the “external trappings” of the revolution. The 
deeper meaning of black culture, Schmidt argued, is to not separate intellectual and emotional 
elements of experience, but to unite them.184 In truth, this “revolution” did not yet involve a 
majority of students. The campus was described by one guest speaker from SNCC as “on a major 
scale dead,” and there may be some truth in that assessment.185 That fall the biggest social 
movement on campus was a boycott of the cafeteria to protest bad food and the lack of 
reimbursement for missed meals — the students’ demands were quickly met.186But it may be 
that what was more important than the content of the demands was the willingness to make them.  
What some saw as a lack of “political” action others interpreted as an essential ingredient in a 
social movement: confidence in the power of collective action to make change. 
 In 1966 and 1967 there was, at the very least, an “undercurrent” of Black Power ideas 
circulating on Tuskegee’s campus, and some students began to take a hard look at teaching and 
learning on campus. Voting with their feet, students abolished many of Tuskegee’s antiquated 
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traditions — especially mandatory chapel attendance. With their newfound collective power, 
students lashed out at easy targets, such as the cafeteria food. While only a minority of students 
began rethinking the nature and purpose of their education, one Tuskegee student (Ernest 
Stephens) and one former Tuskegee professor (Charles Hamilton) authored two foundational 
texts of what became a movement to transform black colleges nationwide. For these activists, 
applying the ideas of Black Power to higher education meant rejecting the dominant “white” 
perspectives focused on individual advancement and encouraging educational forms that 
reinforced the collective goals of social change on a global scale. This radical internationalist 
perspective was an essential aspect of the black movement of the 1960s and 1970s.187 At 
Tuskegee, students who adopted this perspective clashed with the school’s longstanding tradition 
of collaboration with the military.188 
 
A Global Struggle 
 At the start of 1967, Sammy Younge, Jr. had been dead for one year and his murderer had 
recently been acquitted. Younge’s death prompted SNCC to come out against the Vietnam War 
and Tuskegee students successfully campaigned to elect the first black sheriff in the South since 
Reconstruction. As Black Power seemed to sweep across the continent of Africa, Tuskegee 
students had begun thinking about what a “postcolonial” society in Macon County would look 
like. As the year progressed however, the international perspectives of student activists collided 
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with Tuskegee’s historic collaboration with the American government and its military. The war 
in Vietnam and the resistance to apartheid in South Africa both became central issues on campus. 
 Tuskegee retained its military training program in these years, but the “hearts and minds” 
of students and faculty were in doubt. In 1967 Tuskegee’s annual ROTC parade was interrupted 
by half a dozen student protesters — including Michael Wright and Chester Higgins, Jr. — who 
joined the crowd carrying signs that read “We Protest the Draft,” and “No Viet Cong Ever Called 
Me a Nigger” — the latter slogan a reference to Muhammad Ali’s famous defense of his own 
refusal to fight in Vietnam.189 As Higgins mingled with the ceremony crowd, two young women 
in attendance saw he was holding an anti-war petition and stopped to sign it. “For my brother,” 
one woman said, “he’s in Viet Nam.”190 The next month a full-page ad ran in the Campus Digest 
with a headline quoting Dr. King’s bombshell speech in Harlem calling the United States the 
“greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.”191 Amazingly, one hundred forty faculty and 
students signed their names to the ad, protesting the “oppressive” war in Vietnam and calling for 
a 10-minute silent vigil on campus.192  
 Some Tuskegee student activists became directly connected to national and even 
international anti-war forums. Back in 1965, Gwendolyn Patton told the Digest that she did not 
know enough to comment on the Vietnam War.193 Just two years later she argued it was a “racist 
war,” and that black people should be on the side of the global revolution, the Vietnamese side, 
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and that “[t]his country was built on racism and imperialism.”194 Patton later signed on as a full-
time worker for the Student Mobilization Committee (affiliated with the Young Socialist 
Alliance) to organize students nationwide against the war.195 Patton wasn’t the only Tuskegee 
student activist making such global connections. George Ware was one of two SNCC members 
to travel to Havana with Stokely Carmichael to speak about Black Power and the Vietnam 
War.196 The Tuskegee administration could not stop alumnae like Ware from speaking out, but 
they could try to give equal time to pro-military voices on campus. 
 Anti-war activists and pro-war United States officials debated American policy in person 
before audiences of Tuskegee students in 1967, particularly in reference to apartheid in South 
Africa. South African activists spoke at Tuskegee that year on more than one occasion, 
encouraging students to make connections between political situations an ocean apart, and 
calling out the United States’ role in propping up the South African regime. Dennis Brutus, who 
later shared a jail cell with Nelson Mandela, came to campus and indicted the government for 
helping preserve apartheid.197 Reporting on a Tuskegee forum on Africa and Afro-Americans, 
the Campus Digest editors summed up the connections: “Our causes are identical,” they wrote. 
“We are united, united as one against a common oppressor.” They called for Tuskegee students 
to “throw off the psychological veils of misconceptions,” and “see for ourselves what this 
African heritage is about.”198 In late November, Forman led a symposium on South African 
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politics attended by 300 Tuskegee students. Calling the United States’ policy toward South 
Africa “racist,” a South African exile told the crowd that “Economic and political power… is the 
answer.” “We’re not Americans, brother,” Forman said, echoing the previous speaker. “We are 
victims of the U.S. force which has colonized black people all around the world.” In a sign of 
shifting attitudes on campus, the State Department Representative G. Edward Clark, also an 
invited speaker at the forum, tried to defend the United States’ position, but received only boos 
from the audience.199 At no other point in Tuskegee’s history could such a response to white 
guest speakers have been conceivable. 
 
The Governor’s Revenge 
 The radicalization of Tuskegee students over these two years did not go unnoticed or 
unopposed. In published accounts and interviews, some of the activists have stressed the role of 
the Tuskegee administration and of president Foster in trying to retard the student movement.200 
Guy Trammell, Ernest Stephens’s brother, took a more sympathetic view. Foster excelled at 
finances and budgeting, Trammell said, but wasn’t as well-equipped to respond to the students’ 
requests for educational change on campus. He suggested the analogy of a child wearing a 
formal suit. “If you're thinking about keeping the same suit on junior and he's grown up,” 
Trammell said, “it just doesn’t fit anymore.”201 Indeed, although Foster had broken with tradition 
by supporting civil and voting rights activism on the part of faculty and students, he seemed 
determined to keep students from outgrowing that particular “suit.” However, there is evidence, 
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presented above, that, in 1966 and 1967 Foster continued to work behind the scenes to defend 
students’ right to take part in protests. Foster’s management of students, trustees, and politicians 
meant that Tuskegee was not completely “unglued” in the years, and may explain the late 
emergence of a movement to transform the campus. 
 In 1966 and 1967 the most intense pushback came not from within Tuskegee but from 
without. In these years, in an historic reversal, Tuskegee Institute came to be perceived by the 
governor of the state of Alabama as an enemy of the status quo. George Wallace and his wife 
and successor, Lurleen, openly despised the school. Lurleen Wallace followed in her husband’s 
footsteps, staunchly opposing desegregation, creating greater tension with Tuskegee Institute, 
whose administration, faculty, and students were increasingly visible as desegregation advocates. 
The voting rights struggle described in chapter two was the first break between the state 
leadership and the school. School desegregation was the second. In March of 1967 a federal 
court ordered all Alabama schools to desegregate.202 Lurleen Wallace opposed the plan, while 
Tuskegee community members — including student Chester Higgins, and others — gave public 
testimony in favor.203 Two months later, in May of 1967, Governor Lurleen Wallace proposed a 
budget for the following year that did not include an appropriation for Tuskegee — rupturing an 
86-year-old tradition of state support.204  
 Lurleen Wallace’s attitude did not necessarily reflect that of Alabama’s elite or that of 
other sections of the American ruling class, who continued to support Tuskegee University. 
George Wallace made a name for himself in national politics as a staunch segregationist, a 
position he clung to long after other southern leaders had decided that segregation was 
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expendable. On a personal level, Wallace was known for meting out harsh reprisals against 
anyone who crossed him.205 The Southern Courier editors believed that the move to defund 
Tuskegee was George Wallace’s way of seeking “revenge” because the school had broken away 
from its historic relationship with the state, allowing oppositional people and ideas on campus.206 
The liberal Tuskegee News editors agreed that “Evidence of reprisal is clear” in the governor’s 
education budget.207 The appropriation in question was about $650,000, or 5 percent of 
Tuskegee’s $13 million budget.208 Foster estimated the state appropriation at 11.6 percent of 
Tuskegee’s total budget, claiming that it subsidized 53 percent of the student body.209 The 
Wallaces’ disapproval did not seem to be widespread among their class. Tuskegee continued to 
receive support elsewhere. In 1967 the Ford Foundation gave $300,000 to Tuskegee to advance 
scientific research on “race relations.”210 Southern elites had not yet abandoned hope in the 
school, either. The Wallaces were unable to convince Alabama’s politicians that Tuskegee was a 
threat. The Alabama State Senate voted almost unanimously (26-1) in early August of 1967 to 
restore $470,000 a year in funding to Tuskegee for two years.211 Governor Lurleen Wallace 
signed the bill, though she did succeed in stalling the payment for one month.212 
 While Tuskegee Institute won a reprieve, the student movement faced new and 
challenging obstacles in the years ahead. The intellectual ferment of the movement was exciting, 
but the brutal reality of racist violence was chilling. Earlier on the same day that Sammy Younge 
died, a voter registration official in Macon County had pulled a knife and threatened that he 
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would “spill [his] guts.” Younge’s friends promptly reported the incident to the FBI. The New 
York Times reported that FBI officials did enter Macon County soon afterwards — to investigate 
Younge’s murder.213 Student activists had fought continuously for local white people to comply 
with federal desegregation orders, but began to realize that federal agents might not be on their 
side. As they radicalized and made common cause with global revolutions, the students 
demanded democracy in the county and on campus. To carry out that struggle, one could not call 
upon the FBI, or even the black sheriff of Macon County. To truly make Macon County a center 
of Black Power, or to transform Tuskegee into a Black University, student radicals could only 
count on themselves. 
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Chapter Six: Unrest, 1968 
 
 In the middle of the spring semester at Tuskegee in 1968, Chester Higgins, Jr., sat down 
with Luther Foster for an interview that was published at the end of the month in Campus Digest. 
The exchange between these two men reveals the tension of the moment — Higgins represented 
a student body confidently insisting on change and Foster stood for an administration trying to 
end the conflict by any means necessary, and as quickly as possible. Higgins got right to the 
point. “There is a trend of thought among students on campus,” Higgins said, “that you are a 
smooth talker; that you pacify students with statements that really don’t say anything; that you 
are evasive.” Foster refused to take the bait. “They have a right to their views,” he demurred. The 
undergraduate challenged the college president on the disciplinary actions he had taken against 
students and on suspending the student-run judicial system. Foster asserted his right to take these 
actions “in an emergency” and insisted that he rescinded them because it appears the campus is 
“returning to normal.”1 In truth, the new “normal” at Tuskegee was better summed up by the 




 Collective power, once successfully asserted in one domain, tends to stimulate the 
imagination: if we won x, why not try for y? At Tuskegee, protest movements emerged on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chester Higgins, Jr., “Spotlight: Foster Interviewed,” Campus Digest, March 30, 1968, 1-2. 
2 “Students’ Demands’ Met After Boycott, Campus Digest, March 30, 1968,” 1. 
 
Page 230 
variety of fronts, taking up issues and involving actors that weren’t as central or visible on other 
campuses. After a fresh round of protests in the winter of 1968, Tuskegee students won the right 
to use meal card credits for missed meals, an improved selection of food, and a separate table 
dedicated only to seasonings — a victory that was no doubt as savory as it was sweet.3 And 
whereas most campus rebellions seem to originate (then and now) in humanities departments, the 
events of 1968 at Tuskegee were anchored among Engineering students. On December 12, 1967, 
Tuskegee’s Engineering students sent a five-page letter to the Dean of their department, laying 
out a series of complaints and recommendations (both in great detail) for improving their course 
of study. The letter discusses inadequate equipment and the need to upgrade facilities, but circles 
back again and again to one central problem: poor instruction.4 
 The professors, the engineers wrote, were chronically underprepared, assigning textbooks 
that they did not use, and giving exams that did not match the material discussed in class. For 
some instructors, the failure rate was “unusually high” and often there was clear “lack of 
preparation” to teach.5 In a section called simply “Mandate” the students outlined “directives for 
immediate implementation,” including: removal of chronically ineffective instructors; deans 
should conduct classroom visitations; exams should be aligned with course material; and the 
department should make necessary equipment available to students. The students demanded an 
answer from the dean by December 14, 1967.6 That date, and many other deadlines, would come 
and go before the engineers decided to do more than write letters. In late January, Tuskegee 
Institute received a $78,000 donation for the purpose of upgrading its engineering facilities, 
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making it easier for the administration to come to terms with student demands in certain 
respects.7 The sticking point, however, for students and administrators alike, was the faculty. 
 Mandatory participation in the Reserve Officer Training Corps program for male students 
was another bone of contention. It was Tuskegee’s second president, Robert Russa Moton, who 
initiated the organization of ROTC on campus, beginning in 1919.8 The implementation of a 
fully funded program was part of a political battle for equal treatment of African Americans in 
the armed forces.9 Armed black student soldiers bearing the nation’s uniform were a provocative 
sight in those years, particularly in the southern states, to say the least. ROTC students were a 
proud part of Tuskegee’s legacy, and had even defended the campus from the Klan.10 Student 
soldiers remained quite visible in the 1960s — drilling in uniform on campus every Wednesday. 
“If you went to Tuskegee on a Wednesday,” Ronald Hill recalled, “you would think it was a 
military school.”11 George Geddis, a senior, a leader of the protest movement in 1968, had hoped 
to advance to the Air Force through ROTC (the Air Force lost interest, he said, when he switched 
his major to English from Engineering).12 Warren Hamilton came to Tuskegee in 1964 from a 
black community that had rallied to introduce a Junior ROTC program to its high school. It was a 
basic question of fairness. “We didn’t have it and they had it at the white high school,” he said.13 
That black students, just a few years later, protested against ROTC is a sign of how far they 
traveled, politically speaking. 
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 As the war in Vietnam came under greater scrutiny, the mandatory nature of the ROTC 
program (not unlike the involuntary nature of the draft) made it fairly easy for opposition to 
spread quickly. Anecdotal evidence indicates that to some degree, ROTC instructors understood 
this dynamic and began bending the rules in response. Wendell Paris believes that the program 
was effectively no longer mandatory after Sammy Younge’s murder.14 Arthur Pfister felt singled 
out by his captain for being vocal about his opposition to mandatory ROTC. The captain called 
on him to lead the pledge of allegiance, and afterwards Pfister simply stopped attending the 
course. “[The captain] gave me a C anyway,” he said.15 
 Like the nice captain, Tuskegee administrators mostly chose a soft touch, acknowledging 
and even welcoming the protesters and their messages. In a mid-semester speech, President 
Foster suggested that in the near future students should be encouraged to take greater control of 
their education, perhaps even designing and carrying out their own courses.16 Early in the year 
the faculty chimed in to support students, as well. The Tuskegee chapter of American 
Association of University Professors voted to strongly support student rights on campus, 
including rights to organize and protest.17 Emphasizing dialogue, freedom to hear all views, and 
intelligent compromise, Tuskegee’s administrators no doubt believed they could resolve the 
crisis without resorting to harsh punishments. 
 Still, the hard boot of discipline was never far behind, particularly when the armed forces 
of the state got involved. In January, the Department of the Army Training distributed a 90-page 
document to all fifty states, TC 19-3, “Control of Civil Disturbances,” a manual for how to 
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handle urban rebellions.18 But as the saying goes, when there’s nothing left but force, there is 
nothing left. Far from winning “hearts and minds,” America’s armed forces were losing the wars 
both at home and abroad. At the end of the month, during the Tet holiday, North Vietnamese 
peasants who were presumed hobbled and overawed by American firepower, launched 
simultaneous attacks on more than one hundred southern Vietnamese cities, gaining control of 
several and exposing to the whole world the inability of the United States to defeat the national 
liberation movement.19 1968 was to be a bloody year. 
 
Massacre in Orangeburg 
 As in Tuskegee, Alabama, there was a large black middle class in Orangeburg, South 
Carolina, due to the presence of two historically black college campuses in town — South 
Carolina State University and Claflin College. At the start of the year, 1968, and after several 
years of bitter desegregation struggles, the only bowling alley in town (and the only one within a 
forty-mile radius) remained off-limits to black people. In late 1967 the “For White Only” sign 
was tactfully taken down and replaced with one neatly printed in the new lingo of segregation, 
“Privately Owned.” In early February students from South Carolina State University began 
protesting the establishment by entering, being denied service, and then repeatedly finding 
themselves ejected. During a week of protests beginning February sixth, police defended the 
owner’s decision to keep black people out, responded to the students in numbers and with 
violence, swinging clubs and sending several students to the hospital. Students retaliated by 
smashing windows at white-owned businesses and throwing bricks and bottles at police. One 
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student, Henry Smith, an advanced ROTC aspirant, called his mother to explain the violence. 
“Sit tight on the campus,” his mother advised. “But if you have to go, pray.”20 
 On the evening of Thursday, February eighth, hundreds of frustrated students built a large 
bonfire from wood scraps and hurled more insults at police than projectiles. More than one 
hundred state patrolmen and National Guard troops gathered nearby, some shouldering their 
weapons. The troops pushed the students back away from the bonfire, and one of them began to 
fire on the students, followed immediately by several others. In approximately ten seconds of 
shooting, bullets hit thirty students, three of whom would soon die of their injuries: Samuel 
Hammond, Delano Middleton, and Henry Smith. “Who’s laughing now?” one policeman said in 
passing to injured students in the hospital emergency room.21 
 Although white officials insisted on calling it a “riot,” among black people the reaction 
was significantly different, including the immediate labeling of the event as “the Orangeburg 
Massacre.”22 In the aftermath, the presidents of five black colleges (Atlanta University, Clark 
College, Morehouse College, Morris Brown College, and Spelman College) and of the 
Interdenominational Theological Center sent an open letter to President Lyndon Johnson, the 
Attorney General, state governors and local police, calling on them to stop “storm troopers” from 
invading college campuses.23 The governor of South Carolina was burned in effigy on black 
college campuses in Virginia, South Carolina, and North Carolina.24 A Howard University 
campus demonstration of sympathy with Orangeburg victims drew almost five hundred 
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students.25 SNCC decided to send members to Orangeburg from Tuskegee, who, for their own 
safety, traveled as representatives of their Student Government Association instead. Faculty and 
students raised $112 on campus to send the Tuskegee delegation, which included Melvin Todd, 
Michael Wright, and Warren Hamilton.26 
 The trip both radicalized and terrorized the student delegation. “We were on the way to 
Orangeburg and we were on a two-lane road, driving kind of fast,” Melvin Todd recalled, “and a 
car comes behind us and pulls right up on the bumper and would not back off.” The students had 
a .38 pistol in the car for protection, and debated when or whether they might need to use it on 
the road. They wondered: “If he tries to pass, do we shoot at him before he can shoot us? If so,” 
Todd said, “which one of us is going to do it?”27 The delegation used Warren Hamilton’s 
parents’ home in Savannah as a place to lodge.28 When they arrived in Orangeburg, there were 
troops everywhere and armored personnel carriers in the streets. Hamilton saw small planes 
flying low over the Orangeburg campus; it seemed to him “like a military occupation.”29 He also 
told the Southern Courier that he had the opportunity to view the body of one of the slain 
students. “He had been shot in the chest and the back,” he said. “Another boy’s back was almost 
blown out.”30 Local students told him they heard someone shout “Shoot the Niggers” before the 
police opened fire and that local black people in Orangeburg believed the KKK controlled the 
State National Guard.31 Michael Wright recalled that the delegation decided to start a new 
campus organization — called “Unity” —  when they returned from Orangeburg. “We realized 
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that the same thing could happen at Tuskegee,” he said, “and we had to protect ourselves.”32 
Orangeburg “may well be the site of a future racial war” Melvin Todd wrote in a report for the 
Campus Digest that was reprinted in other regional newspapers. The delegation’s reports were so 
horrible that some Tuskegee students reacted with disbelief. After reading his Digest article, one 
classmate asked Todd why he would print lies.33 
 Still, other Tuskegee students were making connections between armed conflict abroad 
and at home. In mid-February, several representatives of the Nation of Islam (NOI) came to 
speak to what was reported as an “enthusiastic crowd” on campus. The Vietnam War heralded 
the end for white rule, NOI Minister Louis Farrakhan told Tuskegee students. “The wars are not 
going to stop until the white man’s power to rule is completely broken down,” he said.34 Michael 
Wright and several other students decided to make this connection more concrete in an act of 
theatrical solidarity a few weeks later. On February twenty-ninth, four officials from the U.S. 
State Department came to Tuskegee to defend the Vietnam War in a campus forum. The first had 
just begun to speak when Michael Wright rushed to the front of the hall with a sign and a brown 
bag full of raw eggs. Several white professors called out from the audience accusations that the 
panelists were “murderers.”35 Wright shouted the words printed on his placard: “Inasmuch as our 
Vietnamese brothers don't have adequate enough air force to do their bombing, we black brothers 
will help them.” Four or five other students then helped him pelt the panelists with eggs before 
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dashing out of the room.36 The administration began proceedings to have Wright expelled, giving 
Unity its first call to action.37 
 
Unrest 
 In March, Tuskegee student grievances reached a boiling point that exceeded the student 
actions of 1903 and 1940.38 That month, the administration was unable to isolate the relatively 
small group of students who pushed the movement forward, primarily because those leaders 
wisely hewed close to the demands supported by the largest number of their peers: ending 
compulsory ROTC participation, granting athletic scholarships, increasing student power in 
governance, and supporting the engineering students. The “Black University” idea had traction, 
it seems, to the extent that it meant students would have the power to make the kind of changes 
that effectively upgraded Tuskegee’s offerings. That there needed to be more Afro-American- 
and African—oriented curricula rapidly became common sense among students, but the “Black 
University” concept had sway because organizers effectively merged that slogan with students’ 
most urgently-felt needs as students.  
 As administrators moved to take action against Michael Wright and his fellow protesters, 
Unity leaflets tacked between the language of politicized blackness and of defending students’ 
rights and student power. A March first leaflet (unsigned, but presumably issued by Unity), 
called administrators “indigenous uncle Toms” for attacking anti-war protesters as they 
challenged an attempt by the State Department to “brainwash” black students. The authors 
resolved, in the very masculine language of many Black Power activists in those years, that they 
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“as Black men” will “carry on the struggle for Liberation of all oppressed and exploited people,” 
they wrote, asking students: “which side are you on?”39 Two days later another leaflet registered 
a new approach, calling for students to specifically defend Michael Wright on the premise that 
his case represented an assault on students’ rights. The authors acknowledge that “Many students 
believe that the actions of Michael Wright (and possibly others) were wrong but don't justify 
being expelled from school.” The administration’s charging of Wright and others with “conduct 
unbecoming” of a Tuskegee student set a dangerous precedent by using such an “elastic” 
criterion, the leaflet argued.40 This temporary strategic retreat from attacking the broader issue of 
the war to the narrower issue of student expulsions was probably a wise move; it may reflect a 
recognition that the February twenty-ninth egg-throwing action was a few steps ahead of what 
“many students” were ready to support, and displays tactical savvy on the part of student 
activists interested in building the broadest possible base for future actions.  
 No doubt sensing the gathering storm, on March seventh the administration arranged for 
an all-Institute meeting where students would be allowed to air their grievances, provided they 
submit them in writing in advance. Unity threatened an all-student boycott without “free-
flowing” dialogue, but called it off after the acting chair of Unity had the opportunity of 
“conferring with the President.”41 The all-Institute meeting proceeded as planned, but there is no 
record of the discussion. It is likely that no amount of talking could overcome the basic problem: 
students wanted to move as quickly as possible and the administration tried to move as slowly as 
possible. Each day student demands went unmet, the student movement’s resolve deepened and 
strengthened. The underlying issue of power — who would decide the content and pace of 
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reform at Tuskegee? — was just below the surface. And then Stokely Carmichael returned to 
campus.42 
 Bringing Carmichael to campus offered an opportunity to once again assert the 
connection between student power and the ideas of Black Power. Unable to successfully move 
the administration on other issues, student activists asserted their control in an area where they 
had greater autonomy — the selection of outside speakers. Carmichael, then at the height of his 
fame, naturally drew a flock of reporters. Student organizers, however, decided that 
Carmichael’s speech would be for black people only, and white people (in this case, all of the 
journalists who arrived) would not be permitted to enter. This decision immediately raised alarm 
bells -- white visitors had never been barred from Tuskegee’s campus in its entire history. A 
local television news program featured an on-camera editorial, “Monday Night’s Incident at 
Tuskegee,” claiming that reporters and photographers were “bodily ejected” by non-student 
SNCC members and that campus officials briefly got them in only to ask them to leave moments 
later fearing “the militant attitude of some SNCC leaders would lead to a confrontation,” the 
editorial stated. The broadcast attempted to frame the issue of power as originating in the 
presence of outside agitators: “The general impression of the reporters who were there was that 
SNCC,” television viewers heard, “and not the Student Government group or the Tuskegee 
Administration… was in control and running the show.”43 The editorial may have falsely posed 
the “outsider” issue, but the matter of control was very real. 
 In the second half of March, Foster continued to offer the carrot of understanding and 
reform, but then shifted to wielding the stick of suspension and expulsion. Immediately 
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following the Carmichael incident, the administration first proposed more discussions — several 
weeks of discussions, in fact. On March fourteenth Foster released a schedule of upcoming All-
Institute meetings on all of the most salient topics roiling the campus: faculty performance, the 
cafeteria, athletic scholarships, ROTC, and more.44 What the administrators viewed as a 
magnanimous gesture of reconciliation, students perceived as unnecessary stalling tactic. On 
March sixteenth Unity distributed a “Parent Day Fact Sheet” and Michael Wright tried to 
interject himself into the day’s program to make a speech, but was stopped.45 Three days later 
Foster switched tacks, issuing a written letter to all students about the “seriousness of the present 
situation” wherein a “relatively small fraction of the student body” is trying to “create 
confusion.” Foster warned that the administration would take over discipline from student 
judiciary if need be.46 Negative publicity, television editorials, and the persistence of student 
activists may have pushed Foster to take a harder stance. 
 March twentieth was a day of reckoning: Foster met with a delegation from the Ad-hoc 
Committee for the Advancement of the School of Engineering (ACASE), although the content of 
the discussion is unknown; separately, five students were placed on probation for participating in 
an “unauthorized meeting”; and roughly three hundred students marched to Foster’s home at the 
outskirts of campus and someone threw a projectile through his window.47 The Campus Digest 
and Unity leaflets both reported that student leaders Michael Wright and Warren Hamilton 
worked to prevent further “hot-headed” actions at Foster’s house by organizing students into 
discussion groups on the spot.48 Those groups voted to endorse five resolutions: ROTC should be 
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voluntary, no curfew for juniors and seniors, removal of restrictions on student living 
arrangements, improved health services, and the ability to make up lost time on work-study 
assignments.49 Meanwhile, another collection of students showed up at the faculty meeting that 
day and tried unsuccessfully to present a petition of clemency for students penalized for 
protesting. The students listened to faculty deliberations about how to deal with the student 
movement. One instructor was heard to say that the activism was the result of a “malignancy” in 
the student body. He warned that they needed to “take action now” to “get rid of the cancer.”50 
 Foster apparently concurred. On March twenty-first he issued another stern missive to the 
entire Tuskegee community. Events are becoming “increasingly serious” and “threaten the 
continued operation of Tuskegee's program for the remainder of the year,” he wrote. Foster cited 
unauthorized meetings on campus and the projectile – a piece of concrete – thrown through his 
window. For the first time, he mentioned that he was thinking about closing the school entirely.51 
Students were not unaware that the crisis was coming to a head. That morning, two students — 
Burns Machobane and Chester Higgins, Jr. — witnessed the swirl of protests: “students from the 
school of Engineering had placards raised high and were marching in front of Huntington Hall,” 
and “determined and adamant young ladies with ‘natural’ hairdos sat blocking the entrance in a 
manner that indicated there would be no classes that day.” Higgins decided to create an archive 
of the tumult by systematically collecting the daily flood of documents. The resulting 166-page 
documentary volume, Student Unrest, Tuskegee Institute: A Chronology, published in 1968, is 
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the most comprehensive record of the textual evidence available: every memo, leaflet, letter and 
transcript he could find.52 
 One thing that comes through quite clearly in Student Unrest is the role of the 
Engineering students in pushing forward a cause that was widely perceived by the broader 
student body to be just: raising the standard of education. On March twenty-first — the day after 
they met with President Foster — ACASE issued a “to whom it may concern” letter essentially 
stating that they tried to go through “due process” and got nowhere. Now, the engineers declared, 
they were willing to boycott and picket classes, and contact the press.53 Interestingly, they 
insisted that their militancy was not to be confused with radicalism. On the same day, in a 
separate letter from ACASE to the faculty, the engineers emphasized that “we are not part of any 
other organization,” they wrote. “We do not follow any leaders except our own elected officers, 
we are not a subset of any Black Power organization.”54 Thus, the students essentially disavowed 
the context that gave their protest force. At the same time, their department’s leadership refused 
to concede any ground. The Campus Digest reported that Dean Dybczak, head of the School of 
Engineering, appeared on a local TV show the following day (March 22) and claimed that the 
engineering students were led by outside agitators and were trying to “lower” the school’s 
standards.55 
 Engineering students, if they received adequate preparation and actually graduated, had 
promising futures ahead of them. AT&T, General Electric, IBM, Xerox, Bell System, Ford, 
Western Electric, Pan American World Airways (Guided Missiles Range Division), and Pan 
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American Petroleum Corp (division of Standard Oil), and more paid frequently for advertising 
space to recruit students.56 Whereas most black student activists were concentrated in humanities 
departments, Tuskegee’s engineering students – those who were, in a sense, following in the 
spirit of The Founder by pursuing a “practical” education – systematically escalated their actions 
in 1968, and provided an anchor for the broader student movement. The engineering students 
were not, in the first instance, motivated by broader social justice aims. Rather, they were 
fighting for Tuskegee to live up to the promises of its existing educational program. In the 
context of heavy corporate recruitment, this was a high-stakes struggle, and one that led them 
into coalition with leftward-moving students. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	  Figure 6. A typical, full-page corporate recruitment advertisement aimed at Tuskegee students. 
Source: Campus Digest, October 19, 1968.  
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 The “cancer” continued to spread over the next few days. Of course, there were “outside” 
agitators — from SNCC especially — but by the spring of 1968 their focus was mostly 
elsewhere; Tuskegee’s spring was a homegrown revolt. On March twenty-second the 
administration cancelled all classes to arrange more discussions.57 In the evening twenty-seven 
students and faculty members met to forge a consensus for common action. They agreed to focus 
on two issues: ROTC and athletic scholarships.58 No self-appointed leaders could stop other 
demands from circulating, however. In the context of an aroused student body, making demands 
and seeing some of them met, other students began thinking about what they would like to see 
changed, too. A student from the Electronics Division wrote to the Campus Digest complaining 
of the high student-faculty ratio, the scarcity of laboratory equipment, and generally dirty and 
“deplorable” conditions of the division. The piece was titled, “What About Us?”59 For the man 
who had always worked to reconcile the students’ right to protest with the priorities of the 
administration, the situation on campus became increasingly untenable. On March twenty-third, 
the student paper reported that Bert Phillips was resigning his post as Dean of Students.60 He was 
leaving, he said, “because of actions, inactions, and reactions of the students, faculty, and 
administrators over the past few weeks.”61 His resignation would take effect in two and a half 
weeks, on April tenth. In 1968, however, two and half weeks was a very long time. 
 The student movement gained strength day by day, transgressing beyond adult 
expectations of what was reasonable or necessary. On March twenty-fifth, activists were able to 
mobilize broader layers of the student body, one way or another. They called for a boycott of 
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classes and those students who were more reluctant to participate encountered picket lines 
blocking their entrance to at least three buildings.62 An unsigned leaflet explained that although 
“we appreciate the effort of Dr. Foster to suspend classes last Friday,” those discussions were 
insufficient, so “we will remain out of class until all problems are resolved.”63 A possibly 
apocryphal scene capturing the clash between faculty and students was relayed to visiting 
professor James Torrens, a white Jesuit who arrived at Tuskegee to teach in the fall. “Ada Peters 
was an elegant, brisk schoolmarm,” he wrote, describing one of his colleagues, a black woman 
from Maine. When Peters arrived to teach her class one spring day, she was blocked: 
“You can't go in there, Miz Peters,” one of the militants told her, “I'll lay right down here in front 
of the door.” “Lie!” she corrected him indignantly, and walked in.64 
 No class meant mass meetings in the open air, a show of force that got results. Warren 
Hamilton spoke to a crowd of 1,000 students who gathered in front of the administrative 
building: “We want our education to be relevant to us — that’s what this is all about,” he said. 
Foster was correct that the activists indeed were “a relatively small fraction,” but for a time they 
connected with a much larger group of students. Mary Ellen Gale reported for the Southern 
Courier that Senior class president William Clark elicited “wild applause” from a crowd 
representing roughly one-third of the student body when he said, “Viet Nam [sic] is someone 
else’s war — our war is here!”65 Foster was no doubt aware that he could not isolate the 
“fraction” and that further discussions were useless. By the end of the day he granted several 
concessions to the students, including: the immediate reinstatement of the student judicial 
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system; extended library hours; and all syllabi would be available at the beginning of each 
semester. Remaining issues were deferred to other bodies: Foster recommended that all 
departments consider whether faculty should be required to have research publications; he 
acknowledged that students would hold a referendum on athletic scholarships; and Foster said 
students should be invited to the April sixth meeting of the trustees to make a presentation on 
ROTC.66 
 With some victories under their belts, most students returned to class on March twenty 
sixth.67 That day a TV editorial agreed that Tuskegee student demands were valid, but only up to 
a point. It warned viewers of the danger that a “militant minority” might try to take over.68 In 
March, however, the most militant minority was not the students gathered around SNCC, but 
those enrolled in the Engineering department. On March twenty-seventh they boycotted all 
classes, physically barred faculty from entering the department building, and left the 
administration’s latest reply to their demands burning in a nearby trashcan.69 Their militant 
stance earned respect and support from their fellow students. Non-engineering students joined 
demonstrations outside of the building they occupied. The engineers drew praise and admiration 
for methodically pursuing their demands, at each step willing and able to escalate. “It is 
impossible,” James Norton, Jr, editorialized in the Campus Digest, “to not admire the cool, 
professional and dead-serious attitude that they have shown during the period of protest.”70 
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The Death of Nonviolence 
 In the first eight days of April 1968, the conflict between students and administrators on 
Tuskegee’s campus became a matter of life and death. Not since Sammy Younge’s murder two 
years earlier had the stakes seemed so high. On their own, the issues yet unresolved were not 
lethal. The call to make ROTC voluntary flowed from growing animosity towards the brutal war 
in Vietnam. Athletic scholarships would help to secure a place on campus for many students who 
otherwise would have difficulty affording tuition. Engineering students dug in their heels over 
the replacement of professors because without new ones they felt unable to succeed in courses, 
and consequently, in the field. Underlying these concerns was the question of who was in charge, 
the students or the administration? The students never proposed themselves as a replacement for 
the faculty or the administration, but they insisted on the power to insist on having a say in the 
matter of their education. The first eight days of April were the highest expression of this long-
standing tension on Tuskegee’s campus, rivaled only by the student strikes of 1903 and 1940. 
The events at Tuskegee might not have been so dangerous, however, had it not been for the 
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King on the fourth day of April, 1968. His death, and the 
uprising of black people that followed in one hundred twenty-five American cities, meant that 
any collective action by black people in Alabama — even on a private college campus like 
Tuskegee — was treated by the state as a mortal threat. The students wanted reform, but the state 
of Alabama responded like it was revolution. 
 The very first day of April, 1968, began with threats and defiance. President Foster wrote 
a letter to the Engineering students expressing satisfaction that they were close to an agreement 
on all issues except one. In his view, the reasonable thing now was for classes to resume. He 
explained that he would conduct a referendum among Engineering students -- asking: Will you 
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come to class on Tuesday April second, yes or no? If no, he threatened to take steps to suspend 
the Engineering program for the rest of the year. The students replied the following day to say 
that they did not want their department closed, but rather wanted the issues resolved — 
particularly the problem of ineffective faculty. The engineers sought broader support, writing an 
open letter to their fellow students. They repeated Foster’s threat, and warned students should 
“[b]e aware of the fact that at any time he could decide to close your school too.” Engineers 
called for students to assemble outside of Moton Hall at 11:00 a.m. to show their support.71 
 While the engineers rallied, a group of approximately thirty students gathered separately 
to plan next steps for the broader movement. “We weren’t getting anywhere with Foster,” 
George Geddis recalled, so the discussion shifted to what to do with the upcoming meeting with 
the trustees on April sixth. Geddis was the president of the student theater, so he was able to 
make that space available for “plotting” and as a “staging area” for the protest.72 Michael Wright 
was there, and spent much of the time drafting what became known as the “Mandate” document, 
including its preface, outlining the Black University concept. The mandate was far from 
“revolutionary,” Wright recalls, but included reforms that the students felt were realistic. “They 
were concessions that we knew they could make without harming any of the operations,” Wright 
said. “It would just harm the reputation of the place of Tuskegee’s elite with the political class 
that runs this country,” he continued. “But that’s their problem.”73 According to his handwritten 
affidavit, Michael stayed in the theater overnight in early April for several days.74 
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 The document that emerged from the theater — the “mandate” — was an eighteen-page 
catalog of proposals for reforming Tuskegee.75 Some were more far-reaching than others. As 
Wright indicated, many of the items were easily actionable. Other, more philosophical points 
raised in the “Black University Concept” in the first two pages would have required greater 
revision of Tuskegee’s political-educational paradigm. In fact, there is significant a political 
distance from pages one and two to pages three through eighteen. The first two were unsigned — 
although participants agree that they were written by Michael Wright.76 At the time he was 
probably the most politically active undergraduate student on campus, and the text expresses his 
vision of connecting the Tuskegee student movement to a broader struggle for democracy and 
justice. The remaining sixteen pages are also unsigned,77 and come across as less political and 
more like a wish list for students who have personal ambitions that go beyond the limitations of 
their school’s offerings.78 The meaning of “Black Power” and the idea of a “Black University” at 
Tuskegee in April of 1968 is contained in the merger of these two tendencies. 
 The Black University Concept, as Wright defined it in this document, meant a “re-
direction of the goals” of Tuskegee such that, ideally, the school “benefits and carries on a 
perpetual reciprocal relationship with the entire Black community.” The purpose should be to 
speak from and to the black experience, not to “hand America a carbon copy of itself.” Wright 
contrasted “individual concerns” with a “collective ethos,” emphasizing that “Survival of the 
Black population is of primary concern.” The document continues by briefly outlining two types 
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of “mandates” addressed to “inter-Tuskegee” problems: policies regarding outside speakers and 
political activities on campus; and academic “revisions” to implement. The text indicates that 
students and faculty had voted to approve revised policy guidelines, but that “final official 
endorsement” by the administration was not yet forthcoming. The academic revisions are “major 
academic and programatic [sic] considerations” for which the students “demand immediate or as 
nearly feasible attention as possible.” These included a general emphasis on Afro-American 
history and culture, and specifically the addition of an Afro-American history course as a general 
requirement, as well as the addition of specific black-oriented tracks of study in sociology, 
psychology, and “all of the social sciences.” Wright also proposed a new African Studies 
Program, and mandatory Ibo and Swahili courses as foreign language requirements.79 In this 
way, some of the “mandates” were actually aimed not at administrators but at students — ROTC 
would be voluntary, but Ibo and Swahili would be mandatory! 
 As they gathered in the student theater on April second, perhaps taking turns at a 
typewriter, the twenty or thirty students assembled dreamed up their ideas for how to reform 
Tuskegee Institute. They came up with demands in thirteen domains: Faculty Research, 
Education, ROTC, School of Mechanical Industries, Engineering, Fine Arts, Music, Speech and 
Drama, John Andrews Hospital, Free Student Theater, Withdrawal from Courses, Checks and 
Balances, and [Assigning of Names to] Nameless Dormitories. Of these, only three were written 
up to express explicit connection to the “Black University” theme: Education, Free Student 
Theater, and Nameless Dormitories.80 Pages three through eighteen lack the philosophical 
flourish of the first two pages, but make up for it with often (but not always) greater levels of 
detail and specificity. The document overall feels like a collection of proposals drafted 
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independently of each other. Most demands take up less than half of a page, yet then the next 
demand begins at the top of the next page, suggesting that they were actually composed 
separately and only later joined together. The document also reflects the pressures of the moment 
— trying to maintain broad support among students and seize an opportunity to make substantive 
changes.  
 At Tuskegee, in April of 1968, invoking the Black University Concept served to connect 
local demands to the global context. With the Black University concept came the Black Power 
movement and the global uprising of black people around the world. Thus the proposal to reform 
the School of Education stated that professors need to “be aware of the special problems that are 
peculiar to Black people, and to provide the essential proficiency in the techniques of dealing 
with Black people.”81 The page explaining the call for a free student theater proclaims: “Since 
the theater has chosen to address itself to the expression of Black needs, Black ideas, and Black 
talent, and since the administration has not [seen] fit to provide us with these things, and has, 
indeed, attempted to suppress such expression,” therefore what has been known as the “Little 
Theater” should become a free student theater, they wrote.82 Without the specific demands for 
upgrading Tuskegee’s academic offerings (research requirements for faculty, improving the 
departments of mechanical industries and engineering) and quality of student life (improved 
service at the hospital, the ability to withdraw from a course at any time), the movement would 
have lacked numbers on campus, but without the Black University concept, it would have lacked 
the force of the global movement. Tuskegee’s students fought for reform under the banner of 
revolution. Some of Tuskegee’s administrators and trustees came to understand this. The state of 
Alabama did not particularly care to interpret the difference. 
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 By April third there was no going back. On that day, Foster offered to continue the 
student-initiated suspension of all Engineering classes pending a settlement of the outstanding 
issues and on one condition: the Engineering students must relinquish control of their 
department’s building. The students voted to turn down the offer, and maintain their occupation. 
In response, administrators cut off all power and telephones in the building, so the students 
resorted to using candles and walkie-talkies for light and communication.83 As the engineers 
plotted their next steps by candlelight, other students gathered in the Little Theater. They 
finished typing up their demands, but they prepared to confront the trustees with more than 
printed words on a page.84 
 Unlike the black elite or the southern segregationists with whom Tuskegee student 
activists had largely clashed thus far, Tuskegee’s trustees were the liberal (and mostly northern) 
elite. Tuskegee had twenty-three trustees in 1968; five — president Luther Foster, former 
president Frederick Patterson, Dr. Montague Oliver, president of the board of education in Gary, 
Indiana, Federal Reserve member Andrew Brimmer, and millionaire businessmen and civil 
rights movement supporter A.G. Gaston — were black; only two — congresswoman Frances 
Bolton of Ohio and Donna Salk, advisor to California’s Fair Employment Practices Commission 
and wife of the famous scientist Jonas Salk — were female (and white).85 In exchange for partial 
funding from the state, Tuskegee Institute granted the governor the ability to appoint five 
trustees. In 1968 the most radical among them may have been Gaston, and the least was probably 
Walter Bouldin, president of the Alabama Power Company and member of the deeply 
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conservative Alabama Chamber of Commerce.86 In total, six were businessmen, six were public 
officials, three were bankers, and the rest were mostly a collection of lawyers and 
philanthropists. One notable exception was a retired four-start general, Lucius Clay, who had 
commanded American forces in Europe during the Second World War.87 Gaston wasn’t the only 
one left-of-center on the board, however. Melvin Glasser was the director of the social security 
department of the United Auto Workers, a position he used to advocate for a national health care 
program.88 Investment bankers Richard Waddell and William Gridley had both financially 
supported civil rights activism and Alexander Aldrich, executive assistant to then-New York 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller, had marched with Dr. King.89 These, truly, were the country’s 
liberal elite.90 
 This collection of powerful personalities could not have known that the mounting conflict 
on the nation’s most well known historically black campus was about to coincide with the 
assassination of the nation’s most well known black leader. When the trustees arrived on 
Tuskegee’s campus — “in Cadillacs” as Michael Wright recalled — the roughly twenty to thirty 
students assembled in Little Theater decided that they should be confronted with protests from 
the overwhelming majority of students.91 But the activists had a problem: how would they 
convince their classmates to come out in such numbers? It’s not clear who arrived at the idea, but 
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somehow the activists decided that, by physically locking up classrooms and buildings, students 
would have no choice in the matter — they would have to gather outside.92 “That was my part, I 
had the locks,” Ronald Hill remembered. “I locked up all the buildings.”93 Michael Wright 
remembered that they were thoughtful about which buildings to lock and which not to lock. “We 
left the cafeteria open, obviously, and we left the recreation room untouched, obviously, because 
we did not want to alienate ‘the base,’” he recalled with a chuckle.94 Preparations continued into 
the night and the next day, April fourth. But that evening, the laughter stopped. “In the middle of 
that planning,” George Geddis said, “we were watching TV and the news came across: Martin 
Luther King had just been shot.”95 
 It is difficult to overstate the impact of Dr. King’s assassination. King was murdered in 
Memphis, where he had traveled to support black sanitation workers who went on strike for 
union recognition. “African Americans everywhere recognized King’s death as a watershed 
moment that required a massive response,” historian Michael Honey wrote. “King’s death burst 
the dam of whatever patience held back the rage of Black America at Depression-level 
unemployment; job, housing, and school discrimination; pervasive police brutality; useless 
deaths of Black soldiers in Vietnam; and the plethora of ills that stalked the ghettos.”96 The state 
responded with an unprecedented mobilization of troops on domestic soil — the Army’s TC 19-3 
document put into action. The Governor of Tennessee called four thousand National Guard 
troops to enter Memphis that night.97 President Johnson ordered the same number to guard the 
nation’s capital, and governor’s mobilized guardsmen in Chicago, Detroit, Boston, Jackson, 
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Mississippi, Raleigh, North Carolina, and Tallahassee, Florida to “stem disorders or guard 
against them.”98 It seemed that King’s murder spelled the end of nonviolence as a strategy. In 
D.C., Stokely Carmichael told reporters, “White America has declared war on Black America.” 
There was “no alternative to revolution,” and for black people, “the only way they will survive is 
by getting guns.”99 
 “We were in shock,” Michael Wright said of his reaction to the news of King’s 
assassination. “My girlfriend… loved Martin Luther King beyond any level of love, and 
honestly, I mean love.” She worried that Michael and the other student activists would be killed. 
“She had an existential meltdown,” he said. King’s death “entirely changed the tone” of the 
student movement, George Geddis thought. “We became much more sober and much more 
dedicated… After we got through crying, we focused on the anger and on the dedication to our 
goals.”100 Cozetta Lamore remembered that after Dr. King was murdered, “a small group took 
charge,” and made demands of Tuskegee’s administration. The attitude was, “Enough is enough; 
you killed our leader.”101 Polls published a few days later in the Campus Digest indicated the 
growing resolve: a majority of students agreed on the need to remove inadequate instructors, 
upgrade academic offerings, supported scholarships for athletes and stood in solidarity with the 
Unity movement.102 
 As they were after the murder of Sammy Younge, on April fifth Tuskegee administrators, 
faculty and students were united in grieving and at odds in action. In the morning, many 
Tuskegee students did not go to class. Michael Wright, Eugene Adams, and a few other activists 
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led flying pickets of roughly three hundred students combined that traveled around campus 
enforcing a boycott of classes.103 Students sat-in in all of the administrative buildings. Some 
students gathered at Dorothy Hall — the site of the trustees meeting — and demanded that the 
trustees act on the Mandate. “Basically, as we're going up the stairs and to the second floor 
where the meeting was, I was met by a bunch of people,” Geddis recalled, including Dean 
Phillips, who told them they had to leave.104 At some point during the day, a local court granted 
Tuskegee an injunction against student protesters.105 We know that some students did get 
through, however. The trustees recorded in the minutes of their meeting that they met with 
approximately thirty students that afternoon to discuss a “Mandate”; Foster was excused from 
the meeting to allow “freer student expression.” Ten trustees were absent that day, which meant 
only thirteen had arrived in the first place. With Foster out of the room, that left twelve 
trustees.106 Thirteen other Tuskegee officials were in the room, however, including lawyers, 
accountants, auditors, other officers of the university and two representative of the Carver 
Research Foundation.107 After listening to the students, the trustees argued that it was not fair to 
insist that they answer – as the students apparently demanded – in just four hours. The students 
replied that some items could be acted upon immediately, since they did not require additional 
funds. The trustees replied that they did not have a quorum and were therefore unable to vote. 
The meeting was adjourned at 7:15 p.m.108 That evening, the combatants temporarily united — 
nearly three thousand people in total — by gathering in Logan Hall for a memorial service for 
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Dr. King, featuring speeches and singing. The Reverend Raymond Harvey, who led the service, 
spoke about ongoing injustice in the state of Alabama, but made no mention of the student 
protests or demands.109 
 Although unspoken the night before, student demands were at the front of everyone’s 
mind the next day. According to their minutes, the board of trustees reconvened the following 
morning, April sixth, at 10:00 a.m. They re-arranged their agenda in order to consider student 
grievances first and planned to hold further discussions with students that afternoon. Also, “by 
prior agreement,” twenty students joined the meeting at 11:15 a.m. Two students laid out three 
central issues that represented the will of the student body. Bennie James explained the 
grievances of the engineering students. Albert Joyner discussed ROTC and athletic scholarships. 
The trustees promised to respond by 3:30 p.m. that day. The Trustees reconvened at 2:00 p.m. 
and, at some point during their deliberations, they were informed that students had taken control 
of the telephones and switchboard and had locked the entrances to the building.110 “I don't recall 
how the decision got made,” Geddis said. “It was kind of one of those decisions. We decided that 
we weren't going to leave. We chained the doors to the guest house.” There were roughly one 
hundred students inside.111 Ronald Hill chalked it up to a failure of communication and a desire 
to say to students, “no, stay in your place.” As a result, “we just did what we had to do.”112 When 
the students refused to reopen the switchboard or to leave the building, the trustees voted to call 
the sheriff. They adjourned at 5:00 p.m.113 
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 Approximately three hundred students participated in the occupation of Dorothy Hall on 
April sixth. For students like Michael Wright, this was the confrontation they had been building 
towards. For others, the moment swept them up and carried them along like a wave.114 “I was 
always a quiet person,” Lena Agnew admitted. “I would see and watch, but I didn't get involved 
as much as most people did.”115 Agnew’s one and only participation in a protest during her years 
at Tuskegee was the April sixth sit-in at Dorothy Hall. Still, she understood the issues. “We 
heard that the trustees were coming for their annual meeting and we had some things that we 
wanted them to do,” she said. “We wanted better food, better dorms. There were a lot of issues 
we were confronted with, and we thought the only way to get their attention was to have a sit-in 
where they were staying.”116  
 Inside the building, as students confronted the trustees directly, face to face, their hopes 
of persuading them fell. At one point, a trustee, Dr. Shilling, called student William Clark a 
“communist.”117 In his disciplinary hearing the following month, Clark recalled that this 
comment made him “furious.” “I told him we are not communists — every time a black man 
does something in this country,” he said, “we are called communists.”118 For George Geddis, it 
was “my first confrontation with real power,” he said. “I remember specifically, at that time, I 
spoke to one of the trustees, Melvin Glasser.” Geddis misremembered him as a representative of 
General Motors (not the UAW). He said to Glasser: 
Do you understand what happens if these state troopers come onto a black campus? We 
are a bunch of ugly niggers. Somebody's going to get killed. He looked at me and said, 
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“Well then, leave.” That's when I realized nothing's going to happen. These guys have all 
the power and we can't move them.119 
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As some trustees engaged in dialogue with protesters, others, unbeknownst to the 
students, worked with administrators to end the standoff on their own terms. At some point, a 
local photographer, P.H. Polk, entered Dorothy Hall. He was not a professor or employee of 
Tuskegee Institute, but he was known to the students and trusted (it was Polk who first taught 
Chester Higgins, Jr. how to use a camera). Apparently no one complained as he began taking 
photographs of the occupation, and some may have even posed for them. Polk later turned the 
images over to the administrators, who used them to identify and prosecute student activists.120 
The trustees also contacted the sheriff, Lucius Amerson. In the aftermath of the massacre in 
Orangeburg and the use of martial forces nationwide after Dr. King’s assassination, this was a 
perilous move. Amerson would, in turn, escalate matters further by calling in the Alabama 
National Guard. The students who had worked so hard to get him elected didn’t quickly forget, 
and referred to him as an “Uncle Tom” in the weeks and months that followed.121 Lastly, at 6:30 
p.m., the trustees announced to students inside and outside the building that, for the first time in 




 Major General Lucius Clay had a plane to catch. He explained his situation to the 
students, and they let him leave. Presumably Clay knew danger when he saw it, and in the 
occupation of Dorothy Hall, he didn’t see it. “This is simply a group of rebellious young students 
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who want to run the university,” he told Tuskegee News. “There was no threat of violence.”123 
There actually was a threat of violence, but not from the students. With the Orangeburg massacre 
on his mind, Michael Wright suggested that the students protesting outside of Dorothy Hall 
should come inside for safety.124 “We had no intention of hurting anybody… but we were not 
going to just get shot down like the students at South Carolina,” he said.125 
 Day gave way to night, and morale gave way to hunger and exhaustion among the 
students, who struggled to maintain a unified stance on their aims and means. “It was a very 
emotional situation,” Michael Wright recalled. “To carry out a consensus meeting was becoming 
more and more difficult.”126 Between two and three o’clock in the morning, the committee of 
students leading the occupation decided to let the board of trustees go, conceding that their lack 
of quorum meant no decisions would be made on the spot. Wright disagreed with this decision, 
and a group of students continued to confront the trustees as they came downstairs to leave. Still 
another group refused to let Foster go, so the president stayed in the building and continued to 
respond to their questions. Michael Wright went into the bathroom and cried.127 
 Around 3:30 a.m., Sheriff Amerson led roughly three hundred National Guardsmen and 
seventy State Patrolmen to the gates of Tuskegee’s campus.128 As word of the troops’ presence 
reached Dorothy Hall, the bulk of the students still occupying the building “vanished.”129 Lena 
Agnew and her friends had to lie to their classmates who were blocking the exits — the young 
women claimed they needed to retrieve pillows so they could be more comfortable — and never 
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came back.130 At one point Dean Phillips ran over to Michael Wright and told him: “If you’ve 
never listened to me in the past, listen to me now. Let the President and myself go out because 
the state troopers are coming.”131 The news also spread to the dorms, where Caroline Hilton 
remembers that some of her classmates braced themselves for battle. “I didn't realize how serious 
it was until the girls would say, ‘The National Guard's coming, the National Guard's coming,’” 
she recalled. “They took mattresses and put them across the doors in the dorm, and they all 
pulled out their guns. They were getting ready to shoot it out. I couldn't ... I said, ‘No, no, no, I 
have to get out of here.’”132  
 Perhaps nothing illustrated the contradictory position of Tuskegee’s students – 
simultaneously recruited into the corridors of power and affluence as graduates and feared and 
punished as protesters – as much as this: Tuskegee Institute, itself a military training ground, was 
facing a military invasion. As they did 28 years earlier, troops gathered near Tuskegee’s gates, 
preparing to enter the campus. And just as Patterson did in 1940, Phillips (once again) acted to 
protect students. He approached the gates with some other campus officials, and noticed that the 
troops had bayonets affixed to their rifles. Phillips asked them not to cross the gates but the 
soldiers said they were coming anyway. One of them told Phillips: “Well, you know, you all at 
Tuskegee have been too uppity for a long time.”133 Somehow, the dean did convince the soldiers 
not to go to Dorothy Hall. Amerson, however, led troops to the Engineering Building, where he 
presented a copy of an injunction against their occupation and successfully persuaded the 
engineering students to leave in order to avoid being arrested.134 Fortunately, there were no 
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injuries and no lives lost, but the armed forces of the state of Alabama had finally accomplished 
at gunpoint what neither the trustees nor the administrators could: dislodging the student 
movement and its leadership. This was a bitter ending, one that exposed divisions and tensions 
about who stood where and who was on whose side. For example, as they crossed the campus in 
the early morning hours, Sue Pendell, a professor, recognized some of her students among the 
National Guardsmen.135 
 The closing of the campus brought this phase of the student movement to an abrupt end. 
All students were ordered to leave campus and thus, physically removed from the school 
community, the activists were unable to organize. The bus and train stations were instantly 
jammed with suitcases and boxes.136 One Tuskegee student who owned a small private airplane 
— a Cessna — gave Caroline Hilton and some friends an airlift out of town.137 Meanwhile the 
administration took the opportunity to get more organized. Administrators successfully sought 
police warrants for disturbing the peace against sixteen students, including Ronald Hill and 
Michael Wright.138 They began making plans using the shutdown to permanently expel the main 
organizers of the movement. Parents were sent a letter explaining that all students were 
dismissed and would have to apply for readmission — an unprecedented step in the school’s 
history. “Tuskegee officials… hope to weed out the troublemakers by carefully screening the 
new applications,” a local television editorial segment reported. “These moves are drastic, but 
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they are necessary…”139 Two weeks later, on April twenty-second, Tuskegee Institute reopened 
with approximately ninety percent of the former students applying for readmission.140 
 For the rest of the semester, Tuskegee student activists — those who returned — spent 
most of their energy defending themselves and their comrades in court — on and off campus. 
Thirteen students took Tuskegee to federal court for not readmitting them. They claimed they 
were exercising their right to protest, and were trying to win “modern educational programs… 
rather than merely training Black students in obsolescent technical skills designed to keep the 
Black people relegated to second-class status.”141 Judge Frank M. Johnson, who had repeatedly 
ruled in favor of the Tuskegee faculty in their bid for voting rights, now ordered both parties (the 
students and the administrators) “cross-restrained,” meaning that the administration had to 
reinstate students who had been summarily expelled and at the same time those students were 
prohibited by the court from doing anything to “disrupt” the process of schooling at Tuskegee 
Institute.142 The judge ruled that students’ right to due process had been violated, so the 
administration organized on-campus trials for student activists. With perhaps unintended irony, 
and seeking a means to protest what they called “kangaroo courts,”143 student defendants wore 
chains with padlocks around their necks as they traveled on campus — evoking both the 
accusation that the administrators was serving as “overseers” on a “plantation,” and displaying 
the very tools they were accused of using to shut down the school.144 
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 Student activists maintained a defiant stance, and their anger at the administration 
deepened. As the trials proceeded and some students began receiving suspensions, the Campus 
Digest shared their outrage. A familiar refrain was the idea that the administration was acting as 
servants of the white trustees. “The Administration is not Black; it is white,” a May eighteenth 
editorial argued. “No matter what reasons are given, the only real reason that the Black brothers 
and sisters are being ‘executed’ by the Administration is that the students offended the 
Administration’s WHITE BROTHERS!” An accompanying cartoon portrayed a menacing figure 
in a white pointed hood labeled with the president’s initials, “LHF.”145 Dean Phillips, perhaps 
sensing his inability to reconcile the antagonists, abstained from the campus judicial process.146 
The results of these trials are not clearly recorded, but there is evidence of a wide range of 
outcomes. Some, like Michael Wright, were expelled.147 It seems that many others, such as 
George Geddis, were permitted to return to campus.148 Still others, like Warren Hamilton, were 
allowed to graduate early. “I felt really hurt by that,” he said. “It was like they just got rid of 
me.”149 
 
Victory in Defeat 
 Returning to campus after the shutdown, Caroline Hilton thought she had been through a 
“time warp,” as though the occupation of Dorothy Hall “wasn’t really real.” It seemed as though 
everything was back to “business as usual.”150 George Geddis felt the difference, though. The 
“tone” of the campus had changed. “There were more instructors doing African-American 
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history,” which felt like an accomplishment.151 The Campus Digest remained an outlet for the 
angriest students, although the lack of by-lines suggests the anger was mixed with fear. One 
anonymous front-page editorial attacked the administration [alternating capitalization of 
“Black”]:  
Your white National Guard allies didn’t have to pull the triggers of death on black 
students as they wanted to because your whitewashed minds had already and still are 
pulling the triggers of suspensions, suppression, and extermination of Black Souls, Minds 
and Bodies. Your whitewashed minds have already pulled the triggers which snuff out 
the lengths, breadths, and heights of Black students in a black institution. Forgive our 
whitewashed Black Judases for they know not what they do.152 
 
 Something had changed on campus, but it was more diffuse and intangible than a well-
organized movement of students might demand. The militants on campus now commanded few 
forces, if any. The ALCPP incorrectly predicted that Tuskegee would be the “head” of black 
student protest in the year to come.153 But everyone was aware that the global movement was 
gaining steam, which seemed to validate the militants. The day after Tuskegee Institute 
reopened, students occupied five buildings on Columbia University’s campus in New York City, 
only to be dislodged by a police attack a week later. The next month, a protest movement that 
had begun in Parisian college dormitories spread to workplaces; on May twenty-second, nine 
million people were on strike in France — the largest general strike in world history at that 
point.154 Undeniably, Tuskegee students had contributed to this great wave of global protest. 
Frederick Patterson, former Tuskegee Institute president and one of the trustees held hostage in 
the prior month, actually paid homage to the activists in his 1968 commencement speech to the 
campus. Patterson said that the student movement was part of a “larger context of rebellions 
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involving college students all over the United States — and, in fact, over most of the world.” 
Revolution, he said, “is long overdue” in American society. He cautioned against separatism, 
however, arguing that Black people could get their fair share of America’s resources without 
going “off in a corner for blacks only to get it.”155 Patterson essentially outlined the 
administration’s new stance (now that the crisis had passed): they would praise the militants as 
forward-thinking, but draw the line at separatism. 
 When classes resumed in the fall — with a record enrollment156 — students turned to the 
pages of the Campus Digest to assess what, if anything, had been accomplished, and what the 
future held.157 In a letter to the incoming class of freshman, an anonymous student author 
warned: “If you are willing to walk the straight and narrow, and not do or say anything 
‘unbecoming to a Tuskegee Student [sic],’ welcome to the right place.”158 Some students feared 
that Judge Johnson’s temporary injunction against student protests would continue as a tool for 
punishing future demonstrators.159 “At this moment, with the threat of reprisals for any, and 
every action hanging over our heads,” Caroline Hilton wrote, “we are not free people.”160 
Confirming their worst fears, Judge Johnson did just that. He extended the injunction — making 
the temporary ban on protests a permanent one.161 
 Radicalism was replaced with caution. Two elections — one on campus, one off — may 
be interpreted as a backlash, or at least a move away from a radical posture. In August, 
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Tuskegee’s first black candidate for mayor, Thomas Reed, failed in his bid. Although black 
people were more than eighty percent of Tuskegee’s registered voters, Reed captured less than 
half of the overall votes. A white man, C. M. Keever, was elected in a landslide. Keever 
speculated that his election represented the will of Tuskegee’s black citizens to not “control” or 
“segregate” the city.162 Likewise, some students decided to keep their “heads down” and focus 
on graduation.163 In mid-October, Lamont Isom was elected student body president, campaigning 
on a promise to improve “relations” between students and faculty. Caroline Hilton called 
Johnson’s injunction “a big issue” in the election.164 
 But this was not a return to the past. The idea that Tuskegee had to change in some way 
persisted, particularly in the area of curriculum. For their part, the faculty openly debated the 
merits of black speech patterns and whether or not they should teach “standard” English. 
Professor Torrens was told that the English department, which had a high proportion of white 
professors, was the object of much faculty resentment in part because of its campaign “real or 
imagined, against Negro dialect,” Torrens wrote. One black faculty member referred to them as 
the “Foreign Language Department.”165 Caroline Hilton, the new Campus Digest editor-in-chief, 
continued to defend the Black University concept. Lamenting that this aspect of the spring 
demands has been “lost in the mire,” she argued that “Our curriculum must be made relevant to 
the total black experience.”166 Hilton wasn’t alone. The “girls” of Rockefeller Hall sponsored a 
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talk by history professor Aubrie Labrie on the Black University concept. Labrie stressed the need 
for independence from the government or from any white people.167  
 The next week, Hilton argued that a “new breed” of black students were coming of age at 
Tuskegee. The philosophy of this new breed, she wrote, “is black: Black pride, black awareness, 
black self realization, and most of all, a black social consciousness.” Whereas at the height of 
their power activists on campus married individual and collective impulses, now they were 
counterposed. This group eschewed materialism and individualism, Hilton claimed: “Collective 
growth as a people must precede any and all personal aspirations.”168 This was a more radical 
stance, but in the last months of 1968, it inspired fewer followers.  
 From the pages of the Campus Digest, the most political students continued to imbue the 
concept of blackness with a radical critique of the status quo. Arthur Pfister published one of the 
most searing indictments of Tuskegee in a full page poem accompanied with photographs. In 
“Aint’ That Sad,” Pfister ridiculed the rituals of ROTC — marching, drilling, wearing military 
uniforms, etc. — as “white.” “‘Skegee is Mean, so big — so mighty/” the poem began, “But it 
still makes BLACK PEOPLE / into copies of whitey. / … ain’t that sad?”169 A chapter of the 
Student Organization for Black Unity (SOBU) was officially chartered at Tuskegee Institute in 
November of 1968. The purpose of the organization, according to an announcement in Campus 
Digest, was to “unify the black students of Tuskegee Institute with the black community and all 
Black Student Organizations across the country, which are pertinent to the struggle for Human 
Rights of the Black Man in America, and all the colored peoples of the world.” Through working 
in SOBU, a Tuskegee student would become “aware of his vanguard role in the liberation 
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struggle, a struggle for which many are called but few answer.” The founders were listed as 
nineteen students, including Cozetta Butts, Caroline Hilton, George Geddis, and Arthur Pfister, 
with Aubrie LaBrie serving as faculty advisor.170 
 Some students interpreted the presence of white professors at black schools as “inherently 
problematic.” Ironically, in many cases white faculty members were among the most enthusiastic 
supporters of black student protests.171 One student, Julia Ann Fuller, argued that all white 
professors should be removed from Tuskegee. “They are bringing white-oriented ideas on our 
campuses because they are white and those are the only ideas that they could possibly bring,” she 
wrote.172 Some, indeed, did leave.173  Caroline Hilton described Tuskegee as a campus “in 
turmoil” on the one hand, and yet also “a vanguard of revolutionary thinking among black 
colleges in the south.” The students gathered around the Campus Digest and SOBU had, in fact, 
played a vanguard role on campus, and although their organized forces were smaller, their 
influence was still felt. The official theme for the Homecoming festivities was “Mind Expansion 
Through Black Awareness.”174 
 There were also those in the campus community who reacted against the more radical 
meanings of blackness. Professor E. B. Henderson defended the idea of Black Studies, as long as 
it was not “propaganda” for separatism.175 The newly-elected SGA president, Lamont Isom, 
articulated support for the Black University concept, while echoing the arguments of trustees that 
Tuskegee should “place great emphasis on Black ideas and Black culture,” but should not 
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prepare students for a “totally Black society.”176 Outgoing student president Warren Hamilton 
felt torn between the two groups. As he walked across campus one day, someone threw a large 
rock at his head. “I was too radical for some people and I was a Tom to other people, because, to 
the revolutionaries, I didn't go far enough.”177 
 The list of victories the Tuskegee students won in 1968 is impressive. Late in the 
semester, the Campus Digest printed a full-page report from a Special Joint Committee, detailing 
its recommendations and the Tuskegee’s Educational Council’s actions on issues raised by 
students in the spring. The reforms resulting from student pressure included: student 
representation on all committees dealing with student affairs; abolition of the second year of 
compulsory ROTC; full scholarships for athletes; increased attention to black cultural and 
economic study — specifically fifty new course hours devoted to black culture and an African 
studies program; principle of publications as a requirement for faculty; revised guidelines on 
outside speakers; upgrades to the School of Education; improvements to the School of 
Mechanical Industries; student majority control of the Campus Digest; an independent student 
theatre; improvements in health services at John Andrews Hospital; students able to withdraw 
from courses at anytime; and buildings renamed after famous black people. The only outstanding 
issues were: the formation of a student-faculty committee to further deliberate on the issue of 
how to evaluate Engineering faculty; and formation of a committee to evaluate the system of 
checks and balances in Tuskegee’s administration and for status of Dean of Students.178 Winning 
such significant changes quickly – added to the frightening near-invasion of state troopers – 
meant that only a small number of students remained convinced by the fall of 1968 that the 
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movement hadn’t gone “far enough.” Whatever might be said of the hotheaded, rash, or 
impatient tendencies of student activists, all of these same qualities were essential ingredients for 
pushing through this sweeping reform agenda on Tuskegee’s campus. 
 Looking back at their former selves of half a century before, former Tuskegee student 
activists said that in 1968, Tuskegee was a “haven for activists.”179 Yet they conceded that the 
core of the movement constituted fewer than two dozen students,180 who, by the late 1960s (and 
unlike their predecessors), were relatively disconnected from the surrounding black 
communities,181 and that while its means were militant, the late 1960s student movement’s 
demands were not necessarily radical.182 Ironically, their assessment echoes that of their former 
antagonist, Tuskegee President Foster. In December, Foster published his annual President’s 
report, reflecting on the 1967-1968 school year. “There was a strong orientation of Tuskegee 
students to vital issues in today’s society,” he began. “It is a tribute to Tuskegee’s philosophy 
and program that this place has nurtured student views and their frank expression.” Faculty and 
students “were chagrined,” by the “breakdown in orderly processes” which were “led by a small 
cadre of militants bent on disruption” leading to the school’s closure. But learning from the 
experience will lead to greater unity in the community, he concluded, adding that an 
“examination of the Student Mandate of last spring, along with the philosophical stance of the 
Institute on most of the issues, revealed that we were closer together than might have 
appeared.”183 Foster is correct in pointing out that the “Black University” concept as spelled out 
in the mandate document was winnable, although he neatly obscures what it took to make those 
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reforms a reality. Closer to the truth is that it took the threat of a revolutionary movement to win 
reform. By temporarily galvanizing the entire student body around a reform agenda and under 
the banner of Black Power, a small group of Tuskegee student activists successfully created a 





 The history of the Tuskegee student movement casts new light on old debates. It 
challenges us to reexamine the accommodation-or-protest dichotomy as a way to understand 
black history. The actors did not debate whether or not to accommodate or to resist in any given 
moment, but how much to do both. All social struggles concede certain aspects of the status quo 
in order to challenge others. Few of his students would blame Booker T. Washington for taking 
white people’s money to underwrite their education (Du Bois did the same to fund his own 
activities), but some did criticize him for conceding the struggle for political rights in the arena 
of public debate, or for over-working (and under-educating) them. The terms of accommodation 
and protest are not fixed and absolute, but are relative and shift over time. Yesterday’s audacious 
demand can be tomorrow’s shameful accommodation. A challenge in one era can be a 
concession in the next. Washington opposed instruction in Latin and Greek, while parents and 
students demanded it. Teaching these languages in the postbellum South was seen as a challenge 
to the status quo because it implied that black people and white people were intellectual equals. 
In later years, by contrast, teaching these same languages would be perceived by Black Power 
activists to be an accommodation to Eurocentric curricula — a concession to the white power 
structure. 
 There is always some element of challenge and some element of accommodation in every 
social action, especially when it comes to the attempt to develop and preserve an institution. No 
institution can be at war with the status quo in all ways all of the time and endure. Tuskegee 
Institute’s history is full of leaders willing to make compromises: Lewis Adams traded votes for 
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a school; Washington sacrificed civil rights for money; Moton acceded to injustice to secure a 
hospital; Patterson acceded to segregation in order to let black pilots learn to fly. The social 
boundaries shifted over time and, in general, students moved with the times faster than faculty 
and administrators. Washington promised a way “up” from slavery; but for some, it didn’t go 
“up” far enough. During World War I, the changes came fast and thick, but black college 
administrators were still bound to and by old arrangements. As mediators between the white 
power structure and the black students they served, black administrators sometimes developed 
conceptions of education that were different from those of powerful white people, but not 
always. The gap between students and administrators, between rising expectations and long-
standing social accommodations on Tuskegee’s campus set the stage for the student protests and 
strikes in the 1890s and 1900s as well as in the 1960s.  
A school is a unique kind of institution. Schools produce people and ideas, and neither 
are easily reconciled to the social status quo. School leaders can try to contain and limit a 
curriculum, but literacy is a power that has no natural boundaries. Learning can lead to thoughts 
and questions beyond a given curriculum. At the heart of the educational conflict in the 
postbellum South was the question of whether or not schooling – however modest in scope – 
would in fact raise black people’s social status or expectations or both. In this respect, white 
elites and black people of various classes more or less participated for opposite reasons in 
founding and supporting Tuskegee Institute.1 The former wanted to use the school to keep black 
people in their place (to “make the people”), while the latter aimed to use it to change black 
people’s status. Arguably, this same dynamic is true for the education of all subordinate classes 
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of people, although in the case of Afro-Americans it takes on unique dimensions and twists 
because of racism and the legacy of slavery.  
 Without appreciating the record of internal dissent and protest at Tuskegee Institute, 
some historians tend to conflate Washington’s interests and strategies with those of all black 
people. They make it seem as though Washington’s approach was the only possible path, and the 
collective resistance of black people is ignored. Students were not the only ones with a history of 
collective action. The black mineworkers and sharecroppers who tried to organize unions after 
1900 in Alabama represented an alternative outlook and strategy for advancement, and one that 
Washington and his successors actively opposed and tried to suppress. Washington’s emphasis 
on self-help and entrepreneurialism was primarily the strategy of the black middle class. After 
the Civil War, this small but fragile class grew more self-conscious and, at times, clashed with 
the black working class as well as with the ambitions of Tuskegee students. Some argue that 
Washington “wore the mask” as black people have had to do since slavery. However true this 
may be, this interpretation misses the fact that black people did not all agree about how much of 
their views to mask and how much to forthrightly declare. And while recognizing the need for a 
certain amount of obliqueness, black people did not necessarily agree about what did or should 
lie behind such a mask.  
The histories of the Alabama’s labor movement and of the Tuskegee student movement 
suggest that there were multiple constituencies of local black people who disagreed with 
Washington’s public presentation. Washington’s program was controversial in his own place and 
time. When we imagine (as August Meier did) that the sum total of opposition to Washington-
ism came from elite northern black people such as Du Bois, we miss the ever-present and 
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significant current of critique of southern black people, including faculty members, students, and 
parents of Tuskegee Institute throughout the school’s history.2  
 
Washington and Washingtonism 
 This record of criticism does not invalidate or diminish the legacy of Tuskegee Institute 
or of other historically black colleges. It does, however, suggest that they are the products of 
more than just a great leader’s great vision. Another way to view this history is that Washington 
made the institution possible, but once they entered it, the teachers, students, and parents of the 
school had to struggle in order to realize its (and their) greater potential. Instead of the “great 
leader” version of Tuskegee Institute’s past, this alternate history points to the role of parents, 
teachers, alumni, and administrators in defining and redefining the ways and means of the 
school. This push and pull between different actors within the campus community takes on 
greater significance given Tuskegee Institute’s standing as a “capital” of black America in the 
first half of twentieth century. The struggle over different strategies and expectations within the 
school, in some ways, is a microcosm of the conflict among black people as a whole, emerging 
from slavery, trying to carve out and define a measure of freedom for themselves in difficult 
circumstances. 
The institution that Washington built endured. It not only survived his death in 1915, it 
thrived. By mid-twentieth century, Tuskegee, Alabama was home to a large black middle class, 
but not the kind that Washington imagined. Where he preached the value of tilling the soil, black 
people were more likely to be found mowing their lawns. Tuskegee’s black middle class was an 
intellectual and professional set, more equipped to interpret poetry than farmers’ almanacs. 
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Beginning with Washington’s immediate successor, Robert Russa Moton, Tuskegee Institute 
learned to revise Washingtonism to fit each new age, in words and in deeds. As Tuskegee 
Institute raised its sights, increased its offerings and became a university, it seemed logical to 
imagine that that had been what Washington had wanted all along. When Tuskegee professors 
respectfully and patiently asserted their right to vote, it was conceivable that they, too, were 
operating within Washington’s long-term plan of using economic strength to gain political 
power. When students began to adopt the ideas of “Black Power,” some, like Gwen Patton, tried 
to interpret this step, too, as an extension of Washingtonism. But when Tuskegee students 
boycotted classes and took the mostly white trustees hostage, it was no longer possible to make 
the square peg fit the round hole. 
And yet, Washingtonism is still with us. Of course, we do have the option of admiring 
Washington and acknowledge his achievements without believing that his ideas are applicable to 
all times and places. But the impulse to apply his credits to the present and even to the future 
persists, perhaps because some of the same conditions that gave birth to Washingtonism persist. 
We have, since the 1970s, been living through a counter-revolution of sorts – a vicious 
counterattack that has worked to demoralize and demobilize the black-led insurgency of the 
1960s. Not unlike the period after Radical Reconstruction, there has been a feeling for several 
decades that nothing great can be accomplished for black people without deference to elite 
priorities. In the field of education, desegregation and redistribution of resources have been 
shelved by policymakers and what new resources there are, are devoted almost entirely to the 
proliferation of charter schools and school “choice.” Washington would probably recognize the 
corresponding ideological landscape, such as calls for “personal responsibility” in today’s press.3  
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Aspirations for collective social change can be deferred, but they never die. In the right 
context, even elite schools – places where wealth and privilege are concentrated like Harvard or 
Columbia University – can and have become centers of opposition. When collective aspirations 
for change burst through to the surface, they challenge old assumptions and ideas. Tuskegee 
students experienced this in the 1960s as their upbringing and education increasingly collided 
with their experience in a social struggle. These students were in a unique location both socially 
and geographically. They were students in an elite school in a surging economy. They were in a 
middle-class community surrounded by deep poverty. They were also black students in the Jim 
Crow South. Their movement was shaped by these locations and is both recognizable as part of 
the larger trends in the region and the era, and is also distinctive. On no other black college 
campus in the 1960s did students come to radical consciousness in the shadow of such a 
prominent political and educational figure as Tuskegee students did. While some students 
rejected Washington, it should not be surprising that others tried to recruit him to their cause. 
 
Tuskegee Today 
 Guy Trammel is a very busy man. He grew up in Tuskegee, Alabama, and although he 
did not attend Tuskegee Institute, his brother, Ernest Stephens did. Trammel did not have time to 
conduct a sit-down interview, but he was willing to talk if I was willing to do so on the road. I 
met him Tuskegee’s town square. I hopped into his van, turned on my recording device, and we 
zoomed off on a mission to pick up food from a statewide food bank distribution hub. Guy was 
following in the footsteps of his mother, an activist with the Congress of Racial Equality in 
Philadelphia who found work as a teacher in Macon County. She took Guy with her after school 
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and on the weekends, loading up the car with clothing and books to take to rural families in the 
nearby counties. “When I got older, she had me sit down and read with the children,” he said. 
We paused the interview only to load up his van with non-perishable food, and later to 
unload it all at a community center back in Tuskegee. The difference between the town described 
in my interviews and the town as it is today is jarring. While Tuskegee University’s campus 
seems just as pristine, immaculate, and impressive as ever, one has only to cross the street to be 
in a different world. Working in the campus archives by day, I was warned to make sure to leave 
town by sundown, for safety purposes. It is no longer the case that Tuskegee Institute is 
surrounded by Alabama but not in Alabama, as George Paris said. Today it is more accurate to 
say that Tuskegee University is surrounded by Tuskegee, Alabama, but is not of it. Off campus, 
the official poverty rate in town is 27.6 percent.4 Macon County’s poverty rate, 32.2 percent, 
places it among the poorest counties in a poor state – only 7 of Alabama’s 67 counties have a 
higher poverty rate.5  
On our return trip, Trammel took a detour to show me the large, well-maintained 
mansions around City Lake – owned mostly by people who work for the city government, 
Trammel said. Many people interviewed for this study explained the town’s economic woes in 
similar ways: the result of white flight and corruption in city government. City managers are 
widely believed to be corrupt – they brought millions of dollars into Tuskegee through the 
“Model Cities” program and other federal initiatives, maintaining their salaries and standards of 
living, but never seemed to translate that into sustainable economic development and wider 
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opportunities for the population.6 Johnny Ford, a twenty-nine year old son of a VA hospital 
employee, was elected mayor in 1972, completing the capture of political power that had once 
been exclusively in the hands of white people.7 “Black Power” was, in a sense, achieved, but was 
not what many people expected. 
 In informal conversations with Alabamians, I frequently heard people connect the pattern 
of white flight to the events of 1968. This may explain why the dramatic story of the Tuskegee 
Revolt has gone untold thus far: for those who stuck around, it seemed to mark the end of the 
good years. Tuskegee University, for its part, understandably might hesitate to lift up a story 
about how its students became such harsh critics of their school and took such militant action 
that they were expelled en masse. Unlike the voting rights struggle, the Tuskegee airmen, or 
other chapters from Tuskegee Institute history that highlight the school’s contributions to proud 
national accomplishments, the student movement seems to have led nowhere – at least, nowhere 
good. But one lesson of this study is that the events at Tuskegee were central to the broader black 
movements in the South, and share many dynamics of the black movement nationwide, including 
its outcomes. 
Tuskegee is not the only municipality where the ascension of black elected officials who 
rode a wave of social movement to power did not result in improved conditions for the majority 
of black people. What happened in Tuskegee, Alabama also happened in Newark, New Jersey 
and Chicago, Illinois.8 “Practically everywhere black Americans attempted to steer liberalism 
from the late 1960s onward,” N.B.D. Connolly writes, “they wound up trying to replace older 
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forms of white paternalism or political patronage with only a fraction of the public and private 
resources local governments once enjoyed.”9 The twin ironies, as Norrell likewise points out, are 
that white people fled the town in fear of intrusions by the federal government, just as the 
government started to shift towards conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, 
black people seized control of the local political machinery at the very moment that the local 
machinery was becoming less important.10 Thus, depending on your perspective, one could 
conclude either that the black movements in the 1960s “went too far” or, alternatively, that they 
“didn’t go far enough.” This study makes far more sense in the latter framework than the former.  
 
The Students: Where Did They Go? 
 Many Tuskegee Institute activists tried to “go” farther after their student years. Wendell 
Paris contributed to the struggle to wrest control from segregationists of the farmers’ aid 
organization, the Agricultural Stabilization Conservation Service, and to use its resources to help 
Black Belt farmers. His brother George traveled to Zimbabwe to work with farmers as part of the 
nationalist movement there. George Paris still lives a short distance from the university and has a 
small farm that some students help him to tend. Ernest Stephens lived for a time in New York 
City with George Ware. When their childhood friend, Kathleen Neal came to stay with them, 
they spent countless evenings in intense political discussions and escorted her to her first 
demonstration. Ware – who had also traveled to Cuba with Stokely Carmichael – and Stephens 
were the first to introduce Kathleen Neal (later, Cleaver) to radical ideas and politics. Chester 
Higgins, Jr. took what P.H. Polk taught him about making photographs, and turned that into an 
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award-winning and globe-spanning career documenting the beauty, strength, and humanity of 
Afro-Americans and people of the global African diaspora. When he left Tuskegee, Michael 
Wright traveled throughout the state of Alabama organizing steel workers. Later he sought to 
combine the Marxism he learned in SNCC with liberation theology. In 2000, Lucenia Dunn was 
elected the first female mayor of Tuskegee. She still lives there and is working on developing the 
local food economy, hoping to make it beneficial to both residents and farmers. Arthur Pfister 
became a well-known figure in the black radical poetry scene. His 1972 book, Beer Cans, 
Bullets, Things & Pieces includes a forward by Amiri Baraka. Pfister is known today as 
“Professor Arturo” – he has taught on many college campuses and is particularly celebrated in 
his hometown, New Orleans, for his contribution to artistic responses to the political crisis that 
followed Hurricane Katrina.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Of all of the 1960s Tuskegee students, Gwen Patton’s post-graduation activist career is 
probably the most extensive. Apart from Sammy Younge, Jr., she is the most well-known 
Tuskegee student activist and certainly is the most widely cited. In part, this is because she, more 
than any of her classmates, continued to work closely with organizations of the broader 
American left. She worked with SNCC, with the Socialist Alliance, collaborated with both the 
Black Panther Party and with the Detroit Revolutionary Union Movement. She was a co-founder 
of both the National Black Antiwar Antidraft Union and the Black Women’s Liberation 
Committee, pursuing them as vehicles for her internationalist and anti-imperialist politics, 
historian Ashley Farmer notes.12 Her trajectory appears to be similar to that of other radicals as 
the movement ebbed. She was one of nine national delegates in Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow 
Coalition, a historic attempt to capture the Democratic Party with an insurgent electoral 
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Figure 9. Gwen Patton in her home office, July 2015. Photo by author. 
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campaign.13 She earned a doctorate and was a professor for a while before settling back in 
Montgomery. Patton is widely interviewed in Civil Rights and Black Feminist literature, but has 
never herself been the subject of a scholarly study.  
	  
From Black Power to Black Studies 
 In a new afterword for the 1992 edition of Black Power, co-author Charles Hamilton (by 
that time a professor at Columbia University), revised his ideas on Black Power somewhat. What 
he could see now, he wrote, was the rise of a conservative interpretation of Black Power as Black 
Capitalism. That strain of Black Nationalist thought, Hamilton noted, ran through Booker T. 
Washington, Marcus Garvey, and the Nation of Islam. “People could ‘close ranks’ and still have 
vastly different views about how to proceed politically,” Hamilton wrote.14 Racial identity was 
“necessary” he concluded, but not “sufficient” for building a truly liberatory movement. There 
would have to be a political reckoning and a challenge to Black Capitalism. “The earlier edition 
of this book was not sufficiently attentive to this predictable dichotomy.”15 
These issues of identity and geography remain unresolved. Despite Fanon’s cautions, 
many Afro-American radicals embraced a less nuanced identification of their struggle with the 
global struggle of people in the Third World against colonialism. For a very long time, some 
black people in North America harbored dreams that there could be a territorial or geographic 
solution to the problem of anti-black racism. In the 1960s, it was widely believed that territorial 
sovereignty in the Black Belt and racial autonomy in higher education could mean genuine 
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liberation in both. But nominal “independence” of an impoverished nation-state was actually not 
the dream that all African revolutionaries dreamed – some saw it as a new kind of trap.16 Not 
unlike the first wave of black politicians to capture political offices in the 1960s, African 
activists who led newly “independent” nation-states in the same years faced similar dilemmas. 
And even on a much smaller scale still, decolonizing the campus would likewise prove to be a 
process full of pitfalls. 
Attempts to institutionalize Afro-American Studies in the United States did not begin in 
the 1960s; Du Bois, Hubert Harrison, Carter G. Woodson, Arturo Schomburg – and at Tuskegee 
Institute, Monroe Work – are among the most successful progenitors of this effort.17 By the time 
Tuskegee students got around to demanding a “Black University” in 1967 some of what they 
wanted was unofficially in place – the time, space, and other resources provided by relatively 
accessible and generous higher education systems were crucial to nurturing that generation of 
young black activists; nearly every organization of black radicals in the 1960s and 1970s has its 
origins on a college campus.18 Using the campus as a launch pad was one thing; overturning 
racist curricula and institutionalizing Black Studies was another.   
In a twenty-three-page assessment of the Black Studies struggle, published by Tuskegee 
Institute in 1970, African Studies instructor James Preston argued that the effort rose and fell 
with the student movement that brought it into being. Curiously, he alternates in the text between 
calling it a “Black Studies” program and an “African Studies” one. After the student “revolution” 
was squashed, the African Studies idea continued to circulate on campus, he writes, and was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Frederick Cooper, Africa in the World (Harvard University Press, 2014). 
17 Joseph, The Black Power Movement, 252; James Preston, “Tuskegee: A Study of the Emergence of a Black 
Studies Program” (Tuskegee Institute, July 30, 1970), Tuskegee Institute Archives, 3; Wayne Au, Anthony L. 
Brown, and Dolores Calderón, Reclaiming the Multicultural Roots of US Curriculum: Communities of Color and 
Official Knowledge in Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 2016), chapter 5.  
18 Joseph, The Black Power Movement, 273; Murch, Living for the City.  
 
288 
formally proposed and well-received by students, faculty and administrators just one month after 
the showdown at Dorothy Hall. In the fall of 1969 the program was officially announced and a 
leader was named, but the effort suffered from the start. The faculty who were qualified to teach 
the courses were already over-stretched and couldn’t dedicate time to it. The effort to recruit 
faculty was strained by a bitter debate over whether white faculty members with appropriate 
credentials should be allowed to teach some of the courses. Preston believed this was a 
“psychological hangup” on the part of students, which endangered the program. Such students 
“would rather win the battle and lose the war,” he wrote. The program required extra care and 
attention from administrators to make it successful, but none was forthcoming. “In the beginning 
of the struggle,” Preston concluded, “all the pressure had emanated from students; and without 
their constant prodding, the program had little chance of survival.” Fearing the degree would 
have no relevance after graduation, few signed up. By the spring of 1970, the program had only 
one student majoring in it.19 
 The impact of the Tuskegee student movement, however, has to be measured beyond the 
rise and fall of a single program in a single institution. As the vision of an insurgent movement, 
Black Studies was about transforming the entire school institution on the way to changing the 
whole society. As the Black Power movement ebbed in the 1970s and 1980s, however, higher 
education proved resilient to change, able to thwart Black Studies or to incorporate it into the 
framework of other academic disciplines.20 Since the society, too, was resilient, Black Studies as 
insurrection became untenable and unsustainable.  
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 So what was the point, then? Knowing the outcome, it would be simple to read history 
backwards and therefore wonder what, if anything, had been accomplished. My purpose, in this 
study, is not to concede defeat in advance, but to recognize that in 1968, because of the high 
level of social contestation, many different futures became possible, not exclusively the one we 
ended up with. To the extent that Tuskegee students contributed to pushing the boundaries of our 
educational and political imaginations – even if they ultimately failed to achieve all of their 
larger aims – they remind us that we cannot reduce the ideals of “black education” to the plans 
and ideals of famous educational leaders, past or present. As they have historically, and as they 
are at the moment of this writing, it is likely that educational systems will continue to be 
challenged and changed by black students as they awaken to their collective powers. 
 
Black Education, Past and Future 
 The educational and political struggles of black people in the United States are far from 
over. In the long view of history, Afro-Americans have made astounding educational strides. 
Black students graduate high school at nearly the rate of white students, and attend and graduate 
from college in higher proportions than ever before. These achievements are even more 
remarkable in light of the fact that steep barriers persist: black students are more likely to be 
suspended from school, more likely to attend segregated and underfunded schools, and are more 
likely to carry heavy debt burdens to fund their education. At a time when students are told that 
education is their “ticket” to changing their lives as individuals, the education system is 
staggering under the weight of austerity. These conditions make schools, at all levels, sites of 
extreme pressure and contradiction, places that are likely to continue to be social battlegrounds 
for the foreseeable future. 
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As economic inequality reaches new extremes in this country, a profound financial gap 
has opened up between the situation facing different classes of black people. There are still ways 
in which all black people, regardless of social class, are often lumped together in terms of social 
policy – encounters with the police in public places, for example. The growing prominence, 
wealth, and power of black elites has not attenuated racism. The rise of “black faces in high 
places” has been entirely compatible with both heightened inequality and with the growth of 
white supremacist organizations. Solutions that became part of the common sense among 
radicals in the 1960s – that college-educated, middle class leaders could liberate people of the 
global Third World by forging a new, assertive national sovereignty – are not likely to reappear 
in exactly the same form as a popular roadmap for social change.  
The radicalism of the Tuskegee student movement is not to be found in terms of its 
demands, which, even at its height, amounted mostly to modest reforms. Many of the militants – 
the engineering students, especially – explicitly insisted that they were not “ideological.” The 
Tuskegee student movement was radical because it elevated students to the position of making 
demands. The rhetorical questions posed by the president of Fisk University – just before the 
Fisk student movement drove him from office – still resonate one hundred years later: Shall the 
factory be turned over to the workers and be run by the workingmen’s council? Shall the 
colleges be turned over to the students and be run by undergraduate committees? The Tuskegee 
student movement – fighting for democracy in the Black Belt and on campus – answered these 
questions in the affirmative. 
 The Tuskegee Revolt is part of a long pattern of black radical action in the center of 
empire, expressing the tensions of both sides of the hyphenated “Afro” and “American.” The 
contradictions of Tuskegee Institute’s history are bound up with the contradictions of black 
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history: the aspiration to reform the nation, and the imperative of forging the means of surviving 
it; the irrepressible need to fight for change, and the bitter necessity of reckoning with defeats. 
The Tuskegee student movement is a small part of the long Black Freedom Struggle, the battles 
of which have frequently taken place in (and for) schools. That experience of collective action, 
too, becomes a kind of school. In that school, students frequently become teachers and teachers 
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